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IN THE 
Supreme Court of AppealS. of Virginia 
AT RIGHl\fOND. 
'l'lfE CHESAPEIAI{E AND OHIO RAILvVAY C01IPA.NY 
vs. 
1\L L. BARLO·W. 
PETITION FOR \VR.IT OF E~ROR AND SUPERSEDEAS 
To the Honorable J-udges of the Supren~e Oottrt of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
The petition o~ The .Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Com-
pany, a corporation, respectfully represents that it is ag-
grieved by a final judgment of the ,Circuit Court of Hanover 
County, entered on J nne.- 29th, 1929, in favor of 1\{. L. Barlow 
and against your petitioner for $7,500.00, with interest there-
on from November 28th, 1928, the amount of damages by a 
jury in their verdict' ascertained in an action at law wherein 
the said 1\L L. Barlow ·was plaintiff and your petitioner was 
defendant. For convenience the parties will be hereinafter 
referred to as plaintiff and defendant, in accordance with 
their respective positions in the trial court. 
STATE:NIENT OF TilE CASE. 
This is an action for damages for personal injuries and 
damage to an automobile growing out of a grade crossing col-
lision in IIa.nover County, Virginia, between the automobile, 
which was being driven by the plaintiff, and a freight train 
operated by the defendant company. The accident occurred 
at about nine o'clock on the night of 1\iarch 20th, 1928, at a 
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public road crossing located approximately 300 feet west of 
Hanover Depot. 
A blueprint, dra"\vn to scale (JVL R·ec., p. 96, Exhibit Brown 
#6), as well as three photogTaps (:~I. Rec., p. 92, Exhibits 
Barlo\V Nos. 1, 2 and 3), introduced in evidence, show the 
physical surroundings of the scene of the accident. At this 
point the defendant had three tracks running in a general 
easterly and westerly direction, including a main line track, 
with a side or passing track on each side of it. A short dis-
tance east of the crossing involved, and south of the defend~ 
ant's right of way, is a store, known as Campbell's store. · 
For convenience this crossing will be hereinafter referred to 
as the store crossing. 
On the night of the accident, the plaintiff, driving a Chev-
rolet couch, had gone to Campbell's store by \Vay of this cross-
ing. Coming out of the store about an hour later, with t)}e 
intention of going home, he started his automobile and began 
to retrace his course over the store crossing. After getting 
partly on the defendant's main line track the plaintiff's au-
tomobile was struck by the train which was proceeding in a 
westerly direc~tion. The plaintiff was thro\vn out of the au-
tomobile and the automobile was knocked away from the track. 
As a result of the accident the plaintiff reeeived a broken 
right wrist and a dislocated right collarbone, as well as cer-
tain minor cuts and bruises (l\L Rec., pp. 12, 13, 22 and 23). 
rrhe automobile was praeticaUy demolished C:M. Rec., p. 24). 
Certain undisputed physical facts are shown hy the blue-
print and photographs, as well as by uncontradicted testi-
nlony of witnesses: 
lt..,rom the southerly rig·ht of 'vay line to the cm1ter of the 
main line track at the store crossing there is a distance of 
40 feet. Campbell's store, including the side porch facing 
the railway, is situated entirely outside of .this right of w·ay 
line. (:1\I. R.e~., pp. 96, 97, 99). 
The west end of the depot platform is 165 feet east of the 
eenter line of the store crossing·, and a private road crossing 
east of the depot building and next to the ''Tie Yard'', shown 
on the blueprint. is 450 feet east of the store crossing. (M. 
Uec., pp. 97, 99.) 
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From a point 30 feet south of the store crossing there is an 
11nobstructed view along the track in au easterly direction 
for at least as far as ~the private road crossing, in spite of the 
fact that the track "rithin this space is on a curve. 
The train, \Vl1ich consisted of a locomotive and between 25 
and 30 freight cars, was running at a speed o.f approximately 
fifteen miles an hour, having reduced its speed in passing 
Ilatwver Depot for ~the purpose of stopping just beyond the 
store crossing and picking up a car on ·a siding (~L R.ec., pp. 
105, 110, 134). The locomotive was equipped with a strong 
headlight, lor.ated _upon its pilot and admittedly shining as 
the train approached the crossing_ OvL Rec., pp. 30, 51, 52, 
108). 
The only ground of negligence relied upon by the plaintiff, 
and submitted to the jury by the instntctions, \vas a failure 
on the part of the defendant's enginemen, in approaching 
the store crossing, to give the crossing signals prescribed by 
Section 3958 of the Virginia ·Code. 
In addition to the plaintiff himself, a number of witnesses, 
located a~t different places, testified that they did not hear 
the train give any crossing signals, either by whistle or by 
hell (~I. R.ec., pp. 19, 4-3, 57, 62, 64, 73, 7'7 and 85 ). Some of 
these witnesses were positive as to the fact that the engine 
·hell was not rung. 
It is conceded that this testimony, although in direct con-
flict with the statements of the engineer, fireman and head 
brakeman, to tho effect that the sig·nals were given by both 
whistle and bell in compliance w1th the statute (1L Roo., pp. 
101, 104, 119, 120, 132-133), was sufficient to support a find-
ing by the jury that the statutory signals were not given. 
There being evidence in the case from which it is subniitted 
the jury was hound to find the plaintiff neg·lig-ent. in approach-
ing and going upon the c.rossing, counsel for the plaintiff very 
naturally sought to apply the provisions of Section 3959 of 
the Code. This section of course relieves a traveler at a 
railroad crossing, to some extent at least., of the serious legal 
consequences of a failure ''to exorcise due care· in approach-
ing such crossing". 
So far as concerns his o·wn movements and conduct imme-
diately before the ac.eident, the plaintiff relies solely upon 
the testimony which he himself gave upon the witness stand. 
For this rea_son, and for ~the further reason that this testi-
nlony is believed to be determinative of the result of the case, 
it will be noted at some length. 
---------- ·----- -------------
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The plaintiff stated that his car was parked about 15 feet 
in front of and facing 1he store, that after ·starting ·its motor 
he ''Backed around down the hill and pulled up to the rail-
road a certain distance, I don't know, 10 feet I reckon-5 or 
10 feet". (M. R-ec., p. 16.) 
After heading toward the store crossing, he described his 
movements in the following manner (:M:. Rec., pp. 17, 18, 
19): 
''A. I started across ; I looked; I don't know how many 
feet, but just before I got to the side-track I looked good both 
ways, didn't hear any train, didn't hear a sound. I was still 
in second gear. I pulled up the -grade and looked all the 
time like anybody else would be doing·. I was looking. I g·ot 
about that far across (indicating). There was a big light 
at Campbell's store and dark as a dungeon down the rail-
road. Just as I got about two feet with the front wheels 
across the main line the light swung around in my face. Then 
no bell was ringing and I· hadn't heard a sound. I knew I 
was hit. The last thing I remember I said to myself, 'If the 
bell had been ringing I would not have been hit'. · 
Q. You don't kno'v ho·w far the train was from you when 
the light struck you t 
A. No, but it was not very far. There is a. curve around 
there. It 'vas thro"ring the light the other way all the ·time. 
As soon as it straightened up it 'vas right at me. When it 
thre'v the light on me I knew tthe .train 'vas right at me. 
Q. It was throwing the light towards Jacobs' storeY 
-A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The light did not hit you until just before it struck you 1 
.A: It looked like it was -about 10 or 5 yards. 
Q .. Was there anything at Campbell's store ·which would 
interfere with your seeing clearly the light coming up the 
track-any light at Campbell's store¥ 
A. Nothing but the lights he had. 
Q. How many lights did he l1ave on his store~ 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Has he a light on his side porch~ 
.A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. .And a. light in front f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is it right light around his store 1 Do those lights give 
a pretty good light~ . 
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On cross examination the plaintiff testified that th~ weather 
was "pretty cold", that it was a "pretty dark night" and that 
the windows to his car were"just about half way" closed· (1\L 
Rec., p. 28). He further testified as follows (1\L Rec., pp. 
~8-34): 
'' Q. When you g·ot to, say, the distance of about thirty 
feet from the track on your way- across, about how fast were 
yon going. I mean the track on which this train was run-
ning? 
A. Well, I was ntnning very slow; I was in low gear. 
Q. About two or three miles an hour 1 
A. I suppose so. 
Q. You were in lo'v gear 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About two or three miles an hour? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you increase speed any between that time and the 
time you were on the track~ 
A. I did after looking both ways, I increased speed. 
Q. How fast were you going then? About five miles 1 
.l\. Something like that I reckon. 
Q. Going up grade, two or three miles an hour, 1\ir. Bar-
low, under those circumstances, in what distance could you 
have stopped the car~ 
A. I could have stopped it in two feet at the speed I was 
in. 
Q. And when did you get to a speed of, say, five miles an 
hour? By the time you hit the first track or before you hit 
the first track? 
A. About the time I hit the first sidetrack. 
Q. In what distance could you stop that car at that rate 
of speed f 
A. I could stop it in two feet, going up grade like that .. 
Q .. S'o practically in that distance you could have stopped 
the car within two feet, if necessary1 
A. Yes, sir, with good brakes. (J. Did you have good brakes on the car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, 1\tir. Barlo,v, the first track that you passed, which 
I believe is known as the passing track, you didn't see any 
train or any cars on that track, did you? 
A. I dou.'t remember seejng any. 
Q. You sa,v. the headlight on the engine 1 
li .. I don't remember. The light blinded me. I saw it 
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coming right around in my face. It was like somebody thrt>w-
ing· a ftashlig·ht in your face. 
Q. It was a very strong light, was it¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 1\fr. Barlow, when yon were, say, thirty feet from the 
crossing, was there anything to prevent you from looking·· 
down that track towards the direction from which the train 
was coming, anything that would have kept you from seeing 
as far as the east end of the station f vVas there any ob-
struction to your view in there~ 
A. No, I don't think so. 
Q .. Nothing that would block your vision from the time 
yon .. were, say, thirty feet from the track¥ 
A. Thirty feet1 Yes, sir, it would be. At thirty feet you 
couldn't see around the curve a.t all. 
Q. Here is a picture which purports to be taken 33 feet 
south of the main line track, in the road leading over the 
crossing·. 
·.:\rr. Haw: ·You mean the straig·ht road, not the road he 
was on'l 
}[r. Spicer: The road that goes directly over the crossing. 
Tn o1·her words, 3~ feet from the track. 
Q. (Continued.) Can yon tell from that. picture just ex-
nctly wlH~re you turned~ This picture was taken 38 feet from 
the track~ rigl1t opposite the crossing. Did you come right 
hy there, right by that point in eop1ing from the store? (In-
dicating.) 
Note: Pieture exhibited to witness was filed and marked 
''Ex. Barlow #1''. 
~\.. Of course from the picture here, I was here ( indicat-
ing·). I backed around here and headed straight to the cross-
ing and pulled up a certain distance to the railroad. 
Q. If this picture was taken 33 feet from the track (that 
is, the main track), 'vas there anytl1ing to prevent you from 
lurdng a clear view do,vn towards the east when you were 
:~;.~ fe~t from the track? · · 
A. N 0t as I see, not the way the picture shows. 
l\{r. Hpicer: I don't mean to say you passed through this 
identical spot, but at some time or other you passed at a point 
:i3 feet from the track. 
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Witness: It 'vas so dark down that track, either this light 
from Jacobs' store or this light from the train was over there, 
I don't kno'v which it was. It was dark down there. you 
couldn't see anything. 
Q.. There wasn't any obstruction though after you looked 
ueyond the porcll' 
.A. It was a dark night; you couldn't see; I didn't see any-
thing. 
Q. There is nothing to keep you from seeing east as far 
as any buildings or trees or any other obstruction is con-
cerned ; is that true? 
A. "'11at you are saying I haven't said before. I don't 
know about that. You are saying that; I am not. 
Q. :Here is another picture which .shows a locomotive do,vn 
in front of the station, the picture being taken from a point 
321;2 feet south of the track. Would there be anything be-
tween you, if you were in that same position, and that loco-
motive that would keep you from seeing· the locomotive~ Is 
there anything in there between you and the locomotive to 
keep you from seeing it f 
A .. No, sir. 
Q. So that the natural darkness which you speak of would 
he the only thing between you and the locomotive, is that 
true~ 
A. I don't sec anything on there. 
Q. You don't see anything~ 
A. No, sir. 
Note: Picture exhibited to witness was filed and marked 
"l!ix. Barlo·w #2'.,. 
Q. Yon spoke of looking in both directions. Where were 
you when you last looked towards the east as respects the 
track on which this train was· coming~ 
A. I don't know exactly. I probably might have been on 
the sidetrack. 
Q. You don't know exactly~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you been across this crossing before? 
1\.. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you come across there on your way to the store? 
A. 1res, sir. · 
Lowry, the defendant's fireman, who was seated in the cab 
---------
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of the engine, on the side from which the plaintiff approached 
the track, was the only other person testifying as to the plain-
tiff's movements immediately before the accident. He stated 
,. that hy reason of the headlight, he saw the automobile 'vhen 
the engine was in front of the depot; that it appeared "as if 
it was running very slow''; that when the front of. the en-
gine reached the west end of the depot platform, the auto-
mobile, which was about. 40 feet from the main line track, 
increased its· speed and came up on the crossing (!I. R-ec., pp. 
120-123, 130). He further stated that the automobile stopped 
on the main track, then rolled back about three feet, and was 
struck by the eng·ine "just about the front door" (l\L Rec., 
pp. 121, 123). 
'rhe engineer, being on the opposite side of the engine, could 
not see the pLaintiff approaching the crossing. When apprized 
of his presence by a shout from the fireman, he applied _the 
emergency bra.ke.s, but it was impossible to stop in time to 
avoid the collision (1\L Rec., pp. 105, 106). 
Although, as noted, the plaintiff stated that in coming out 
of the store he was by himself, there were several witnesses 
who said they came out just ahead of him or at about the. 
same time. 
Cflmpbell Shelton, just before the collision occurred, was 
in his car, somewhat in front of the store, but further from 
the crossing than the plaintiff. lie heard the eng·ine 'vhistle 
blow once, sometime before the accident, saw the engine head-
light shining "along about the cattle pen", east of the station, 
and knew a train 'vas coming·. He admitted that the head-
light was a "pretty strong light". (l\L Rec., pp. 50-54.) 
Quite a number of persons in various places appeared to 
hear the noise of the train itself a.s it approac.hed the depot 
and the store crossing. 
John :Harding·, who was about a quarter of a mile north of 
the depot, heard the train all the way from Cady's to Hanover 
(~I. Rec., pp. 62~63). · 
:AHss Josephine Winston, in company \vith two other per-
sons, in a house located from a quarter to a half a mile south 
of Campbell's store heard it (M. R.ec., pp .. 73-74). . 
Howard W. Taylor, who was in his home, about 300 yards 
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from the depot in a southerly direction, heard the train for 
at least a mile and a. half before it reached Hanover station 
(M. R·ec., pp. 82, 84-85, 87) . 
. ].;Irs. E. I{. Taylor, who was in her residence, about 150 feet 
north of the store crossing, heard the train approaching the 
crossing (J\II. Rcc., pp. 76-77). 
PLEADINGS. AND TRIAL PROOEEDTNGS. 
The plaintiff's Notice of 1\!Iotion, which claimed damages 
in the sum of $20,000.00, charged that the defendant's train 
approached and went over the crossing without blowing its 
whistle, ringing its bell, ·or giving any warning signal what-
ever, and without keeping any lookout for persons going over 
the crossing. As already stated, the case was submitted to 
the jury upon the specific charge that the defendant's engine 
had failed to give the signals prescribed by Seetion 3958 of 
the Virginia Code. The jury was also told that if the ap-
proach to the crossing was believed to be ''extraordinarily 
dangerous'' the defendant o'ved the duty of exercising ''ex-
traordinary care to prevent injury to persons about to cross 
over on said crossing·''. No recovery was sought under any 
theory of last clear chance. Damages were soug·ht for per-
sonal injuries to the plaintiff, some of which 'vere alleged 
to he permanent in c.harac.ter, as well as for the destruction 
or the automobile. 
The defendant pleaded the general issue and also filed a 
notice of its intention to rely upon the contributory negligence 
of the plaintiff, with particulars thereof. At the trial the de-
fendant maintained that tl1e plaintiff's negligence was the 
sole proximate cause of the accident. 
During tlw ceurse of the trial, the defendant. objected to a· 
certain question propounded to the plaintiff by plaintiff's at-
torney, as well as to the answer thereto. These objections be-
ing overruled, the defendant e~ceptecl to the rulings of the 
court for reasons then stated (~efendant 's Bill of Exceptions 
No. 3, ~L Rec., pp. 151, 152). · 
At the conclusion of the evidence the plaitniff asked for 
tl1ree instructions. The defendant objected to the giving of 
any instructions authorizing a reeovcry by the plaintiff, upon 
grounds then stated, and flirther made specific objections to 
two of the. instructions asked for by the plaintiff, hut the 
Court overruled all of these objections, to which rulings the 
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defendant excepted (Defendant's Bill of Exceptions No. 2, 
1I. Rec., pp. 145-147). 
Subject to the objections noted, the defendant asked for six 
instructions, all of which were given by the Court (Defend-
ant's Bill of Exceptions No.2, l\L Rec., pp. 147-149) . 
• 
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff which is set 
out.in the orders of the Court (lVI. R.ec., p. 6). A motion was 
made by the defendant to set aside the verdict. of the jury 
upon grounds then ·stated, but the Court overruled this mo-
tion and entered up judgment in accordance with the ver-
dict, to which ruling the defendant exc€pted (Defendant's 
Bill of Exceptions No. 1, l\[ Rec., p. 144). 
ASSIGNl\iENT OF ERRORS. 
It is respectfully submitted that in the record, proceedings 
and final judgment of the Circuit Court of Hanover O'ounty, 
there were and are manifest errors, said errors being more 
particularly se-t forth as follows: 
1. The Court erred in allowing plaintiff's counsel to pro-
pound a certain question to the plaintiff and in allowing ~b~ 
answer thereto to be received in evfdence (Defendant's Bill 
o[ Exceptions No. 3, l\L R.ec., pp.· 151-152). 
2. The .Court. erred in overruling the motion of the defend-
ant that no instructions be given which authorizecl a. recovery 
by the plainttff (Defendant's Bill of Exceptions No. 2, M. 
l~ce., p. 147). 
H. The Court erred in giving Instructions 1 and 2, or eit.h'.}l. 
of said instructions (Defendant's Bill of Exceptions No. 2, 
1\L R·ec., p. 147). · 
4. The Conrt erred in ove1:ruling the motion of the defend-
ant to set aside the verdict of the jury and in refusing· to enter 
np judgment for the defendant, or to award it a new trial 
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ARGUMENT. 
I. The evidence shows conclusively and as a matter of law, 
that i'rrespective of any finding of negl·igence on the part of 
the defendant, such negligence had no ca,usal reltaion to the 
acc·ident, b~~.t that the plaintiff's act of driving his a;utotno-
bile im1nediately in front of 'the train was the sole proximate 
ca~use of the accident. 
In support of this statement it is further submitted: 
A. Plaintiff's own testimony ·affirmatively shows that he 
actually saw the engine headlight and the rays of light cast 
ahead of the train by the headlight in, ample time to have 
avoided the accident. · 
B. Even thoug·h plaintiff's testimony could be construed to 
mean that he claims not to have seen either the headlight or 
its rays of light, an~ not to ha:ve heard the noise of the train, 
in time to have avoided the accident, such testimony would 
be in its nature incredible and contrary to undisputed physical 
facts. 
II. In any view of the evidence the plaintiff has failed to 
sustain the burde·n of proof. 
III. Court erred in not 'requiring jttry to reduce dan~ages 
because of plaintiff's negligence. 
IV. Damages awarded by . the jury were excessive in any 
event. 
V. Cou.rt erred in adntitting ce1·tain, testimony of the plain-
tiff. 
VI. Court Erred in G·ranting I n.struction 1. 
I. 
A. 
Plaintiff's own test-irnony a.ffinn·atively shows that he ac-
t?ta.Uy saw the Mzgine headlight and the rays of light cast 
ahea.d of the tTain by the headlight in antple time to have 
avoided the accident. 
It is to be noted that the plaintiff said that in approaching 
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the crossing his automobile was at first in low gear, running 
"very slow" or at a speed of about two or three miles an 
hour. Without increasing speed he changed to second gear. 
Thereafter, about the time the automobile reached the side 
track nearest him, he increased speed to about five miles an 
hour. In traversing this distance the plaintiff frankly ad-
mits that at any given point he could have stopped within a 
space of two feet. 
If there is any one point emphasized by the plaintiff in his 
account of the accident, it is that ·while thus approaching and 
going upon the crossing·, he -constantly maintained an effective 
lookout for trains in the direction from w·hich came the train 
that subsequently struck his automobile. 
He specifically states that ''just before I got to the side-
track I looked good both ways'', that he ''looked all time like 
anybody else would be doing", and that he saw "a big light 
at Campbell's store" (~I. Rec., p. 17). Obviously he was re-
ferring to the engine headlig·ht. This conclusion is a.pparent 
from the photograph (Exhibit B·arlow #2, ~I. Rec., pp. 33, 
92), taken 32¥2 feet from the south rail of the main line track 
looking east, which shows a locomotive in front of the de-
pot. 
The plaintiff further states as a fact within his knowledge, 
that while he was in this manner approaching the track the 
headlight '' wus throwing the light the other way all the 
time", that it was throwing it "towards Jacobs' store". (M. 
Rec., p. 18.) He also admits ·that he "sa\v it coming rig·ht 
around in my face", that "it was like somebody throwing a 
flashlight in your face". {IVL R.ec., p. 30). 
This testimony shows on its face that the plaintiff saw both 
the headlight itself, as 'veil as the rays of light cast ahead of 
the train by tne headlight, in ample time to have avoided the 
accident. Certainly no amount or cha.vacter of wan1ing sig-
nals could have told him more than he already knew, namely 
that a train was approaching and that it was perilous to pro-
ceed across the tracks. With this information at hand it was 
therefore plainly incumbent upon him to govern his own 
movements accordingly. 
As was said in Johnson's Adm/-r. v. C. & 0. R. Co., 91 Va. 
171: 
"If his faculties warned him of the near approach of a 
train, it was his duty to keep off the track." 
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That the sol~ purpose of a locomotive bell or whistle signal 
at a crossing is to warn of the approach of the locomotive or 
train is too apparent for argument. 
The case of fVright v. Atl. Coast Line, 110 Va. 670, was an 
action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, who 
was struck by a train, 'vhile standing upon the track at a 
flag station and signaling to ·the engineer to stop the train. 
There was a public road crossing a short distance from the 
station and th~ plaintiff's mother was walking along the high-
way toward the crossing as the train approached. 
It was alleged that the defendant's servants negligently 
failed to sound the statutory crossing whistle signal, thereby 
pl·acing the plaintiffs' mother in a position of imminent peril, 
and that the plaintiff, in deliberately exposing herself to dan. 
ger, was exonerated from a charge of contributory negligence, 
uy reason of her attempted rescue of her mother. · 
In sustaining a. demurrer to the declaration, on the ground 
that at the time of the attempted rescue the plaintiff's mother 
had not been put in a position of peril, by the failure to sound 
the crossing whistle signal, the Court said at pages 674-675: 
''The purpose of sounding the whistle is to give warning 
of an approaching train to those who are ignorant of its ap-
proach. The allegations of the declaration quite plainly show 
that the plaintiff's mother knew the train was approaching·. 
The plaintiff alleges that her mother did not bear her shout 
because of the noise. The noise referred to must have been 
the noise of the train-no other noise is. suggested by the 
facts alleged. The plaintiff was standing· in front of her 
mother signaling the train to stop, and the mother was walk-
ing toward her. The mother was near enough to the ap-
proaching train to step from the public road immediately in 
front of the engine, jqst in time, as alleged, to be struck ahd 
killed. ~ * * It cannot be doubted from these allegations that 
the mother both saw and heard the train, and therefore had 
all the knowledge she would have had if the whistle had been 
sounded; and yet, with this warning she stepped upon the 
track just in time to be killed. Southern Ry. Co. v. Daves, 108 
Va. 378, 61 S. E. 748.'' . 
Section 3959 of the Code, which is so strongly relied upon 
.in the instant case by the plaintiff, was of course inserted in 
the Code by the Revisors of 1919, with a reference to the 
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change effected in the holding of the Court in Atl. db Danville 
R. Co. v. Reiger, 95 Va. 418. . 
In that case it was held that even though the operatives 
of a train failed to give the statutory signals then required, 
yet if they gave another of other 'varnings: 
( 1) \Vhich in f·act notified the traveler of the train's ap-
proach, or 
(2) Which would have. given him notice if he had been ex-
ercising ordinary care, so that he could have avoided injury, 
he was not entitled to recover. 
~Ianifestly no change was made in the application of the 
first of the principles stated. The provision was designed 
to aid only those travelers who are unaware of the approach 
of an· engine or train and are exposed to danger upon a cross-
ing by reason of a. failure 9f the train employes to. give the 
signals prescribed by .Section 3958. Actual notice of the 
train's approach dispenses with the need ·and purpose of any 
further '"'~a.rning. A traveler who actually sees the train it-
self or its headlight, or who is otherwise apprized of its pres-
ence in time to avoid dang·er, is not in position to shut his 
eyes or disregard such notice and then claim the benefits of 
Section 3959. The substantive right of a traveler to recover 
is not enlarged by this sect.ion, though the defenses available 
to the defendant railroad company 'vhich are predicated upon 
the traveler's conduct are circumscribed. The c.ause of ac-
tion is still a neglig·ence action, with its essential elements of 
causal relation and proximate cause. 
Thus, in J!..T orfolk 801~. R. Co. v. Banks; 141 V·a. 715, the Spe-
eial Court of Appeals, in criticising an instruction which au-
.thprized a verdict for the plaintiff, upon proof merely that 
the defendant failed to give the statutory signals and that 
the plaintiff w·as injured in a collision at a. crossing; said at 
pages 720-722 : 
''Another fatal objection to the instruction is that it au-
i horizes the jury to find for the plaintiff even though he may 
haYe gone upon the track in full view of the oncoming- train, 
and at a time when to do so was courting disaster and flirting 
with death." · 
* 
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While Section 3959 of the Code provides for a recovery 
when the defendant has not blown the whistle, and rung the 
bell as therein required, even though the plaintiff is guilty of 
negligence in attempting to cross the track in front of an 
approaching train, this must be rood in the light of the uni-
versal principle of law, that no negligence of the defendant, 
however gross, can sustain a verdict for the plaintiff ·unless 
that particula~· negligence contributed to the inj:ury. 
There must be some causal connection between the failure 
of the defendant to observe the statutory requirements and 
the injury suffered by the plaintiffs.'' 
A.nd in the case of Etheridge v. Norfolk Southern R. C'o., · 
143 Va. 789, in discussing an instruction, which before being 
modified by the trial court, had authorized a recovery for the 
plaintiff upon a finding_ of failure to give the statutory sig-
nals, irrespective of the question of proximate cause, the 
Court further said at pages 798-799: 
''This instruction as offered was approved by this Court 
in C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Gayle, 132 Va. 433-439, 112 S. E. 785, but. 
it is immemorially true that no judgment can be based upon 
a defendant's negligence unless that negligence in some de-
gree contributed to the injury. There must be some causal 
connection between them. Certainly one, who with suicidal in-
tent threw himself in front of an ·approaching train at a cross-
ing, ·could not be l1eard to .say the whistle was not sounded, 
so it does "not follow that the violation of the statute, 'in any 
particular', necessarily gives to a. plaintiff the right to re-
cover. Its purpose was not to impose an unconditional pen-
alty on railroads, hut to protect the pubiie. The trial court 
properly modified tlus instruction by the addition noted.'' 
"\Vhile tlw provisions of Sections 3958 and 3959 have been 
construed in a number of eases, it is sig·nifieant that in no 
instance has a recoverv been allowed where there was evi-
dence showing that the clriver of a vehicle .ac.tually saw a train 
approach and thereafter f.ailed to take precautions which 
would have prevented an accident. 
Freely conceding t.ha.t in the instant case there was proof 
to support a finding by the jury that the statutory crossing 
Rignals were not given by the enginemen in charge of the 
train, it is earnestly submitted that the plaintiff's own evi-
dence, which has been reviewed, clearly shows that this fact, 
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if true, had no causal or proximate relation to the injuries 
complained of by the plaintiff. It affirmatively appears from 
this evidence, that the deliberate, culpable act of the plain-
tiff in driving upon. the defendant's main line track and thus 
exposing· himself to know danger, \vas the sole proximate. 
cause of the accident as .a matter of law. 
In the recent case of Barksdale v. Sou. R. Co.:~ 148 S. E. 683, 
(decided by'this court on June 13, 1929), the plaintiff's de-
cedent w·as shown to have gone to· Sutherlin, a flag station, for 
the purpose of becoming a passenger on a train reaching t4ere 
at 3:15 A. ~I. After remaining in the station waiting room 
for s·ome tinie, the train's approach was announced, and the 
· · decedei1t thereupon started 1across the defendant's tracks to-
wards the boarding platform on the opposite side. Having 
stumbled and fallen in front of the tr~ain, or being knocked 
down by the train, she received injuries from which she 
died 
In affirming a judgment of the trial court, which in an ac· 
tion for the death of the decedent, struck out all the plain-. 
tiff's evidence, this Court said: 
"The plaintiff's notice of motion alleges that defendant 
failed to use ordinary care to keep the approaches from its 
passenger station at Sutherlin to its boarding platform, from 
'vhich its passengers 'vere invited and required to board its 
cars, in a reasonably safe condition. It is conceded that the 
defendant "ras charged with this duty, and there is evidence 
tending to prove that the defendant was guilty of negligence 
in failing to discharge its duty to the plaintiff in that re-
spect. · 
Notwithstanding the negligence of the defendant, the plain-
tiff cannot recover, where his injury is the proximate result 
of .his stepping upon the track in full view and immediately 
in front of a. n1oving train. 
In Wa.shington, etc. R. Co. v. Strurler, 132 Va. 368, 111 S. 
E. 239, West, J., speaking for the court quotes with approval 
from Sims, J., in TVilntou.th's Adnt's. v. So·ltthern R. Co., 125 
V a. 520, 99 S. E. 668, as follo·ws: 'The conduct of the plain-
tiff's intestate in stepping upon the track in front of such 
visible danger, almost immediately upon him, must under·all 
the authorities, be regarded as negligence 1Je·r se, which was 
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the proximate cause of his death'-citing Thompson on Neg. 
1666, 1667' 1672. 
Upon the record in the instant case, was the plaintiff's in-
testate guilty of contributory negligence as a. matter of law 
which will bar her recovery¥ This question must be answered 
in the affirmative. 
It plainly appears, '"ithout contradiction, that Agnes Ter-
rell, in full view of the headlight .of the locomotive and in 
full possession of all her faculties, stepped on the railroad 
track immediately in front of the on-coming train, was struck 
by the engine, and received injuries which resulted in her 
death. She was clearly guilty of contributory negligence a~ 
a matter of law, and cannot recover damages for the injuries 
sustained by her. 
The negligence of the plaintiff's intestate being the proxi-
mate cause of her death, it is immaterial that there are some 
slight conflicts in the details of the evidence, or that the de-
fendant was negligent. 'Certain it is that fair-minded men 
cannot differ upon the question of the negligence of Agnes 
~errell being the proximate cause of her death. In attempt-
ing to cross the track in the manner and under the circum-
stances stated, she was gambling with death and lost. She 
was in a place of safety between the switch track and the 
main line· . .She had only to remain where she was and board 
the train in safety after it had come to a stop, as other passen-
gers. did. ' ' 
The case of Gordon's Adn~'r. v. Director General, 128 Va. 
426, was an action for the death of' a person who had alighted 
from a train at a station ai1d was thereafter struck by an-
other train running in an opposite direction. There was a 
conflict in evidence as to the movements and conduct of the de-
cedent immediately before the acci"dent. This Court, com-
menting upon this evidence, said in part: 
"Even if there be some antecedent negligence by those op-
erating a r-ailway train, still if one who is in the full posses-
sion of his faeulties steps upol). a railroad track in full view 
of and immediately in front of a rapidly approaching train, 
and thus meets death, his administrator cannot recover, be-
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cause the decedent's own negligence is the proximate ·cause 
thereof.'' 
In 3 Elliott on R.ailrouds (3d Ed.), Sec. 1664, in a discus-
sion of injuries received by travelers in grade crossing ac-
cidents, it is said: · · 
''The failure of the employes of the company to give warn-
ing throug·h the appropriate signals is not the proximate 
cause of the injury where the plaintiff sees the train and 
assumes the risk of crossing in front of it, so that in such a 
case there ·are really two grounds of defense, contributory 
negligence and the failure to show tha.t the negligence of the 
defendant was the 1Jroxitnate ca,use of the inj'l"ry.'' (Italics 
ours.) 
In Vartanian's The Law of Automobiles in Virginia and 
'\Vest Virginia, Section 143, after referring to the Virginia 
cases holding that even though the statutory crossing sig-
nals be not g·iven, yet if another warning be given which ''did 
in fact notify" the traveler upon the crossing, of the ap-
proach of the train, there is no liability, it is said at page 
342: 
"This conclusion may perhaps be supported even under the 
present statute today (Sec. 3959), in view of the general hold-
ing that the failure in giving the required signals must be the 
pr·oximate cause of the injury, and it may not successfully 
be contended that_ the fact of going on the crossing with ac-
tu.al knowledge of the approach of the train is the remote 
cause and giving the substituted signals, or even total failure 
to give any signals, is the proximate cause of the injury. It 
should be remembered that the ·object of requiring the giving 
of signals is to give not.ice of the approach of the train, and 
where there is actual knowledge, a literal enforcement of the 
manner and mode of the statutory signals serves no rational 
purpose. Going on the track with aatttal knowled,qe of the 
ap]Jroaching train is 'more than 1nere negligence. T t is a wil-
ful act 'lvhich ass·wmes its inj-u-ries consequ,ences.'' (Itajlic.s 
mostly ours.) 
In Bassett, &c., v. TVood, 146 ·va. 654, it was said at pages 
661-.662: 
"It is settled law in Vrg·inia. that the violation of an or-
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dinance or statute does not make the violator guilty .of neg-
ligence for which damages may he recovered, unless the· act 
'vas the proximate cause of the injury. The doctrine in that 
respect being that the law regards the immediate or proxi-
mate cause "'hieh directly produces the injury, and not the 
remote cause which may have antecedently contributed to it. 
In order for the negligence of the party violating the ordin-
ance to be contributory or concurring it must have some im-
mediate causal connection, or be the pr·oximate cause of the 
injury. If, while one is negligent-perhaps the expression 
should be, in a state of negligence-another negligently em-
ploys an independent force, which, availing itself of the oc-
casion afforded by the former's neg·ligence, works a harm not 
its natural and probable consequence, but an- independent 
harm, the first negligence is not contributory to the second. 
Sou-thern R. Co. v. Ba·iley, 110 Va. 843-845; 67 S. E. 365; 
Miller Mf.q. Co. v. Lovirng, 125 Va. 255;. 99 S. E. 591; 8t01ndard 
Red Cedar Chest Co. v. Monroe, 125 Va. 442; 99 S. E. 589." 
In C. & 0. R. Co. v. 1Yills, 111 Va. 32, this Court said at page 
38: 
''If an injury has resulted in consequence of a certain 
wrongful act or omission, but only through or by means of 
some intervening cause, which last cause the injury followed 
as a direct and immediate consequence, the law will refer the 
damage to the last or proximate cause -and refuse to trace it 
to the one that was more remo.te. '' 
See also: 
lV ashington, etc., R. Co. v. Struder, 132 Va. 368. 
lVilm.ou.th. v. So'lt: R. Co., 125 Va. 511. 
lJfeade v. Saunders, 151 Va 636. 
That the question of proximate cause is one to be deter-
Inined by the court rather than the jury is well settled, where 
the evidence is not conflicting, and reasonable men cannot dif-
fer as to the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. 
Thus in Allison v. FredericlcsburlJ, 112 V.a. 243, at page 248, 
it is said: 
''The second objection to this branch of the instruction is 
t:hat the question of proximate cause 'vas not one of law to 
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be determined by the court, but was ·a question of fact to 
be submitted to the jury. 
This objection cannot be sustained. The law is well settled 
to the ·contrary. When the question is involved in doubt and 
the evid~nce is conflicting, it is a question for the jury; but 
when there is no doubt and no conflict in the evidence, as in 
the case at bar, it is a question to be determined by the 
Court.'' 
The conclusion is practically irresistible that the plaintiff, 
knowing of the train's approach, assumed that he could 
"beat" it to the crossing, and attempted to do so. This i§ 
borne out by the very significant fact that l1e deliberately in-
creased the speed of his automobile "rhen .about at the first 
track, as testified to by himself and by the fireman. 
Or it is possible he may have believed tha.t the train was 
actually on the third or furthest track, and that he could stop 
in a position of safety on the second or main line track. This 
is borne out by the fireman's testimony to the effect that the 
automobile actually stopped on the latter traclr ·and even be-
gan to slide backwards. This explanation would also be con-
sistent with the rather spontaneous remark attributed to the 
plaintiff by Captain "\Vheeler immediately .after the accident,· 
to the effect of ''How did I get on the track?'' or ''How came 
me on the track'¥' (1\f. Rec., pp. 138-139.) 
In the instant case, therefore, it is respectfully submitted 
that the Court should have refused to give any instructions 
authorizing a recovery by the plaintiff, or should have set 
aside the verdict of the jury, and pursuant to the provisions 
of Section 6251 of the Code, entered up judgment for the 
defendant. 
Jfeade v. Saunders, 151 Va. 636. 
Davis v. Rodgers, 139 Va. 618. 
Ba1·ksdale v. Sou. R. Co. (supra). 
B. 
Even though plaintiff's testin~o11,y could be construed to 
'mean that he clai.ms not to have seen either the headlight or 
its rays .of light, and not to have heard the noise of the tra;in •. 
in titne to have avoided the accident, such testimony 'would 
be in its nat'l~;re incredible and contrary to u.ndisputed physi-
cal facts. · 
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If it be contended that the plaintiff's testimony can be con-
strued to mean that he claimed that he neither saw the en- · 
gine headlight or the rays of lig·ht cast by it, nor otherwise 
became aware of the approach of the train in time to have 
avoided the accident, it is submitted that such an assertion 
cannot prevail against the undisputed physical facts affirma-
tively showing it to be untrue. 
Attention has already been directed to the emphatic man-
ner in which the plaintiff testified that he carefully looked 
and continued to look for trains before going upon the cross-
in. He declined to say exactly where he was located when 
he last looked in the direction from which the train came, but 
said he thought he was on the side track (l\L Rec., p. 34). 
Furthermore no other witness purported to contradict him, 
or was in position to contradict him. 
Certainly it could not now be maintained in plaintiff's be-· 
half that he was not keeping an effective lookout, and that 
he did must be accepted conclusively as a fact. 
Ill a.ssie v. Fir1nstone, 134 Va. 450, 462. 
The locomotive pulling the defendant's train had its head-
light located on the pilot. There is no question but that it. 
was burning as the train approached both the depot and the 
crossing, and no contention is made to the contrary. The 
witness Shelton, who was in front of Campbell's store, sa\v 
the headlig·ht or tl1e reflection of its light before the train had 
reached the depot, or "just beyond the cattle pen", which 
was east of the depot, and admitted that it \Vas a ''pretty 
strong light'' (J\L Rec., pp. 51-54A). 
In this connect:on, Section 3976 of the Virginia Code speci-
fically requires railroad companies to equip their train loco-
motives with headlights of not less than 500 candle power. 
TJw defendant is of course entitled to the presumption that 
this statute was complied with, and no violation of it was in 
fact charged by the plantiff. 
The plaintiff himself admitted that the headlight was a 
very strong light", and that it "blinded" him (M. Rec., p. 
BO). · 
The engineer testified that it would throw a beam of light 
from one side of the right of way to the other, beginning at 
a distance of 25 to 50 feet in front of it, and would disclose 
an object as large as a man if within a space of a quarter of 
a mile (M. Rec., pp. 108-109). 
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The fireman said the headlight enabled him to see the plain-
tiff's automobile without difficulty (J\1:. Rec., p. 130). 
Irrespective of testimony, it is certainly a matter of gen-
eral knowledge of 'vhich this court will take judicial notice, 
that a br~ght engine headlight at night creates a beam of 
lig·ht that is necessarily observable by anyone whose line of 
vision penetrates its pathway. Considering the proximity 
of the plaintiff to the headlight, the established fact that his 
gaze was directed to the very place where it was shining, the 
fact that there was notl1ing to obstruct his view, and the fur-
ther fact that shortly thereafter the light enveloped him so 
HR to blind him, the conclusion is inescapable that he saw it 
while nearing the crossing and before he had passed beyond 
the side track. Being able to stop at any time 'vithin two 
feet, under his own admission, he could easily have avoided 
danger. 
In an effort to overcome the obvious conclusion that the 
"big light", which the plaintiff sa''" in going up on the cross-
ing, was in fact the engine headlight, counsel for the plaintiff 
sought to maintain that the illumination created by a 40 
eandle power light bulb, a relatively small house light, on 
(he side porch of Campbell's store, would as to him completely 
nhscure the effect of the headilg·ht. The unreasonableness of 
this contention is apparent on· its face, in v~ew of the statu-
tory requirement of a headlight of at least 500 candle power, 
nncl tl1e plaintiff's admission that the rays of this particular 
headli~·ht were sufficiently strong to produce a binding effect 
npon h;m, 
As already shown. the plaintiff testified that in approacl11ng 
the crossing, his automobile was running at a speed varying 
nnproximately from 2 to 5 miles an hour, while the train was 
:::l1own to have been running at an approximate speed of 15 
miles an hour. Taking these figures either as literally cor-
rect, or as m.ere estimates, and comparing- the relative posi-
fons occupied by the engine and automobile before the c.ollis-
ion, it is evident that the headlight's rays loomed up con-
tinuously and directly in front of the plaintiff's eyes from the 
time he crossed the right of w:ay line, 40 feet distant from 
the center of the main line track. 
If from a point 30 feet from the main line track, the plain-
tiff proceeded at an average speed of 3 miles au hour and 
the train was running 15 miles an hour, the latter would then 
1u1ve been 5 t;mes as far from the crossing or 150 feet (nearer 
than the mail crane at 165 feet). 
If at the same point the plaintiff proceeded at the same 
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speed of 3 miles an hour, and the train ran 21 miles an hour, 
the latter would have been 7 times as far from the crossing 
or 210 feet; or if 24 miles an hour, 240 feet (closer than the 
'vest end of the depot building). If the plaintiff's speed be 
put at a higher figure the train's position would of course be 
relatively closer. . 
Whatever reasonable proportions be assumed, it is easily 
demonstrable that before the plaintiff reached the first track 
at the crossing and continuously thereafter until the head-
light bl~nded him, he was looking straight into the rays of its 
light, entirely unimpeded by any structure on the north side 
of the track as vlell as by the lights at Campbell's store on 
tl1e south side, and therefore was fully aware of the presence 
of the train. . 
Furthermore, as already noted, the plaintiff produced a 
number of witnesses who stated that although they did not 
hear any crossing signals, they heard the noise of the train 
itself as it approached the depot and crossing. These per-
sons were located at various places on both sides of the right 
of way. They were all some distance away from the track, 
from 150 feet to a quarter or half mile. Practically all of 
them had no special reason for listening for the train. It is 
certainly a matter of common kno,vledge that it would be very 
difficult for .a freight train of some 25 to 30 cars to move at all 
without making a consideraple noise. Although the plain-
tiff repeatedly stated that he "clidn 't hear a. sound" it is 
simply inconceivable that in effectively exercising his pow-
ers of observation, he did not hear the train in close proxim-
ity to the crossing. 
Fully applicable to the instaJ!t case is the familiar princi-
ple so often expressed and approved in Virginia, to the effect 
that although there be testimony tending to support the ver-
clict of a jury, yet if there be physical facts which demon-
strate such test;mony to be untrue and unsupported in law 
nnd in fact, the court will not stultify itself by allowing 
such verdict to stand. 
The facts of the instant case bear a striking similarity to 
those existing in the case of Norfolk & TV. R. Co. 'v. Crowe's 
Arbnx., 110 Va. 798. The latter suit was based upon the 
kill~ng in the night time of the driver of a buggy in a grade 
crossing accident, the main charge of negligence against the 
defendant being a failure to ring the engine bell or to sound 
the w·histle as requird by law in approaching the crossing. 
The plaintiff's case rested largely upon the testimony of a 
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companion of the deceased's, Rutledge, 'vho stated that they 
were unaware of the approach of the train until the buggy 
was struck, although they maintained a careful loookout in 
the direction from which it came. It was shown by maps and 
photographs that the occupants of the buggy had an unob-
st~ucted view from a distance of 30 feet from the crossing, 
and it· was also shown that the noise of the train itself was 
heard by witnesses from 400 to 500 yards away from the 
track. 
In passing upon the refusal of the trial court to grant the 
defendant's motion to set aside the verdict renrlered for the 
plaintiff, the Supreme Court, though recognizing the familiar 
rule governing its considerat:on of evidence, held that the 
verdict, being necessarily dependent upon Rutledge's testi-
mony, could not be upheld, in view of '~the physical facts as 
to the surroundings of the place where the accident occurred, 
appearing from plaintiff's own evidence, the maps and pho-
tographs introduced and used by both parties at the trial and 
the uncontradicted evidence given in the. case." 
In stating its conclusions, the Court said at pages 805-809: 
''Now to accept as true the statement of the witness, Rut-
ledge upon which the verdict of. the jury can alo~1e be sanc-
tioned, that he and his companion, the deceased, although 
they had both at twenty-five feet from the railroad track and 
again at the crossing, looked and listened for an approach- · 
ing train and neither saw nor heard the train coming, al-
though neither th.e sight nor the noise made by the train was 
obstructed, 'vould, under the circumstances nar.ra ted be to ac-
cept as .true that which in the nature of things could not be 
true. 
In such a case, when the fact testified to and the fact neces-
sary to be proven in order to sustain the verdict of a jury 
could not in the nature of things be true, the authorities 
clearly hold that the verdict should be. regarded as against 
the evidence, and be set aside. 
· This Court, in Anderson v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 93 Va. 665, 25 
S. E. 947, held, that nohvithstanding the rule required that 
the case in the appellate court was to be considered as upon a 
demurrer to evidence, 'that rule, while it may and often 
does require us to accept as true that which is capable of 
proof, though the preponderance of evidence be ever so great 
against it, cannot compel us ~o accept as true what in the na-
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ture of things could not have occurred in the manner and 
under the circumstances narrated, and may be said, there-
fore, to be incapable of proof'. See also Harvey's Case, 103 
Va. 850, 49 S. E. 481; Peters v. So. Ry. Go., 135 Ala. 533, 
33 South 332. 
In the last named case the opinion quotes from the opin-
ion in ·.Artz v. Railroad Co., 34 Ia. 154, 159, where, in dis-
cussing the question we are no'v considering, it is said: 
'But it is urged by the appellee's counsel that the plaintiff tes-
tified that he did both look and listen to see and hear the train, 
but did not; and that this testimony shows that he was not 
guilty of contributory negligence, or that at the very least it 
made that a question of fact for the jury. The difficulty, how-
ever, with the position is that, the conceded or undisputed 
facts being true, th:s testimony cannot, in the very nature of 
things, be also true. It constitutes therefore, no conflict 
Suppose the fact is conceded that the sun was shining bright 
nnd clear at a specified time, and a ·witness having good eyes 
should testify at the time he looked he did not see it shine; 
could th~s testimony be true f The witness may have been 
told that it w.as necessary to prove in the case that he did 
look and did not see the sun shine. He may have thought 
of it with the desire that it should have been so. l-Ie· may 
have made himself first believe that it was so, and this belief 
may have ripened into a conviction of its verity, and possi-
bly he may testify to it in the self-consciousness of integrity. 
But after all, in the very nature of things, it cannot be true, 
and hence cannot in the law form any basis for a conflict upon 
which to rest the verdict. A man may possibly think he sees 
an object which has no existence in fact, but which it may be 
difficult, if not impossible, to prove did not exist, or "Tas not 
seen. But an object and power of sig·ht being conceded, the 
one may not negative the other.' 1lfa-rlmul v. RO!ilroad Co., 
12:3 Pa. 487, 16 Atl. 747,10 Am. St. Rep. 541; Myers v. Railroad 
Co., 136 l\Io. 562, 38 S. W. 308; Ra·il·road Go. v. Pmtnds, 27 
C. C. A. 112, 82 F'ed. 217. 
In the recent work of ~ioore on Facts, the author in sec. 
160, citing Hook v. J.l1issou.ri Pac. R. Co., 162 ~Io. 569, 63 S. 
W. 366, says : 'Courts are not so deaf to the voice of na-
ture ·Or so blind to the laws of physics that every utterance of 
a witness in derogation of these laws will be treated as tes-
timony of probative value because of its utterance. A court 
will treat that as unsaid by a witness which in the very nature 
of things could not be said.' · 
----------- ---~ --
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In section 191 the same author says: 'A conclusive pre-
sumption that a sound was heard by a person is quite often 
applied in the case of persons at or near a railroad crossing 
with a train thundering down on them.' . 
'rhe same author, citing a number of authorities, in a note 
to section 216, says: 'Courts take judicial knowledge of the 
fact that railroad trains create a great deal of noise in their 
movements, and that for some considerable distance such 
noise can be heard.' 
Again, the same author, in section 221, citing ample au-
thority to sustain the· text says: 'P1·es~Mnption that t·rain was 
hea1·d-It must be conclusively presumed that a pedestrian 
who stopped and listened within six feet of a railroad cross-
ing could have heard a locomotive, a train ·which struck him 
going at the rate of fifteen miles an hour. In such a case his 
testimony that he did not hear the tra!n was pronounced 
''so contrary to the daily experience of common life, so at 
war with the conceded and indisputable physjcal facts in thE 
case, that neither courts nor juries can, without stultifying 
themselves, yield to it an iota of probative force or effect. 
It is a proposition too monstrously improbable for rational 
human belief. To argue to the contrary of this is to endeavor 
the transmutation of the impossible into possibility". In 
another case the court said ''It almost seems incredible that 
a man can be within twenty feet of a railroad audnot hear an 
approaching train, even although no whistle was sounded or 
hell rung.'' Again it was held that a person within one hun-
dred feet of the track, possessed of orcl5nary hearing and 
listen!ng attentively with nothing to obstruct the sound, can-
not fail to hear a train approaching at thirty-miles an hour.' 
Elliott on Railroads, in section 1703, citing as authority 
decisions in several States, under the headline, 'Physical 
Facts', says: 'It is an old saying that "actions speak louder 
than 'vords ", and so there are sometimes physical facts pres-
ent in a case sufficient in strength to overcome the evidence of 
'vitnesses. Well-established laws of nature and similar 'vell-
kno,Vll sc1entific and physical facts of which the courts will 
take judicial knowledge may not only justify a trial court in 
directing a verdict or in setting aside a verdict and grant-
ing a new trial,' but may also be sufficient to cause the appel-
late court to reverse the action of the trial court where it 
fails to give effect to such facts by directing a verdict or 
granting a new trial. N otwithstancling the general rule, 'vhich 
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preYails in most jurisdictions, that the court, on appeal, 
will not weigh the evidence, neither the appellate court nor 
the trial court should stultify itself by allowing a verdict to 
stand, although there may be evidence fending· to support 
it, where the physical facts are such as to demonstrate that 
such evidence is untrue, and the verdict unjust and unsup-
ported in law and in fact. In a recent case the plaintiff tes-
tified that he stopped and looked and listened when about 
six feet from a railroad crossing and saw no engine, and 
that as soon as he stepped inside the first rail of the track 
an engine noiselessly approacl1ed and struck him; that his 
sense of hearing 'vas perfect, and that there wa.s nothing to 
obstruct sound or prevent him from hearing. There was 
also undisputed evidence that the engine and tender weighed 
eighty tons, had fourteen wh~els and was running at the 
rate of at least hventy-five miles an hour. The supreme court 
held that it was a physical impossibility. that the engine 
could move at that rate without making any noise, and that 
the plaintiff must have heard it if he looked and listened, as 
he testified that he cEd, and the judgment of the trial court 
on the verdict for the plaintiff was reversed. In another 
recent ~ase the appellate court said that while it had no 
power to weigh the evidence, yet where the evidence which 
appears to be in conflict is nothing more than a mere scintilla, 
or where it is met by well-known and scientific facts, about 
wh1ch there is no dispute, this court will still exercise jurisdic-
tion to review and reverse. So, where it was necessary to 
assume, in order to support the verdict, that the plaintiff 
was fully nine feet high, the appellate court reversed the 
judgment and granted a new trial. In another case a verdict 
was set aside bec.ause the court knew that if the plaintiff had 
been exercising ordinary care and occupying the position he 
claimed he 'vas occupying, he could not have been injured in 
the manner in which the undisputed evidence showed that he 
was injured. And in many other cases verdicts have been 
~et aside heca use tl1ey could only be supported by assuming 
or believing something contrary to human experience or to the 
hnvs of nature. There are many facts of which courts ex-
officio take notice ,and neither averment nor proof will pre-
vail against matters which are judicially known to the court. 
The courts will not allow the verdicts of juries to stand when 
they rest on evidence which tlw courts judicially know to be 
incredible. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, in many 
railroad cases, for the defendant to show the physical facts, 
and it is equally important to the plaintiff for him to come 
prepared, not merely to deny what the undisputed physical 
--~--------------
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facts show must have been true, but to show, by some evi-
dence at least, that the physical facts are not as claimed by 
the defendant or. are not such as to conclude the plaintiff 
in the particular case.' ' 
- A similar result was reached by the Court in the ease of 
Norfolk & W. R. Co .. v. 8t1·ickler, 118 Va. 153, a case involv-
ing a collision between plaintiff's automobile and a motor 
truck operated upon the defendant's track. 
In commenting upon the evidence, and reversing a judgment 
for the plaintiff, the Court said at pages 154-155: · 
''The evidence shows that from a point in the highway 
tl1irty feet from the crossing, and until the same 'vas reached, 
the track in the direction from which the motor truck was com-
ing was straig·ht ·and level, affording an unobstructed view of 
the rails and ties, for a. distance of 1,500 feet. The plaintiff 
says that his car was a light 'Metz' machine, which cost 
$423, and that in approaching the crossing at six or seven 
miles an hour the car could have been stopped in three or 
four feet; that in approaching the ·crossing he listened and 
kept a lookout all he knew ho"T in the direction from which the 
motor truck came ; and that he did not see or hear the same 
until it was within twenty-five yards of his car, which was 
then nearly across the track. The plaintiff was asked: 'If 
you can see east from there and what was moving towards 
you when you looked, 'vhy d:dn 't you see the truck?' His re-
ply was: 'Simply because it wasn't there, is the only reason 
I can give.' It is impossible that the plaintiff could have 
traversed the thirty feet, listening and looking, over a clear 
track of 1,500 feet, a.nd not have seen an approaching motor 
truck until it was too near for him to stop short of the track, 
or for the truck to avoid the collision. He savs that his vis-
ion 'vas good; that he looked, as claimed, continuously while 
passing over th~ thirty feet and did not see the motor truck 
a.pproach~ng anywhere within the distance of fifteen hundred 
feet is an incredible statement that cannot be accepted. He 
could hav_e stopped within three or four feet of the track and 
avoided the accident. It was his duty to look and listen for 
railroad vehicles. Upon the plaintiff's own statement, the 
conclusion is unavoidable that he failed to look at any point 
within thirty feet of the track, or that if he looked that he 
failed to heed the approach of the motor truck, which he must 
necessarily have seen. ·He says that he could have stopped the 
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· car within three or four feet; one look, therefore, at any 
point within thirty feet, would have warned him of his dan-
ger in time for him to have avoided the accident. by stopping 
his car and letting the truck pass. The plaintiff says his 
hearing was unimpaired. It is hardly less incredible that the 
plaintiff listened and did not hear the unusually loud noise 
of an approaching motor truck. Others, very much less favor-
ably situated, heard it without difficulty, and were not listen-
ing with a view to hearing. Tha.t the plaintiff both· looked 
and listened so as to make his looking and listening effect-
tive, and neither saw nor heard the rapidly approaching 
motor at any point within the clear unobstructed .view of 
· fifteen hundred feet, is w~holly incredible\'' · 
. In So~tthern R. Co. v. 1lfason, 119 Va. 256, the Court reaf-
firmed the principles enunciated in the above cases, by approv-
ing as a correct statement of law, "that where the undis-
puted physical facts clearly established by the evidence are 
contradicted by the oral testimony of the· witnesses, such 
testimony must be disregarded". 
In JTa. & S. TY. R. Co. v. Ha-rris & Skinner, 119 Va. 843, 845, 
liarris, the owner and driver of an automobile struck by a lo-
comotive at a grade crossing, in suing for damages to the auto-
tnobile, testified that when he was "five or six feet from the 
rail, before starting across the track, he looked and listened 
in both directions, and neither saw nor heard the approaching 
engine; that he then started across and was in the middle of 
the track when he saw the engine about thirty feet from him; 
that he then shoved the throttle up and the car jumped four 
or five feet, and he jumped out and thus escaped". 
In reversing the judgment of the lower ~ourt and f:iustain-
ing a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence the Court said at 
page 846: 
"It is simply incredible that Harris could have stood within 
fiv·e or six· feet of the ne~rest rail of the railroad track and 
looked over a stra.~ght, clear and un.obstructed distance of 
nine hundred feet without seeing an engine that was in thirty 
feet of l1im as soon as he moved the very few feet necessary 
to put him in the middle of the track .. A simple calculation 
\vill sho.w· that, if the engine was not in sight when Harris 
started across the track and he did not stall, as he says he did 
not, he would have been some distance beyond the track 
before the engine could have traveled a distance of nine hun-
dred feet or more and reached the crossing. Under the con-
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ditions given, it is impossible that Harris could have looked · 
and not seen the approaching engine. This view is concurred 
in by several of his witnesses, who say they did not see him 
look.'' · 
In lYhtrden 'y. Va. Ry. & P. Co., 130 Va. 449, an action for 
damag·es for personal injuries to au elderly lady, who as a 
pedestr:ian, was struck by a street car at night, in the village 
of Ocean Vie·w, a similar situation was presented. After 
quoting the plaintiff's statement to the effect that she looked 
in the direction from w·hich the car approached when about 
two feet from the track, without seeing the car or any of its 
lights, the Court, in rejecting the testimony, said in part, at 
pages 459, 460-461: 
''Now, it must be apparent that wl1atever the witnesses may 
Ray about not seeing, or hearing, a car at the crossing imme-
diately prior to the accident, the car physically must have 
been there, and even if it was not carrying lights, could have 
been seen on a track that was straight for half a mile from 
the crossing. The plaintiff looked to,vards Norfolk when 
she 'vas just at the rail, a step and she was inside the rail, 
the little lights flared out, and in a moment, before she could 
take the few steps that would have placed her across the 
other rail, and in safety, sl1e 'vas struck. In her statement, 
given immediately after the accident, she says that she was 
in the middle of the track when the lights appeared but ap..: 
parently a square away, according to the corrected version 
on the stand. r:rhough she did not hesitate, or stop on the 
track, she was struck before she could cross the second rail. 
The petitioner contends that the court should draw the in-
ference 'that just before striking the plaintiff, the motor-
man see:ng her, turned on two lights, having no headlight'. 
But if the night was clear enough to enable the motorman to 
see so small an object as a person on the track, and seeing 
l1er, turn on his lights, there must have been sufficient light to 
enable a person at the crossing, carefully looking up a. straight 
track, to see so large an object as an approaching sb·eet car, 
even if running w~th no lights sho,ving. 1Ioreover, if it was 
running- very rapidly, as suggested by the plaintiff in her tes- , 
timony, the noise of its approach to any one standing just at 
the track, and looking in that direction, would have been no-
ticeable, whether or not the person who was looking was 
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making any special effort to hear. If the car 'vas traveling 
at the rate· of thirty miles an hour, it was making forty-four 
feet a second. According to plaintiff's statement, she must 
have been struck within a second or two after she last looked 
from a point outside of, but immediately at, the rail. She 
looked, sa"r nothing, stepped inside of the rail, looked again, 
saw the little lights, and almost immediately was knocked 
down. Upon the hypothesis that she was struck one second 
after she looked, conceding a speed of thirty miles an hour for 
the car, then the car was only forty-four feet away from 
the crossing when she last looked and, as she states, saw no 
car. At that distance it must have been plainly visible. 
If she w·as struck two seconds after she looked, then when she 
looked the car was eighty-eight feet away, and could have 
been seen. Just in proportion as the interval of time be-
tween the turning on of the lights, and the actual injury, is 
reduced, the distance of the ear from the crossing, at the time 
the plaintiff alleges that she last looked, is diminished, thereby 
increasing the likelihood that the car could have been seen 
as it approached, and enhancing the improbability of the 
plaintiff's statement that although she looked and there was 
nothing to hinder her from seeing the car, if one had been 
there, she did not see one. 
lVfanifestly, the car was there, on the track and approaehing 
for within a period of time that, at the most, according to 
plaintiff's testimony, was a. second or two, it was upon her. 
Place the car at whatever distance you choose from the cross-
ing at the fme the plaintiff stepped inside of the rail, then if 
·it is claimed that there was light enough to enable the motor-
man to see her, and, apprehending her danger, to turn on the 
lights, as suggested by plaintiff in error, it is obvious that a 
moment sooner there was lig·ht enough to enable one at the 
rail,. and looking towards Norfolk along a straight track, to 
see the car as it approached. If there was no ca.r when the 
plaintiff looked, just outside of the rail, and a second or two 
later she was knoekcd down by a car, it may be well asked 
·when, and how, did that car materialilze!" 
In the case of Atlantic Coast LineR. Co. v. Jl!IcLeod, 11 ·F. 
( 2d) 22 which ·was an action by a pedestrian for injuries 
·~ sustained at a crossing in the night time, when struck by a 
train wl1ich had its headlight burning, the Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in rejecting plaintiff's testi- · 
mony that he looked and listened in approaching the cross-
ing, said at page 23: 
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"If we regard the statement of the plaintiff as meaning 
that he looked an~ listened immediately before going upon 
tJ1e track, and that he did not see or hear the train at that 
time, the testimony i~ so repugnant to the undisputed physi-
cal facts that neither. the court nor the jury could,. with.out 
stultifying themselves, concede to it any probative value what-
ever. Moore on Facts, par. 321." 
It is earnestly subn;1itted that whatever c9nstruction be 
placed upon the plaintiff's testimony with respect to l1is see-
ing the engine headlight, the physical facts conclusively de-
monstrate that he was bound to have been aware of the train's 
·approach in ample time to have avoided the collision. Hence,. 
any failure of the engineman to give the warning signals pre-
scribing by Section 3958 of the Code had nothing to do with 
the accident. In conformity w~th the authorities ·which have 
been cited, the trial court should therefore have refused to 
give any instructions authorizing a recovery by the plaintiff, 
or should have set aside the verdict of the jury and entered 
up judgment for the defendant. · 
II. 
IN ANY VIEW· OF THE EVIDENCE THE PLAINTIFF, 
HAS FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF. 
As has been previously noted, the plai~tiff, in the course 
of cross-examination, was asked if, in approaching· the cross-
ing, he saw the headlight on the engine. His reply was, ''I 
don't remember'.'. (M:. Rec., p. 30.) 
If, in. disregard of the physical facts shown, it be con-
tended from his answer to this crucial question, that it is a 
matter of doubt whether or not the plaintiff actually··saw 
either the headl1ght or its rays of light, while still in a position 
of safety, his predicament from a. legal standpoint is fully as 
serious as in the situation just discussed. 
The. suit is of course predicated upon negligence, and the 
burden was on the plaintiff not only to show negligence but 
also to sho'v that such negligence caused the injuries com-
plained of. As already pointed out, however, the fact that 
the statutory signals were not given, if true, could not have 
had any causal relation to the accident, providing actual 
knowledge of the t~·ain 's approach was otherwise duly brought 
home to the plaintiff. 
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If the inquiry as to whether such knowledge was possessed 
by the plaintiff in time to avoid danger be deliberately left 
unanswered, it is impossible to say that the defendant's neg-
ligence contributed to the accident in any degree: The. plain-
tiff's own independent act may as well have been the sole 
responsible cause. Therefore plaintiff has failed to sustain 
the burden of proof. 
It is well settled in Virginia tha.~ where damages are 
::;ought for injuries which may be legally attributable to one 
of two causes, for one of which the defendant is· responsible 
and for the other of which it is not responsible, the plaintiff 
cannot prevail if the evidence does not show that the damages 
were brought about by the former cause. It is equally true 
that the situation is the same if it is -just as probable that the 
injries are attribtable to one cause as to the other, since the 
hurden rests upon the plaintiff to establish his case. by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. · 
Kendricks v. Norfolk, 139 Va. 702.; 
Sott. R. Co. v. Adams, 129 Va. 233., 
C. & 0. R. Co. v. Catlett, 122 Va. 232; 
C. & 0. R. (Jo. v. Hea~th, 103 Va. 64. 
Furthermore, if the plaintiff could not himself remember 
whether he saw the headlight or its rays of light, no one else 
was in position to answer this question. The inquiry was one 
peculiarly personal to the pl~iutiff. Any ambiguity existing 
was created by his own testimony. Certainly he w·as inter-
rogated sufficiently to bring out the truth, and he is fully 
chargeable with whatever remains undisclosed on so vital a 
point, whether from design or lack of memory. It would be 
n curious result indeed if a party bringing an action for 
personal injuries ''rere allowed to say that he had forgotten 
~vhether or not he had observed a warning sign which would 
have enabled him to avoid the accident, and· thus have this 
question submitted to a jury. 
The principle applies that 'vhere a party to an action tes-
tifies in his own behalf, his testimony is to be construed most 
strongly against him when it is self-contradictory, vague or 
equivocal. And it logically follows in this situation, that if 
that view of his testimony which is most unfavorable to him 
shows no right to recover, he cannot recover. 
Lon.q Ci.(Ja1· Co .v Harvey, 33 Ga . .App. 236, 125 S. E. 870; 
TrV. & A. R. Co. v. Evans, 96 Ga. 481, 23 S. E. 494. 
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In Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, an analogous situa-
tion was commented upon in the following manner at page 
462: ~'-
''As a general rule when two or more witnesses introduced 
hy a party litigant vary in their statements of fact, such 
party has the right to ask the court or jury to accept as true 
the statements most favorable to him. In such a situation he 
would be entitled to have the jury instructed upon his con-
tention, or if-there were a demurrer to the evidence, the facts 
, would have been regarded as established in accordance with 
f:he testimony most favorable to him. This is not true, how-
ever, as to the testimony which he gives himself. No litigant 
can successfully ask a court or jury to believe that he has 
uot told the truth. 
His statements of fact and the necessary inferences there-
from are binding upon him. He cannot be heard to ask that 
his case be made stronger than he makes it, where, as here, it 
depends upon facts within his own knowledge, and as to which 
he has testified.'' 
This language was quoted with approval by the Virginia 
Special Court of Appeals in the subsequent cases of Davis 
Bakery v. Dozier, 139 Va. 618, and Bassett & Co. v. Wood, 146 
Va. 654. 
IIT. 
COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING· JURY TO RE-
DUCE DAMAGES ON ACCOUNT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S OWN NEGLIGENCE. 
Instruction 2, as given by the court, on motion of the plain-
t:ff, was as follows (~I. Rec., pp. 145-146) : 
INSTRUCTION 2. 
The court instructs the jury that the statute law of Vir-
ginia requires the operatives of every engine on a steam rail-
way, when approaching a gTade crossing therpon, to sound its 
whistle at least twice at a distance of not less than 300 yards 
and not more than 600 yards from such crossing, and to ring 
its bell or sound its whistle continuously or alternately until 
Ruch crossing is reached; therefore the court further in-
f'tructs the jury that if they shall believe from the evidence 
that the freight train of the defendant company, on the night 
-
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of March 20, 1928, ran into and collided with the automobile 
of the plaintiff at and on the· grade crossing over the defend-
ant's railway just ,~lest of Hanover Station, and that before 
it reached the crossing th~ operatives of the defendant's en-
gine failed to perform any one of the statutory duties re-
quired of it by law and above enumerated, and such failure 
was the proximate cause of the accident and that the plaintiff 
was injured and his automobile was damaged by said col-
lision, you shall find for the plaintiff, even though you shall 
believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, Barlow, was neg-
ligent in any respect in approaching or attempting to cross 
over said crossing, and his negligence contributed to the ac-
cident nevertheless you shall find for the plaintiff, however 
you may consider such neg·ligence of the plaintiff, if any, in 
mitigation of damages. 
This instruction, which directed a verdict, left it to the 
jury to say whether or not the plaintiff was negligent in ap-. 
proaching the crossing and driving in front of the train. 
vVhat has already been said above in the discussion of the sub-
ject of sole proximate cause, it is submitted, is sufficient to, 
at least, sho,\r that the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of 
la,v. This conclusion is inescapable. under the physical facts 
disclosed by the photogTaphs and blueprint, as well as the 
plaintiff's own evidence, even though it should be held by 
this Court that his conduct, in view of Section 3959 of the 
Code, was not a complete bar to a recovery. Hence, the in-
struction was erroneous in permitting any finding that the 
plaintiff was not negligent. 
But this instruction is further erron·eous. Assuming that 
the jury did believe that the plaintiff was negligent, the in;. 
struction made it entirely optional with them as to whether 
or not they would on that account reduce the amount of dam-
Ages wh!ch they might otherwise award the plaintiff. In 
fixing the amount of a verdict they were permitted to ignore 
entirely the plaintiff's negligence. Nor· was any other in-
struction given which required the jury to give effect to this 
factor. It is submitted that the provisions of Section 3959 
compelled the jury, in the event that they believed the plain-
tiffto be negligent, to reduce any damages which they might 
be inclined to award, had the plaintiff been found free from 
negligence. Instruction 2 should therefore have been amended 
so as to require this to be done. 
The recent case of Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Hardy's Adm'x, 
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148 .S. E. 839 (dec:ded by this Court, June 13, 1929,) is be-
lieved to be decisive of both of these points. 
That case was an action for damages against a railway 
company for the death of the plaintiff's decedent, i~ a grad~ 
crossing accident ·which occurred in Nottoway County. The 
negligence alleged was a failure to give the crossing signals 
prescribed by Section 3959 of the Code. 
In holding the plaintiff to have been guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of Jaw, this Court said in part: 
'' J\fr. Hardy "ras driving along the road, which for several 
hundred feet ran substantially parallel with the railroad un-
til it reached a point near the crossing, when it turned at an 
angle of 40 degrees and went across the tracks. For a: space 
of 50 feet before reaching the track, one on the highway 
had a clear view of trains approaching the crossing. At that 
. point a train could have been seen 550 feet to the east, the 
direction from wl1ich this train was coming, and when within 
20 feet of the crossing, one could see 1,200 or 1,300 feet. Mr. 
Hardy was driving a Ford coupe, was familiar with the cross-
ing, was driving slowly, not to exceed 4 or 5 miles an hour. 
He came almost to a stop when he was between 15 and 20 
feet from the track. There was a signal post and crossing 
sign, but the testimony shows, and the photographs of the 
crossing and its approaches demonstrate, that they could 
not have ol;>structed his view of the on-coming train had he 
looked. While the railroad double track 'vas just below the 
surface of the adjacent land, the shallow cut was not deep · 
.enough to obscure his vision of the approaching train. West 
of the crossing there were other trains standing still, one of 
them a wrecking train, there for the purpose of removing an 
obstruction caused by a derailed car. The nearest car of these 
trains so standing still 'vas more than 750 feet west of the 
crossing, and the engines still further a"ray. These trains 
were not a. menace, and there was nothing else. having the 
slightest tendency to confuse or mislead. 
These being the circumstances, the court was asked to give 
this instruction: 'The court instructs the jury that under the 
evidence as it appears in this case, the plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence in going on the crossing at the time 
and in the manner he did.' 
For the plaintiff it is contended that this instruction invades 
the province of the jury, among other reasons, because it 
violates the spirit, if not the letter, of Code 1919, §6003, pro-
, ; • ~ . ~ ' ' . . ~ • .. • 4. • • • • • 
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bibiting peremp~ory instructions. directing what verdict a 
jury shquld render. : ; . . . . . . ; . ! .: .: 
.. The sufficient .r~sp9nse to this contention· ;is that this }n-
~?t~·uction does not direct a verdict. The question ther~by 
raised was whether or- not the contributory negligence o.(~he 
plaintiff was apparent from t~e. evidence, ~r .w~et?,~r7. ~J?.der 
the testimony, .that ~vas a question about whiCh fru.r..:nnnded 
men might fairly differ. · , , 
A late expression on th9 subject is by Ho~t., J., in th~ c1;1se 
of Ethe-ridge v. No1·folk Southe-rn R. Co., 143 Va .. 789, 129 
S. E. 680. He quotes this from Headley et al. v. Denver ~ R. 
G. R. Co.,.·60 Colo. 500, 154 P. 731: 'Nevertheless, such a 
question, in a particular case. may become one of law a_nd 
thus come within the province of the court, so that a particu-
lar verdict may. and should be· directed. Where the facts .are 
such that reasonable men of fair int~lligenc.e may draw, 4if-
ferent conclusions, the question of contributory· ,negligence 
. must l)e submitted to the jury, for the finding is tlieri of .f~c.t. 
But if it it is clear that only one reasonable inference can 
be drawn from the facts, and the course which prudence dic-
tates be definitely discerned, the :finding thereon is of ltnv, · 
not of fact, and it devolves upon the court to settle the mat-
ter~' 
* * * * * 
There are many other cases illustrating the same proposi-
tion, the latest of which is Southe-rn Ry. Co. v. Davis' Adm'.-r, 
decided :March 21, 1929, 152 Va. -, 147 S. E. 228. In that 
case .it is said: 'It cannot be denied that the failure of a 
traveler upon. a ·higlnvay to look (and list~n) before g~rng 
upon a railroad track, .when there is no obstructed view, and 
that, having such unobstructed view, the going upon a railroaq. 
track from a safe place immediately in front of a moving 
tra!n which is then so close as to make a collision inevita~­
hle, is negligence tJer se.' N. & W. Co. v. Sink, 118 Va. 439, 
87 S. E. 740; WashinlJto·n & Old Dom,iwion Ry. Co. v. Zell's 
Acl1n'-r, 118 Va. 755, 8R S. E. 'J09; -No-rfolk Sou.thern R. Co. 
v. Sm.ith, 122 Va. 302; 94 S. E. 789; Ca.nody v. N o-rfollt & 
. West-e·rn .Ry. Co . ., 129 Va. 56, 105 S. E. 585; W ashinl]ton & 
Old Don~-inion Ry. Co .. 'v. Tho·mpson.~. 136 Va. 597, 118 S. E. 
76; Ether-idge v. Norfolk So~tther·n R. Co., 143 Va. 789, 129 S. 
E. 680. 
:In such cases the conclusion which has been so frequently 
stated by the c~urts nece~~arily Jollqws. A .t!aveler w;ho ~~ 
injured under such c~rcumstances either f~dled to 'look, or 
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both looked and saw the train near and rapidly approaching~ 
but nevertheless disregarded the danger and attempted to 
cross the track immediately in front of it when it was so near 
as ·to make the peiil of such a course manifest. In either 
event his contributory negligence is apparent. 
A lat·e case from the Supreme Court of the United States 
is Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. GoodntG/1~, 275 U. S. 66, 48 S. Ct. 
24, 72 L. Ed. 168, 56 A. L. R. 645. 
The instruction was proper under the facts of this case, 
the court erred in refusing to give it, and the judgment must 
therefore be reversed.'' 
Discussing the effect, under the evidence, of the prqvisions 
of Section 3959 of the Code, it was further said: 
'
1 It is obviou.s that the statute i1nposes upon the jury the · 
duty of considering and appraising the contributory negli-
gence of .the plaintiff. That ~vh·ich is imposed as a duty is 
'mandatory a.IJ'l·d cannot be treated as pennissive. (Italics 
ours.) 
The doctrine of contributory neglig·ence is not abolished, 
hut its penalty is. ameliorated or mitigated. If the contribu-
tory negligence of the pla.in.tiff a11pears; that fact cannot be 
• ?·[Jnored. (Italics ours.) 
* * * * * 
It was the duty of this jury, under the evidence in this 
ease, under the instructions which were given, after having 
decided that the defendant was negligent and therefore liu-
l.Jle for some damages, to consider the apportionment of those 
damages as between the plaintiff and .the company. Both 
being at fault, the total damages should be reduced-miti-
gated. 
The refusal of the court, under the facts of tl1is case, to 
grant this instruction, therefore necessitates a reversal of 
t.he judgment, and the remainder of the case .to the trial court 
for the purpose of assessing and apportioning the damages. 
Before the enactment of the statute, such contributory negli-
gence of a plaintiff as is here shown would have barred the 
action. Since this statute, in cases in which it applies,. this 
is changed, and while there may be a recovery, it is not only 
the duty of the jury to determine the damages but also to 
The Chesapeake & ·Ohio Ry. Co. v. 1\'I. L. Barlo,v. 39 
mitigate and apportion the amount. The judgment will there-
fore be reversed, and the case remanded for that purpose.'~ 
It will be noted that the instruction involved in the above 
case was an instruction telling the jury that the plaintiff's 
decedent was negligent as a matter of law, and that the fali-
nre to give the instruction necessitated a reversal of the case 
lJecattse, under s_~ction 3959, the duty . of the jury to reduce 
damages 'was "1Iandatory" and could not be treated as 
''permissive'' . 
.So _far ·as the record in the instant case shows, the jury may 
well have believed that the plaintiff was grossly negligent, 
but under the language of Instruction 2 they were not re-
quii:ed to consider this factor in reaching a verdict, unless they 
chose to do so. 
See also: 
Smt. R. Co. v. Johnson, 146 S. E. 363. 
That the jury, to say the least, a'varded full compensation 
for the damages shown by the plaintiff, and did not in fact 
mitigate and apportion the amount, in accordance with the 
plaintiff's negligence 'vill be shown under the next heading. 
The serious prejudice to the defendant resulting from the 
giving of Instruction 2 is manifest, and requires a new trial 
of the case. · 
For ready reference we quote .Section 3958 and 3959 of the 
Virginia Code : 
"Sec. 3958. Bell a-nd whistle; liability for failure to us e.-
Every railroad company, whose line is operated by steam, 
shall provide each locomotive engine passing upon its road 
with a bell of ordinary size, and steam whistle, and such 
whistle shall be sharply sounded outside of incorporated 
cities and towns at least twice at a distance of not less than 
three_ hundred yards nor more. than six hundred yards from 
the place where the railroad crosses upon the same level any 
higlr\yay or crossing, and s~ch bell shall bp rung or whistle 
sounded continuously or allterna.tely: until the engine has 
reached such highway crossing, and shall give such signals 
in cities and towns as the legislative authorities thereof may 
require. 
Sec. 39.59. Effect of fail1~;re to g'ive statutory signals.-If the 
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employees in charge of any railroad .engine or train fail tO. 
give· the signals required by law on approaching a grade 
crossing of a public highway, the fact that a traveler on such 
highway failed. to exercise due . care in approaching fSllCh 
crossing shall not bar recovery for an injury to or death o~ 
such traveler, nor for an injury to or the destruction of prop-
. erty in his charge, where such injury, . death, or destruc-
tion results from a collision .on such c-rossing between sue~ 
engine or train and such traveler or the property in his. 
charge, respectively, but the failure of the traveler to exercise 
sucli care may be considered in mitigation of dam·ages.'' 
IV . 
. ·:t . . .• . 
DAMAGES A '\V ARDED BY THE JURY ·WER.E EX-
CESSIVE IN ANY EVE·NT. 
' . 
The-evidence shows that wlth the exception of some minot~ 
cuts ~nd bruises, the injuries suffered ·by the plaintiff we;re 
co~~necl to a broken right wrist and a dislocated right collar-
bone.· While at the time of the trial (approximate,ly eight. 
months after the accident), the plaintiff, as a result of the 
collarbone injury, still had some limitation in the use of hi~ 
sl1oulder, the opinion of the surgeon who had treated him 
·was that this would disappear. He further stated that there. 
was. then a disability of between 40 and 50 per cent in the 
·wrist, which c~ndition he expected to be permanent. . 
The plaintiff,_ who was forty years .old, was an automo-
bile mechanic and opera ted a garage.. In answer to a question 
as to the amount of his income from his business at the time 
of the accident, he said it was "I 1:eckon about $30.00 a week", 
and·that he had not been able to make that much since. He 
said that his shop was closed for about a week, and that it 
was about three months before he could do any work him-
self -that he could not now do as much work as before. He 
further stated that he had a helper at his shop and. had .been 
able to -take care of: all the repair jobs presented in the month 
prec~ding .the trial. . . · . , - . 
Assuming that the jury in fixing their verdict at $7,000.00. 
included therein the maximum amounts allowable under the 
evidence for the plaintiff~s medical expenditures and the dam-
age to the automobile, it will be seen that they allowed ap-
proximately $7,000.00 for the injured 'vrist. and collarbone: 
This sum of course at 6% interest would yield an income of. 
$35.00 a month fo1· the balance of the plaintiff's life and stili 
leave the principal intact at his death. An annuity based upon 
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his normal expectancy would yield a slightly larger income. 
It is submitted that this sum, taking into consideration 
the nature of the injuries, the lack of definite proof as to the 
loss of earnings and the naturally· diminishing earning power 
of a manual .worker at his age increases, was highly exces-
sive, nnd shows that the jury either has misconceived or mis-
interpreted the facts or the law applicable, or was influenced 
by prejudice or passion. It is further submitted, therefore, 
that for this reason the trial court should have set aside the 
verdict and granted a new trial, at least, on the question of 
damages, or should have put the plaintiff on terms. 
In the case of C . .& 0. Ry. Co. v. Arrington;. 126 Va. 194, 
it was said at page 218, that "where the amount of the ver-
dict is attacked because it is so unusual, it is proper to make 
comparisons with the verdicts which other juries have found 
in other cases for similar injuries; for, while each case must 
be determined by its own facts, it is nevertheless true that the 
verdicts of other juries which have been approved by the 
courts, represent the common or average judgment of man-
kind as to the proper recovery in ·such cases"· 
And in the course of a discussion of the same question, with 
reference to an injury resulting in the loss of an eye, the 
Court, in the case of Lorilla·rd Co. v. Clay, 127 Va. 734, said 
nt page 756: 
- ''The attendant suffering or the subsequent incapacity io 
follow one's usual calling may be different in one case from 
what they are in another. But where the facts in a number 
of cases are substantially the same, the compensation to be 
made therefor ought not tQ be left wholly indeterminate, or 
wholly dependent on the verdict of the jury in a particular 
case, if any means can be discovered by which the amount of 
the compensation can be reasonably approximated. It would 
seem that the average judgments of the courts of last resort 
in the different States as to what sum would be a fair com-
pensation for the loss of an eye under ordinary conditions _ 
would furnish some aid to juries and courts in ascertaining 
what compensation should be made therefor. Such average 
judgments should not be taken as a fixed admeasurement of 
the damages to be awarded in any given c·ase, but if there are 
no peculiar circumstances in the case to take it out of the 
general rule, it should be regarded as so far suggestive that 
any radical departure therefrom should cause the court to 
closely scrutinize the proceedings to ascertain if the jury· 
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had been influenced by partiality or prejudice, or have been 
misled by some mistaken view of the merits of the case.'' 
In 17 Corpus Juris, at page 1103 L. R. A. 1915F, at page 
ao Ann. Cases 1913A, at page 1361, 46 A. L. R. at page 1230, 
and in the 3rd Decennial Digest, are found collections of· com-
paratively recent cases, involving injuries relatively similar 
to the injury to the plaintiff in the instant case. While it is 
difficult to generalize on account of the varying circumstances 
and in many instances accompanying injuries, it is confidently 
submitted that an award of $·7',000.00 in a case wherein a 
partially disabled wrist is the predominant injury, would be 
far out of line with the averag·e of verdicts in these lists for 
corresponding injuries 'vhich have received judicial sanction. 
'J1his sum is excessive even with a reasonable allowance in-
cluded for the plaintiff's dislocated collarbone. 
v. 
ER.ROR IN AD~fiSSION OF CERTAIN TESTlMONY OF 
THE PLAINTIFF. 
During the exam1nation-in-chief of the plaintiff, and after 
he had testified with some particularity as to the facts of the 
nccident, the following occurred (M. Rec., p. 19): 
'' Q. Was there any whistle blowing when it struck you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was there any bell ringing Y . 
A. No, sir, not a. sound of a. ringing bell. The last thing 
I remember that passed through my mind I knew the train 
would hit me-
1\fr. Spicer: I object to that form of testimony as to his 
opinion. He can testify as to facts. 
The Court : I think impressions made on hi:tn are proper. 
By Mr~ H.aw: 
Q. Can you say what passed through youJ mind Y 
A. It passed through my mind that ii the bell had been 
ringing I never would have been hit. I knew the train was 
right at me.'' 
It is submitted· that the statement by the witness as to 
what passed through his mind, namely, "that if the bell had 
been ringing I never would have been hit", was clearly vio· 
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lative of the rule against opinion evidence and should have 
been excluded. 
The general rule is stated in 22 Corpus Juris, pp. 485, 502-
504, as follows: · 
"The normal function of a witness is merely to state facts 
within his personal knowledge, and under ordinary circum-
stances his opinion or conclusion with respect to matters in 
issue or relevant to the issue cannot be received. 
As the opinion evidence rule is intended to provide against 
the mischief of invasion of the province of the jury, a court 
should as far as possible exclude the inference, conclusion or 
judgment of a witness as to the ultimate fact in issue, even 
though the circumstances are such as might warrant a rela.xa-
tion of tlu~ rule exc.luding opinion but for this circumstance. 
And it is usually regarded as proper to adopt the same 
course as to facts which are highly material to the issue.'' 
In Atlantic Coast Line v. 'Oaple, 110 Va. 514, in discussing 
a hypothetical question asked an expert witness as to the po-
sition which should have been occupied by a trainman so as 
to avoid injury, the Court said at p. 519: 
''The question did not call for the answer of an expert 
witness. All of the facts touching the matter involved in 
the question were fully before the jury and easily understood, 
a.nd needed no elucidation by an expert. The witness was 
merely expressing an opinion which the jury was as capable 
of expressing as he was. No principle of law is better settled 
than that the opinions of witnesses are in general inadmissi-
ble; that witnesses can testify to facts only and not to opinions 
or conclusion based upon the facts. SotUthern~ Ry. Co. v. 
lJ;J auzey, 98 Va. 692, 694, 37 8. E-. 285. 
While the general rule, is as stated, there are exceptions to 
it; but there is no reason in this case for making an excep- · 
tion. When all relevant facts can be or ha.ve been introduced 
before the jury, and the latter are able to deduce a reasonable 
inference from them, no reason exists for receiving opinion 
' evidence, and it is inadmissible. Iron, &c., v. Ton~linson, 104 
Va. 254,51 S. E. 362; Va. Car. Chen~. Co~ v. Knight, 106 Va. 
67 4, 676, 56 S. E)j 725.'' 
The case of N orolk, .&c. Ry. Co. v. Sttjfolk Ltl/mber ·co., 92 
--. 
44. Supreme Court of A ppeais of Virginia. 
Va. 413, involved a eollision between the trains of two in-
tersecting railroads and the main issue was to determine the 
proxiniate cause of the accident as between the two companies. 
A witness for the plaintiff was asked the following ques-
tion: "Mr. Cannon, if there had been any signal-post with 
signals and a watchman, as the contract requires, and· is now 
there, could there have been any acc.ident on that occasion Y 
To this the witness replied, 'I think not'." Defendant hav-
ing duly objected to the action of the trial court in allowing 
the question to be asked, it was held on appeal, that the ques-
tion called for an express:on of a mere opiniou and should 
have been excluded. 
See also to like effect : 
Virginian R. Co. v. Bell, 118 Va. 492; 
Va.-Car. Chem .. Co. v. Knight, 106 V.a. 674; 
Sou. R. ·co. ·v . .t1f.1a~tzy, 98 Va. 692. 
The witness in the instant case had already testified as to 
f.he facts of the accident and the jury were in as good a posi-
tion to determine the cause thereof ,as he. The circumstances 
were in no sense so complicated or involved as to require· any 
statement of his conclusion nor can it be said that its admis-
sion was of any assistance to them. The opinion moreover, 
was first expressed at the trial and did not possess and guar-
antee of trustworthiness such as might have characterized a 
spontaneous utterance constituting a part of the res gestae. 
It was plainly self-serving in nature as well. 
Furthermore the opinion given was upon an ultimate fact 
in issue. The witness was the plaintiff in the action and the 
only witness who purported to testify on the subject. The 
jury may well have believed that if such evidence was com-
petent it was binding upon them, thus resulting in a substi-
tution of the plaintiff's judgment for their own. This is par-
t!cularly true since objection to the testimony was duly made 
and overruled in the presence of the jury. The defendant's 
case was very seriously prejudiced by the court's ruling, and 
it is submitted that this error alone requires a new trial. 
VI. 
ERROR IN GRANTING INSTRUCTION 1. 
· On motion of the plaintiff the following instruction was 
given by the Court (M. Rec., p. 145). 
The Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. M. L. Barlow. 45 
INSTRUCTION 1. 
"The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from 
the evidence in this case, that the appr~ach to the crossing 
where the plaintiff was struck '-vas extraordinarily danger-
ous, then it was the duty of the servants of the defendant to 
exercise extraordinary care to prevent injury to persons 
about to cross over on said crossing, and it was also the duty 
of the plaintiff to use extraordinary care for his safety. in 
crossing and as to whether such care was used or adopted by 
the defendant's servants or by the plaintiff in conformity 
with the danger of the crossing, is a question for the jury to 
determine.'' 
It is submitted that this instruction, which allowed the jury 
t.o find that tlie approaeh to the crossing was "extraordi-
narily dangerous'' is plainly unsupported by evidence. As 
has already been pointeu out, at a distance of 30 feet from 
t-he main line track the plaintiff had an unobstructed view 
for at least 450 feet. As he dre'v nearer the trac.k this view 
expanded proportionately. 'rhese are undisputed physical 
facts, established by photographs and the blueprint ma.p. 
rrhere were no cars standing on the side track and no other 
trains in close proximity to the crossing. 
Compare: 
J(imbaU & Fink v. Ftle·nd, 95 ·va. 125, 136; 
N. d~ lV. B. Co. v. Holmes, 109 Va. 407. 
The Notice of ~Totion contained no allegation or suggestion 
that the approach to the crossing was "extraordinarily dan-
gerous", nor did :t set out any facts or circumstances to sub-
stantiate a elun·ge of this character. 
Purthermore, Inst.u(•tion 1 was erroneous in imposing upon 
the defendant a duty of exercising "extraordinary care". 
1Jpon well settled principles it was only required to exercise 
ordinary eare to a\·o:d injuring travelers at the crossing. 
JV. dl; Tr. Co. v. ll~':lkes' Arlm 'r, li37 Va. :l02; 
a Elliott on H.ailroads (3rd Ed.), Sec. 1649. 
rehe recent ease of Va .. Eler:. d': P. Co. v. Olirer, 146 S. E. 
~00, was an action for <lamages for persona] injuries received 
Ly the plaintiff, as a passenger in an automobile struck by 
n ~treet car at a highway crossing. 
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In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, for error in giv-
ing two instructions· which placed upon the motorman, ''the 
duty of extraordinary care as an insnrer of the safety of the 
plaintiff", this Court said in part: 
''The instruction is, however, amenable to the objection that 
it imposes upon the defendant the duty of using every means 
it could have used to have avoided the accident. In no sense 
was· the defendant an insurer of the plaintiff's safety. The 
ouly duty imposed by law upon the defendant was the duty of 
exercising· ordinary care to prevent the accident.'' 
In the instant case the train was proceeding at a moderate 
speed and a careful lookout was being maintained. If the sig-
nals prescribed by the statute were given it is difficult to see 
what more could be required. There wa.s no situation of· 
imminent peril created, such as could have been met by extra 
vigilance on the part of the defendant. At the time when it 
first became apparent to the engineman that the plaintiff was 
in peril there was nothing 'vhich they could have done to pre-
vent the accident. There was no attempt made by the plain-
tiff to involw the last clenr chance doctrine a.gainst the en-
g:neman, and clearly no evidence was adduced to support any 
i·erovery under this theory. 
"F}ven. thoug·h the evidence had disclosed that the plain-
tiff's view in approaching the eros sing wa.s obstructed, or 
1hat other physical conditions existed which necessitated ad-
dif onal pret~autions on the part of the defenrlant, the stand-
nnl of care owed bv the defendant would still have been or-
dinary care under 'the particular circumstances. 
Director Orneral , .. Pe11ce's .Adm 'r, 1:35 'ra. 3~9. 
],or the reasons stated, thC'refore the actj.on of the trial 
( ~onrt in giYing Instruction 1, constitutes prejudicial er.ror. 
ns to the defendant, and necessitates a new trial of the c:ase. 
CONCLUSION. 
In condusion it is respectfully submitted that tl1e judg-
Jnent. of the Circuit Court of I:Ianovcr County should be re-
Ycrsed and final .in<lgmcnt enh~·re.d for the d~fendant, or at 
least that tlw defendan1 should he awarded a new trial. 
LEAI<E & SPICER., 
Conn!-:\el for the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company. 
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We, the undersigned counsel, practicing in the Supreme 
Uourt of Appeals of Virginia, are respectfully of the' opinion 
that the judgment complained of in the f.oregoing petition is 
erroneous, and tl1at the same should be reviewed and reversed. 
WALTER LEAI{E, 
MEADE T. SPICER, Jr. 
rro the Clerk at Richmond. 
Received Sept. 20/29. 
H.W.H. 
Writ of error allowed. Supersedeas awarded. Bond 
$10,000.00. 
HENRY W. HOLT. 
Received Sept. 23}29. 
H. S. J. 
VIRGINIA: 
In the Circuit Court for Hanover County. 
Pleas before the Circuit Court in and for the Circuit 
Court in and for the County of Hanover. 
,J nne 2Hth, 1929. 
Be it rememhered that heretofore, to-wit: A.ugnst 24th, 
1928, there was filed in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court 
of I-IanoYcr County hy M. L. Barlow·, Notice of Motion for 
Judgment against Chesapeake & Ohio Ra.ilway Company. 
\Vhicl1 notice together with the Sheriff's return thereon 
is in the words and fi~1ll'es followiu~:. to-wit: 
l\1. L. Barlow, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
(.~hesapealw & Ohio Railway Company, Defendant. 
NOTICE OF 1\10TION. 
rro the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company: 
':rake Notice that I shall, at Hanovei· Courtho~1se, on .Mon-
L 
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day, September 17, 192R, .at 10:00 A. M. or so soon there-
after as· I may be heard, mo-ve the Circuit Court of Han-
over County, Virginia, for a judgment against you in the 
amount of $20,000.00, for damages for a tort committed by 
you against me, for this, to-wit: . · 
That heretofore, to-wit: On the 20th day of March, 1928, 
you were the owner and operator of a certain railroad known 
ns the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, running from Richmond, 
Virginia westwardly to Cincinnati, Ohio, and other points, 
wh~ch said road runs through the County of Hanover, Vir-
ginia, and upon which said railroad, on the ·20th day of March, 
1928, you were operating certain railroad trains propelled by 
and draw·n by steam engines or locomotives and especially 
on said day were you operating upon and along said rail-
road and through the County of Hanover, Virginia, 
page 2 ~ and by Hano-ver Station about 9:00 P. ~f. a certain 
train known as through freight train traveling west-
wnrdly from Richmond in the direction of Charlottes-ville, 
wh.en and at. which time, l\L L. Barlo,v, the plaintiff, was leav-
ing the store of lvi. .T. Oampbell on the southern side of your 
snid railroad and was in his Chevrolet automobile prepartory 
to driving across a public crossing just west of Hanover Sta-
tion over to the northern side of your said railroad, when your 
aforesaid freight train approached the said Hanover Stat:ou 
and said crossing without blowing its whistle, as required 
by la.w, without sounding its bell, as required by la,v, and 
without g·~ving any warning· whatsoever of its approach, ran 
up to and across said crossing· just as the said l\f. L. Barlow, 
who had used all due and proper precautions in approaching 
to and starting across said railroad, had driven upon your 
tracks, when and whereupon and by reason of your fault and 
negligence aforesaid in not sounding your whistle for sa!d 
station and crossing, in not ringing your bell and in not giving 
warning of your approach, and with and by reason of your 
failure to keep a good~ sufficient and proper lookout for per-
sons crossing· your railroad at said crossing, which you well 
knew· was an usual and ordinary occurrence, and by your 
carelessness and negligence in the aforesaid respects and 
generally, you ran your aforesaid· train, referred to as a 
through freig·ht, upon, against and o-ver the automobile in 
wh~ch the said ~L L. Barlow was .riding, wherehy and by rca-
son whereof the said .JI. I..J. Barlow and his automobile afore-
said were violently struck, pushed and tln;own from your track 
·aforesaid a great distance, completely den1olishing said auto-
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. mobile and seriously, painfully and permanently injuring the 
said 1\!I. L. Barlow, ·an of wh:ch 'vas caused through reason 
of your fault and negligence as aforesaid, and without any 
fault or negligence on the part of the said l\L L. 
page 3 ~ Barlow, and thereby and reason thereof, as afore-
said, the aforesaid Chevrolet car of the said 1\I. L. 
Barlo'v was demolished and the said l\1:. L. Barlow received 
n broken and dislocated collar bone and shoulder, a broken 
rig·ht arm a_nd wrist, various and sundry cuts, bru!ses and 
abrasions on his head, body and limbs; by reason whereof he 
wns sick and sore for a long period of time, incurred large 
hospital medicinal and doctors' bills, and suffered great ex-
pense and loss of time from his business and work, and is 
further damaged by reason of the permanency of his injuries, 
all of wltich said damages to his automobile aforesaid and in-
juries and damages to his person aforesaid, which injuriE:s are 
permanent, he has suffered by reason thereof damages in the 
amount of $20,000.00, for which amount he will ask judgment 
against yon as aforesaid. 
l\I. L. BARLOW, 
By GEORGE E. HAW, 
His Counsel. 
By l\L C. 
(SHERIFF'S RETURN.) 
Executed in I-Ianover County, this 24th day of August, 
J 928, by delivering to ·v. C. Ancell, Agent for Chesapeake & 
Ohio Ra :I way Company at I-Ianover Station a true copy of 
the within notice of motion. 
A. B. HALL, 
Sheriff of Hanover Co. ·va. 
And upon another day, to-wit: September 17th, 1928. 
~I. L. Barlow 
against 
The Chesapeake m1d Ohio Raihvay Company. 
. UPON A NorriCE OF ~:lOTION FOR JUDG~IENT. 
rrhis cla~' rame the Defendant, hy its attorneys and with 
leave of c~onrt filed a plea of not guilty, whereupon this mat-
ter is docketerl and continued. · 
Suprcm~ Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
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v. 
rl,he Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company. 
PLEA OF NOT GUILTY. 
The said defendant, by its attorneys, comes and says that 
is is not guilty of the premises laid to its charge in manner 
and form as the plaintiff hath complained in his Notice of 
1\I of on. And of this the said defendant puts itself upon the 
country. 
November 28th, 1928_. 
l\I. L. B» rlow 
v 
LEAI(E & SPICER, p. cl. 
rrho Chesapeake and Ohio R-ailway Company. 
NOTICE OF INTEN'l,ION TO RETJY lTPON CONrrRIBU-
'rOR.Y NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF AS A 
DEF~JNSE OF THIS .A.CTION,.AND PARTICU-
LARS TI-IER.EOF. 
\Vithout admitting, but expressly denying that the defend-
ant w·as guilty of any neg·ligcnce, the defendant will rely 
upon the contributory neligence of the plaintiff_. "\V: L. Barlow, 
as a defense to this action, the particulars whereof are set 
forth as follows: 
1: The plaintiff, on the ocras~on of receiving· the injuries 
complained of, did not look or listen for the approach of n 
trnin to the crossing. 
2. The t>laintiff, on the occasion of receiving the injuries 
eomplainecl of,· did not look or I ~sten for the approacl1 of a 
train when ~meh looking· and listening would be effective. 
:t The plaintiff, on the occasion of receiving the injuries 
eomplained of, negligently failed to heed tl1C warnings, ''ral'll-
i np; signals, and otlwr means of notice of tl1e approach of the 
train to the c>.rossing;. all of which he snw and heard. 
page 5 ~ or, iu the exercise of ordinary C'are, ought to have 
seen and heard. · 
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4. The plaintiff, on the occasion of receiving the injuries 
complained of, recklessly and negligently attempted to drive 
across the tracks in the face of the approaching train, which 
was in full view. 
5. The plaintiff, upon tl1e occasion of receiving the inju-
ries complained of, was driving his automobile at an ·exces-
sive, negligent and improper rate of speed. · 
· 6. If for any reason whatever the plaintiff was unable to 
otherwise assure himself whether- or not a train was danger-
ously near the crossing (which is denied), he should have 
stopped his automobile in a place of safety for that purpose. 
7. The plaintiff, upon the occasion of receiving the inju-
ries complained of, in the exercise of ordinary care could 
have avoided the accident, after he knew, or ought to have 
lnwwn of the approach of the train to the crossing. 
8. The plaintiff, upon the occasion of receiving the inju-
ries complained of, knew·, or in the exercise of ordinary care-, 
oug·ht to have known of the app1;oach of the train to the cross-
ing, and failed to use ordinary care to prevent the accident. 
H .. The pla}utiff was otherwise negligent as 'vill appear 
from his own evidence. 
LEAI{E & SP~CIER, p. d. 
And upon another day, to-wit: Noveml1er 30th, 1928. 
l\L L. Barlow~ 
vs. 
'rhc Chesapeake and Ohio R-ailway Company. 
·uPON A NorriCE OF J\tiOTION FOR JUDG~fENT. 
This day came the parties, and the c}efendant having filed 
. a plea of not g11ilty and notice of intention to rely on con-
1 riba.tory neg-ligence of the plaintiff ar.; the defense of this 
action and particulars thereof; tl1ereupon came a 
page 6 } jury, to-,,-it: Bill Showarcl. J. L. Goddin, R. N. 
· "\Valdrop, Ollie }fartin, 0. R. Chapman, B. F. Wilt-
~hi re and "\Y. E. Duggins, who being sworn the truth upon the 
premises to spe~ik, having fully heard the evidence and. argu-
52 Supreme Uourt of A ppcals of Virginia. 
ment of counsel, being instructed by the Court retired to their 
room and after sometime returned into Court having found 
the following· verdict, to-wit: "We the jury upon the issue 
;joined fine for the plaintiff, and assess his damages at Seven 
·rhousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00)" Signed~ J. L. 
Ooddin, F·oreman. And the jury being discharged the de-
fendant moved the Court to set aside the verdict for the fol-
lowing reasons, to-w:t: as being contrary to the law and the 
evidence, misdirection by the Gourt and excessive damages 
awarded by the jury. 
\Vhich motion the Court takes under ach·isement. 
And up01i another day, to-wit: J·un.c 29th, U)29. 
~[. L. Barlow 
vs. 
Chesapeake & Ohio Rai1way Company. 
ORDER. 
~rhis day came the parties· plaintiff and defendant by their 
attorneys and the Court having maturely c.onsidered of the 
defendant's motion as heretofore made to set aside the ver-
dict of the jury as heretofore rendered in this action on No-
vember 28t1J 1928, doth overrule the same, to which action ·and 
ruling of the Court the defendant by its attorney excepted, 
it is therefore considered by the Court that the plaintiff do 
recover of the defendant the sum of Seventy five hundred 
Dollars ($7,500.00), the damages assessed by the jury in their 
verdict aforesaid, with interest thereon from November 28th 
1.928 until paid and his costs by him about his action expended, 
to whi<•h action and ruling· of the Court the defendant by its 
attorney excepted. 
page 7 ~ Jllemoramdum: Upon the trial of this action the 
defendant excepted to sundry opinions and to the 
judgment of the Court given against it and leave is given it 
f:o file its certificates or bills of exception at any time within 
the time allowed by law; an<l the deft~ndant intimating its 
intention to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals for a writ 
of error and s~tpersedeas to this judgment, it is ordered that 
the same he suspended for a period of ninety days from this 
date 011 condition that the defcmdant or someone for it, shall, 
within fifteen days from the date hereof, enter into a bond 
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before the Clerk of th!s court in the penalty of Two Thousand 
Dollars ($2,000.00) with security approved by said Clerk. 
rrhis day came. again the parties,. by their attorneys, and 
the defendant, hy its attorney, tendered to the court its Bills 
of Exceptions Numbers 1, 2 and 3, which were received by 
the Court signed, sealed and ordered to be made a part of 
the record of this case. 
page 8 ~ 
~ir. Geo. E. Haw. 
1\ttorney for l\L L. Barlo,v, 
R~chmond Va. 
Dear Sir: 
June 29, 1929. 
.. 
11a.ke N ofice: ':rhat we shall apply to the Clerk of the Cir-
cuit Court. of I-Ianover County, Virginia, for a transcript of 
the record in the rase of ~L L. Barlow v. 'rhe Chesapeake 
and Ohio R.ailway Company, which transcript will accom-
pany a petit~on for a writ of error and supersedea,s which we 
propose to file with the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia. · 
Yours very truly, 
LEAJ(E & SPICER, 
Counsel for ~rhe Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company. 
I hereby accept service of the above notice. 
page 9 } ?\Ir. Gco. E. IIaw, 
GEO. E. I-IA W, 
Counsel for l\L L. Barlow. 
.Attorney for J.v.L L. Barlow: 
'Take Notice: that on the 29th day of '"Tune, 1929, at 10 A. 
1\L, we will tender to the IIonorable Frank Armstead at 
Hnnover Circuit Court Clerk's Office Hanover C. H. ·va .. 
for si~11ing and filing. the defendant's Bill of Exceptions in 
the case of ~L L. Barlow v. The Chesapeake a1id Ohio Rail-
way Company. 
l1FJAK~E & SPICER, 
Counsel for 1.,he Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company. 
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I hereby accept service of the above notice. 
GEO. E. HA "\V, 
Counsel forM. L. Barlow. 
png·e 10 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Hanover County. 
l\L L. Barlo'v 
v. 
'L,he Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company. 
DEFENDANT'S BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO.1. 
Be it Remembered that on tl1e trial of this case ·and after 
the jury had been selected and sworn,. the following evidence 
was introduced before the jury: 
page 11 ~ DR. .• T. BLAIR FI'rTS, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first 
duly swo1~n, testified as follows: 
EXA:NIINATION IN CHIEF. 
Br ~fr. IIaw: 
· Q. Doctor, are you a practicing physician~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you practice? 
A. R.icl1mond. 
Q. \Vl1at is your specialty? 
A. Bone and joint surgery. 
Q. IR that what they rail orthopedic surgery? 
A. Yes, sir. ·' 
Q. You specialize in bones and joints? 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did 1\fr. Barlow apply to you for medical assistance 
~orne time during ~larch, 1928? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "\Viii you please g·ive the jury the history of 
page 12 ~ his case as it came to you? · 
A. Mr. Barlow was at Grace Hospital, and Dr. 
Br~·an asked me to look after .him. l-Ie had broken his right 
·wrist. 
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Q. Suppose you let him take his coat off, roll his shirt 
sleeves up and show where it was. 
A. (Illustrating 'vith plaintiff) He had broken this bone, 
the lower end (Indicating), and there were four or five differ-
ent fractures. Then, he dislocated the collar bone here. (In-
rlicating) There was this fracture here of this wrist. He 
had a lot of minor cuts and bruises which did not amount 
to as much as these fractures here. You know, the collar 
l)one comes up and hooks.to t}1e shoulder here, so what was 
to be done was to cut down here and sew this bone together. 
Q. 1V11at did you sew it with, something like catgut~ 
A. Yes, sir. That was sewed together. And he had this 
l1reak in this bone. '(Indicating) This was shattered and 
broken into many pieces. We pieced that together the best 
we could. H~ has gotten a much better result than 've thought 
]w would get here. He has still a lot of limitation; he can't 
bend his wrist this way, can't bend it at all this way. (Indi-
cating) The fingers have limbered up pretty well. 
page 13 ~ He has a fairly good hand. He still has a. lot of 
limitation in his shoulder; he can't use it nor-
mallv as he could. Otherw·ise I believe in the course of time 
most of this will limber up. He can't. get his hand behind his 
head yet. This is a permanent thing. (Indicating) lie is · 
not going to get much better than that. 
Q·. Yon are referring to the wrist~ . 
A. Yes, s ~r. I-Ie has between 40 and 50 per cent disability 
in that writ-it. 
Q. I understand you to say the wrist is what you consider 
. a permanent disability? · 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. About 40 or 50 per cent of the use of the arm? 
1\. Yes, sir. 
Q. How about the shoulder? 
A. I think tho shoulder will get well. It might take a year 
or two years. They ·are slow in getting- shoulders well. 
Q. Did he have any other breaks? 
A. No. Tl1ose were the main breaks. He was cut. up pretty 
well all over. 
\Vitness stood aside. 
Note: The jury were taken to view the scene of the injury 
c•on1plained of. 
page 14 ~ 1\i. L. BARLO\V, 
the plaintiff, in his own behalf, being first. duly 
sworn, testified as follo,vs : 
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EXAMINATION IN ,CHIEF. 
Hy l\Ir. Haw: 
Q. :Mr. Barlow, are you ~L L. Barlow, the plaintiff in this 
easel 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you live¥ 
A. On the W oolfoll{ place. 
Q. "'\Vhat is your occupation f 
.A. Automobile mechanic. 
Q. Do you run a garage~ 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. H~w long have you been operating·a grade there?· 
A. 1'hree years this coming April. 
Q. Were you the party injured by this train on the night of 
l\farch 29th? 
l\ .. Yes, sir. 
Q. 1928~ 
1\.. Yes, sir. 
Q. Just tell the jury how the accident happened,. 
pnge 15 ~ what train it. was that struck you¥ 
A. I don't remember the number of it. 
Q. \Vhcre was it coming· from f 
A. Com~ng from Richmond. 
Q. Going \vest? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About what time of night was it? 
A. It was between a quarter to nine and probably 9:15. 
Q. Somewhere near nine o'clock~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
·Q. vVas it a freig·ht or passenger train? 
A. Freight. 
Q. vVhere were you that night before the accident? 
A. I was in Mr. Campbell's store. 
Q. In· the store of Mr. Campbell on the southside of the 
railroad? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \Vere you driving an automobile? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \Vhere was your automobile parked? 
pnge 1.6 ~ A. l\fy automobile was parked kind of on this 
side next to the railroad. 
Q. Parked in front of Campbell's store by the side of the 
railroad? 
A. Yes, sir, facing the store. 
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Q. When you came out of Campbell's store did you go 
directly to the automobile f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you do when you got in it? 
A. Started it. 
Q. Had a self starter o.n 1 
A. Yes, sir, cranked up and backed around. 
Q. \Vas anybody with you at the time you came out1 
A. Wasn't anybody with me particularly; lots of people 
around there coming in and out. I was by myself. 
Q. You started your car. Did it start at first 1 Did you 
have to start it more than once 1 
A .. No, sir. 
Q. What did you do after your car started f D!d you go 
forward or back f 
1\. Backed around down the hill and pulled up to the rail-
road a certain distance, I don't know, 10 feet I reckon-5 
or 10 feet. 
Q. I-Iow far would you say you were from Camp-
pnge 17 ~ bell's store f How far was your car standing in 
front of Campbell's store~ 
A. Ahout five vards from the store. 
Q. About I5 feet from the store 1 
A. Yes, s:r. 
Q. You backed around to your right 1 
A .. Yes, s!r. 
Q. Headed towards the railroad and started ·acl=oss the 
crossing1 
A. Yes, s!r. 
Q. rren \\7hat you did when you started across the crossing? . 
A. I started across; I looked, I don't know how many feet, 
but just before I got to the side-track I lc;>Oked good both 
ways, didn't hear nny train, didn't hear a sound. I was st!ll 
in second gear. I pulled up the grade and looked all the 
time like anybody else would be doing. I got about that far 
neross. (Indicating) There was a big light at Campbell's 
store and clark as a dungeon clown the railroad. Just as I 
got about two feet w:th the front wheels across the main line 
the light swung right around in my face. Then no bell was 
rining and I hadn't heard a sound. I knew I was hit. The 
last thing I I:cmember I said, to myself, "If the bell had been 
ringing I would not have been hit". 
Q. You don't know how far the train was from 
page 18 ~ you when the light struck yon1 
A. No, but it was not very far. 'rhcre is a curve 
a round there. It was throwing the light the other way all 
;;g Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
the time. As soon as it straightened up it was right at me . 
."\Vh~n it threw tl1e light on me I knew the train was right at 
me. 
Q. It was throwing the lig·ht towards Jacob's storeY 
A. Yes, s1r. 
Q. The light did not hit you until just before it struck 
vouY 
· A. It looked like ·it was about 10 or 5 yards. 
Q. Was there anything at Campbell's store which would 
ii1terfere with your seeing clearly the light coming up the 
track-any light at Gamphell 's store~ · 
A. Nothing but the lights he had. 
Q. H·ow many lights did he have on his storeY 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Ilas he a lig-ht on his side porch Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And a light in front? 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is it right 1ig·ht around his store? Do those 
page 19 ~ lights give a pretty good light? 
A. Yes, sir, I think so, really good, bright lights. 
Q. :rvir. Barlow, did the t:rain blow the whi gtle at all for 
that crossing? 
A. I never heard the sonnJ of a whistle. 
0. Did you notice whether the bell was ringing or not~ 
A. I.will hold up my hand to God that no bell 'vas ringing. 
Q. \\T as there any whistle blow~ng: when it struck you~ 
A .. No, sir. 
Q. vVas there any bell ringing~? 
A. No, sir, not a sound of a bell ringing. The last thing I 
remember that passed through my mind I knew the train 
would hit me-. · 
~Tr. Spicer: I object to that form of testimony as to his 
opinion. lie can testify as to facts. 
The Court: I th:nk impressions made on him are proper. 
Bv 1\rfr. Haw: 
·Q. Can ~von say what passed through your mind? 
lt. It passed through my mind that if the bell had been 
t•inging I never would have been hit. I knew the train was 
right at me. . 
Q. ,Just tell the jury how badly yon were hurtY 
page 20 ~ A. I was hurt real hadlv-mv :;;boulder and back. 
I didn't really lnww l1o'v ·bad it was. It was about 
three n1onths before I could do any work. 
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Q. Was your wrist broken as Dr. Fitts stated Y 
A. Yes, sir. Tl1at has supplied up some. 
Q. How long were you knpcked out of work? 
.A.. I was really knocked out of w~rk three months, could 
not do anything. Of course, I would go down to the shop and 
come back. I think it was about two months after when I was 
in ~Ir. Campbell's store (I went down to see my car for the 
first time) the freight train was coming through-
Mr. Spicer: I object. 
':Phe Court: I don't know what it is. 
Mr. Haw: Don't tell about what other freight trains did. 
Q. You said you were knocked out of work about three 
m.onths? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you been able to work regularly and capably since 
von were hurt? 
· A. No, sir, not as I did before. . 
Q. Are you able to do as much work in a day 
page 21 ~ as before? 
A. No, sir. I can't reach up, when I get under 
n rar, like I did before. 
Q. How long- have you been working as an automobile me-
chanic? . 
A. I have been fooling· with automobiles ever since 1913. 
Q. That was your occupation at tl1e time you were hurt and 
Rti1l is your occupation 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can yon say to what extent you arc affected as regards 
vour ability to work~ 
· A. I reaily wouldn't know; I couldn't say. 
Q ..... 1\.re you capable of making as much money as you were 
hcfore? · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. About what was your income from your. automobile 
lm!=iiness· before vou were l1urt? 
A. I reckon nilout $30.00 a week. 
Q. Have yon hee11 able to make that much since? . 
A. No, sir. I lost a good lot of my business after the acci-
dent happenecl by not having anybody there to do it. 
Q. How old are you t 
A. I w~s born in J 888; that makes me about 40 mv next 
hirthday. · · " 
Q. Forty your next birthday? 
---·-·-------------------------
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page 22 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
. Q. What amount have you incurred or paid out 
in doctors' oills 1 . 
A. I don't know exactly. I am still owing Dr. Bray. 
Q. How much is his bill f 
A. He has not sent it to me. I paid the hospital bill all 
except $7 .50. 
Q. \Vhal was your hospital hill~ 
A. $100.00. 
Q. $100.00 'hospital bill¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \Vhat was nr. Fitts 1 bill? 
A. $90.00. Dr. Bryan's was $10.00 Dr. Bray'~ I don't 
know. 
(~. He is a local doctor here? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About how many tilue~ did Dr. Bray call on you outside 
of the emergency treatment he gave you 1 
A. I think he came to see me two or three times. 
Q. vVere you injured otherwise than your shoulder and your 
wrist? 
A. Well, only just scars. 
Q. You mean you 'vere scratched and bruised 1 
pag·e 23 ~ .A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you suffer from them at all any length of 
time 1 
A. Yes, I really did. My head bothered me for a pretty 
good while. 
Q. Where were yon cut in the head? 
1\.. Up here. (Indicating) 
Q. How long· a cut f 
A. I don't know. I wore a bandage on it about four days. 
Q. Do you know whether they sewed it up 1 
A. I don't think they did. 
Q. You were in the hospital how longf 
A. Six days. 
Q. 'I, hen came home? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 1\fr. Barlow what kind of automobile were you driving'? 
1\.. Chevrolet. 
Q. vVhat was your car worth at the time it was struck1 
A. It was really worth $250.00 or probably $300.00. I 
had different prices offered for it in trading for a new one. 
Q. How long had you bought the car ·t 
page 24 ~ A. I bought it second-hand; I reek on I had it 
two weeks. 
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Q. What was the price tl1at you paid for it? 
A. "\Veil, I don't kno\v. To "tell the truth, I never ·paid the 
1nan for it. 
Q . .Still owing for it 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You actually bought it but hadn't paid· for it yet~ 
A. He turned it over to me to kind of sell it, or give him a 
certain price for it. 
Q. He turned th.e car over to you with the understanding 
that you were to sell it or give h:m the price for it~ 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Yon say the car was worth $250 or $30(H 
A. Yes, sir. l\Ir. Luck I think offered $250 in .trade for 
n new one. I spent about $60.00 on it after I got it to get 
it in order. 
By the Court: 
Q. "\Vhat was it worth after the accident? 
A. I reckon about $10.00. 
Q. Completely demolished it~ 
A. It waRn 't worth anything. Had some right good tires 
on it lntt somebody got them off. 
page 25 ~ CROSS EXAl\IINATION. 
By Mr. Spic~r: 
Q. "\Vhat year caP was that 1 
i\ .. 1925. 
Q. Chevrolet coupe 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q .. You said 1\ir. \Vinston brouglit it to you. I:Iad he exec-
cuted any bill of sale or transfer of title to you'? Had you 
gotten title to the car? 
A. Yes, sir, I think I had. 
Q. You think you had. Don't you know f 
A. I think I had. 
Q. IIad the title been changed at the office of the l\fotor 
Vehicle Commissioner? • 
.. A.. I don't remember. 
(~. Don't you know ? . 
A. I really don't kno,v. I would have to go to the house 
m1d hunt it up. I think I have the title. 
Q. 'l'he car clidn 't belong to you, then f 
A. I said I think I have the title; I am not sure 
Q. I-Iaven 't you got a card from the ~iotor Vehicle Com-
missioner? 
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A. I might have it at the house; I don't lmow. 
page 26 ~ Q. Never took the trouble· to look it up since this 
accident? 
A. I certainly have not. 
Q. Then, the car didn't belong to you if you didn't have it? 
A. It was left in my care .. 
Q. You hadn't paid for it? 
A. No. I still owe for it. 
Q. You don't kno"r what you owe for it ·1 
A. No, sir. Mr. Winston lives in Florida. I hardly ever 
Hee him, haven't seen him in six mouths-longer than that. 
Q. You didn't have a\1y agreement as to what you would 
pay for it? 
A. No 
1\fr. Spicer: I move to exclude the evidence a·s to the value 
of the car. It doesn't seem to me the plaintiff sho,vs any 
financial il1terest in it. 
"\Vitness: As I say, he left the ear with me to do as I pleased 
with it-pay him or sell it or anything I could do with it. 
Of course, lw mailed me the title to transfer it. 
1\fr. Spicer: If he l1ad any ftle at all H: was 
page 27 ~ purely a commission interest. 
The Court: It might be simply a warehouseman. 
I will not exclude the evidence. I will take it up on instruc-
1-ions. I am not prepared to say as a matter of law whose 
loss it was. -
Witness: It is my loss. I have to pay him for the car. 
I\Ir. Sp:cer: He has not sho\\''11 any obligation to pay Mr. 
Winston. 
The Court: I overrule the motion. I am not prepared to 
say· what is the legal responsibility. \Ve can take it up on 
instructions .. 
1\rfr. Spicer: I note an· exception on the ground that the 
evidence docs not show sufficient financial interest for the 
plainfff to recover damages for the loss of the car . 
By 1\i[r. Spirer: • 
Q. I\Ir. Barlow, do you know whether that automobile had 
hecn in a previous collision ? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. 1vfr. Barlow, wlult sort of night was it you 
pnge 28 ~ were at 1\ir. Campbell's store when you came out 
and had this collision 1 "T as it a clear uigl1t or 
rainy night·~ 
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A. It was not a rainy night. It was a pretty dark night. · 
Q. Was it a cold night f 
A. Yes, sir, pretty cold. 
Q. Did you have on an overc.oat f 
A. I think I did, yes, sir. 
Q. Were the windows to your car closed? 
A. No, just about half way. 
Q. Are you sure about that? By about half way you mean 
the one on your left hand side1 
A. Both of them a bout half way down. 
Q. \Vhich 'way did you say you were parked? Which way 
was your car facing? 
A. I was facing l\ir. Campbell's store. 
Q: Facing Mr. Campbell's store f 
A. Yes. 
Q You backed around and put the back of your car south 
away from the railroad track? . · 
A. Yes. 
Q. W11eu you got to, say, the distance of about thirty feet 
from the track on your ·way across, about how fast 
page 29 ~ were you going? I mean the track on which this 
train was running1 
A. Well, I was running very slow; I was in low gear. 
Q. About two or three miles an hour 1 
A. I suppose so. 
Q. Yon were in low gear? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About two or three miles an hour? 
A. Yes. sir. 
Q. Did· you increase speed any between that time and the 
·time von were on the track? 
A. 'r did after looking both ways, I increased speed. 
Q. How fast were you going then f About five ·miles T 
A. Something· like that I reckon. ~ 
0. Going up g-rade, two or three miles an hour, J\IIr. Barlow, 
1mder thoRe cireumstances, in what distance could you have 
Rtopped the car? 
A. I could haYe stopped it in two feet at the speed I was in. 
Q. And when did yon get to a speed of, say, five miles an 
l1our? By the fme you hit the first track or before you hit 
the first track ? 
A. About the time I hit the firRt sidetraek. 
page 30 ~ Q. In what distance could you stop that car at 
that rate of ~peed? . 
A. I could stop it in two feet, going up grade like tl1at. 
L_ 
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Q. So practically in that distance you could have stopped 
the car within two feet if necessaryf 
A. Yes, sir, with good brakes. 
Q. Did you have good brakes on the car¥ 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Now. 1\fr. Barlow, the first track that you passed, which 
I believe is known as the passing track, you didn't see any 
train or any cars on that track, did you 1 
A. I don't remember seeing any. 
Q. You saw the headlight of the engine~ 
A. I don't remember. 'rhe light blinded me. I saw it com-
ing right around in my face. It was like somebody throwing 
a flashlight in your face. 
Q. It ''7as a very strong light, was it¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. l\1r. Rarlow. wl1cn you w·cre, say, thh·ty feet from the 
crossing, was there anything to prevent you from looking 
down that track towards the direction from which 
page 31 r the train was coming, anything that would have 
kept you from seeing as far as the east end of the 
station? \Vas there any obstruction to your view in there~ 
A. No, I don't think so. 
Q. Nothing that would block your vision from the time you 
were, say, thirty feet from the track1 
A. Thirty feet? Yes, sir, it would be. At thirty feet you 
couldn't see around th~ curve at all. . 
Q. Here is a picture which purports to be taken 33 feet 
south of the main line track, in the road leading over the 
crossing·. 
1\f.r. Haw: You mean the straight road, not the road he was 
011? 
1\Ir. Spicer: The road that goes directly over the crossing. 
In other words, 33 feet from the track. 
Q. (Continued) Can you tell from that picture just exactly 
where you turned 1 This picture was taken 33 feet from the 
track, right opposite the crossing. Did you come right by 
there, right by that point in coming from the store~ (Incli-
cating.) 
Note: Picture exhibited to witness was filed and marked 
"Ex. Barlow #1". 
page 82 ~ A. Of course, from the pidure here, I was here. 
(Indicating) I backed around here and headed 
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straight to the crossing and pulled up a· c.ertain distance to 
the railroad. 
Q. If this picture was taken 33 feet from the track (that 
is, the main track), was there anything to prevent you from 
having a clear view do·wn towards the east when you were 
B3 feet from the track 1 
A. Not as I see, not the way the picture shows. 
1\fr. Spicer: I don't mean to say you passed through this 
identical spot, but at some time or other you passed at a point 
:m feet from the track. 
Witness: It was so dark dow·n that track, either this light 
from tT a cobs' store or this light from the train was over 
there, I don't know whieh it was. It was dark down there; 
you coulcln 't see anything. 
Q. 'fhere wasn't any obstruction though after you looked 
beyond t110 porch 1 
A. It was a dark night; you couldn't see; I uidn't see any-
thing. 
Q. There is nothing to keep you from seeing east 
page ;~3 ~ as far as any buildings or trees or any other ob-
struction is concerned; is that true f 
.A. \Vhat you are saying I haven't said before. I don't 
know about that. You are saying that; I am not. 
Q. Here is anotl1er picture which shows a locomotive down 
in front of the station, the pict"qre being taken from a point 
:121;2 feet south of th~ track. Would there be anything be-
tween you, if you were in that same position, and that loco-
motive that would keep you from seeing the locomotive 1 I8 
there anything in there between you and the locomotive to 
keep you from seeing it? 
A .. No, sir. 
Q. So that the natural darkness which you speak of would 
he t1lC only thing between you and the locomotive, is that 
true? 
A. I don't see anything on there. 
Q. You don't see anything? 
1\.. No, sir. 
Note: Picture exhibited to witness was filed and marked 
''Ex .. Barlow #2''. 
page 34 ~ Q. You spoke of looking in both directions. 
Where were you when you last looked towards 
t11~ mu:t ns respects the track on which this train was coming? 
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A. I don't know exactly. I probably might have been on 
the sidetrack. 
Q. You don't know exactly¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you been across this crossing before¥ 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did you come across there on your way to the store? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Ho'v long had you been in the store before you came 
out? 
A. I don't remember exactly; probably an hour. 
Q. You said it was a rather cold night, was it¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was the store door closed¥ 
\Vitness: What do you mean¥ 
Mr. Spicer: Store door. "\Vhen you came out was it open or 
closed¥ 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you have any trouble starting your car, ~fr. Bar-
low? 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. I suppose the car made a certain amount of 
pnge 35 ~ nojsc when you were starting it to. get into low 
gear? 
A. They generally do, aU of them. 
Q. This one did on that occasion? 
A. No more than usually, no more than others would make. 
Q. It did make a noise though? 
A. Sure. 
0. Have you been operating your shop since this accident? 
A. Yes, sir. I have had a fellow down there. It was closed 
np for a while., about a week, didn't have anybody to work 
for me: 
Q. HaYc you been working on automobiles since the acci-
(lcnt? 
A. Yes, sir, in the last two or three weeks I have been help-
i np; a man down there, showing him. 
Q. Have yon got a mechanic there now besides yourself? 
A. No, nothing but a helper. 
Q. l-Ie is not a mechanic? 
A.. No. 
Q. You are still taking repair work? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Have you had to turn down any jobs in the last month? 
A. No. · 
page 36 ~ R.E-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Iiaw :· . 
Q. Mr. Barlow, I don't think you made it plain as to the 
road you 'vent up to the crossing. Did you go up a straight 
road that goes a·cross the crossing, or did you go up a road 
that bends around towards Campbell's store~ The road 
sort of splits. Did you go up a road that curves towards the 
store, or towards Judge Cardwell's, when you started up over 
the crossing! 
A. I backed down the hill and started straight up to the 
crossing. 
Q. Were you going up the crossing road or the road coming 
f1·om Campbell's store T 
A. I was p;oing up the road about half way between the two. 
Q. 'fhe tail end of your car was sort of diagonal towar<!s 
Campbell's store, curving up onto the railroad? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ~fr. Spicer asked you al>out your work, etc. Can you 
tell the jury whether, from the standpoint of your earning 
capacity you are able to do a full day's work or half day's 
work, from the standpoint of the money yon could earn, since 
you hurt your arm~ 
A. No, sir, I have not been able to work; I have 
page 37 ~ a helper and show him how to do, but as for my 
doing a day's work I haven't done a day's work 
since it happened. 
Q. \Vith your arm in that condition, if it continues, will 
you ever l1e able to do a full clay's work in your business? 
A. No, sir. I can't pick up anything off the floor now, can't 
])end it back far enough. The lower I get down the better 
I can pick up anything. I can't reach up to the motor and 
rocls and things. Of course, if I can get up to it, the better I 
can work. · 
Q. To what extent can you work your w-rist up and down 
like that 1 (Indicating) 
A. ·very little. I can't get it back down this way. (Indi-
eating.) 
R.E-CROSS EXA!YIINATION. 
By ~~Ir. Spicer: 
Q. Here is a picture taken from the north side of the road 
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as it comes across the track. Can you point out there about 
where you crossed the track? Can you tell how you entered 
on that picture? Campbell's store is over here. (Indicating.) 
A. Of course, I was in here. (Indicating.) 
page 38 ~ 1vfr. Haw: You have that thing wrong, haven't 
you 1 Let's get that thing straight. 
·vvitness: Wait a minute. I haven't understood the picture. 
Campbell's store would be here. (Indicating.) Of course, 
I was bound to have been in here. (Indicating·.) 
By ~ir. Spicer: 
Q. You were going across the track, weren't you; that was 
your object g 
.... ~. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where did you come up to cross the tracks~ You must 
have crossed somewhere over by the crossing. 
A. Here is where I was hit at. (Indicating) I was com-
ing from back here. 
Q. ,Just mark it .. 
A. I can't mark it because I don't kno,v. 
lVIr. Spicer: I want to see where you were. 
\Vitness: How could I tell. It would be impossible for me to 
f.ell that. 
Mr. Spicer: If Your Honor please-
\Vitness: I don't know. 
J\fr. Spicer: I insist the witness should be able 
page 39 ~ to say approximately where he crossed the track. 
\Vitness: I aimed to cross at. the crossing. 
Tl1e Co~ut: l-Ie can tell approximately, hut on the picture he 
says he can't tell. 
~lr. Spicer: Here is a picture of the crossing, and he cer-
tainly reached the first track. He didn't get across the track. 
Ife certainly should tell approximately ''rhere he struck the 
first track. The picture certainly shows the whole crossing. 
Witness: I would say about jn the center of the crossing. 
rrhat is all I could say. 
Note: Picture exhibited to witness was filed and marked 
"Ex. Barlow #3". 
By 1\'Ir. Spicer: 
Q. You started to cross the track about in the center of the 
crossing·, is that what you say1 
A. Yes, sir. 
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page 40 ~ RE-DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By ~Ir. Haw: 
Q. I have drawn a sketch which shows Campbell's store 
there on the right, and here is the crossing. There is the 
road that bends down towards Campbell's store. Here is the 
straight road. vV ere you coming up this road or in between 
those roads¥ 
A. ·I backed back in here. I would imagine in between the 
two. 
1Ir. Spicer: Just about the center of the crossing. 
By Mr. Haw: 
· Q. Were you curving up or were you going straight 1 
A. I was curving. 
Q. Curving in that way? (Indicating) 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-CROSS EXAl\iiNATION. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. Can you indicate on there about the course you took? 
A. I can't well do it, I don't guess. I know I was back in 
liere. (Indicating) It seems as if I came around in that di-
rection. · 
Q. You mean you came up this way1 (Indicat-
pnge 41 ~ ing) 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So the course you took was approximately up that way? 
A. I wasn't jam up here. (Indicating). 
Q. About in between? 
The Court: lYiark with an X where the witness thinks was 
the course he took. 
By 1\ir. Spicer: 
Q. Docs that line of X 's there indicate approximately the 
course you took f 
A. As near as I can get at it. I am not sure. 
Note: Sketch exhibited to witness was filed and marked 
''Ex. Badlow #4''. 
\Vitness stood aside. 
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page 42 } LONNIE HUGHES, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAJ\IIINATION IN CHIEF. 
·By l\ir. Haw: 
Q·. Lonnie, where do you work¥ 
A. I work down at l\1:r. Campbell's store. 
Q. Were you at Mr. Campbell's. store the night Mr. Bar-
low was struck bv the train 1 
A. Yes, sir. · . 
Q. What were you doing when the accident occurred 1 
A. I w·as closing up at the time when the accident hap-
pened. I was closing the blind next to the railroad when the 
accident happened. - I came around in front, and he had 
cranked up his car. He was in the crossing when I came 
around. Of course, I hooked the blind on the inside. 
Q. He had cranked his car and was getting ready to start f 
A. 1res, sir. . · 
Q. Where were you? 
A. I came around to the other door next to the railroad 
and shoved that blind. 
Q. That is the side door? 
page 43 ~ A. 1[ es, sir. 
Q. You came out the door next to the railroad~ 
A. Yes, sir, and put that blind on and went through the 
other door. 
Q. You mean the front door? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You went around to the front then¥ . 
A. Yes, sir. I went back in the front door and was closing 
the other blind inside when I heard a. crash. 
Q. Did the train blow? 
}\.. I didn't hear it. 
Q. Did the hell ring? 
A. No, sir, tl1e bell wasn't ringing. 
Q. Are you positive of that? 
A. I certainly am. 
Q. Are you or not positive of that? . 
A. I am positive the bell was not ringing. 
Q. Did any whistle blow while you were out there? 
A. I didn't hear it. 
l\·Ir. SpicP-r: I object to the continuous line of questioning. 
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page 44 } By Mr. Haw·: 
Q. Did any whistle blow while you were outside 
the store~ 
A. I didn't hear any. 
Q. Have you got good ears Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you had any trouble hearing whistles there be-
fore? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did any whistle blow after you went back in the store ~ 
A. I didn't hear any. 
Q. Did you have any trouble in hearing the crash t 
A. No, sir, I heard that. 
Q. You heard no bell f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And no bell rang? 
A. Wasn't any bell ringing. 
Q. You were, right at the time of the crash, at the side of 
the store next to the railroad? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. But inside tl1e store? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then before that you just came in the door from the 
front? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 45 ~ CROSS EXAJ\IIINATION. 
Rx )fr. Spicer: 
Q. Where was ~fr. Barlow when you came in the front 
door? 
A. He was in the car, had cranked it up. His car was 
headed towards the store. 
Q. He l1ad not moved the car when you came in Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did yon close the door when you came in? 
A. I don't know. I suppose I closed it (usually do) when 
I went in, because it was cold. 
Q. It was cold¥ 
... ~. It was a very cold night. 
Q. The natural thing for you to do would be to close the 
cloor when you came in.? 
A. I think so. I closed the front door. 
Q. rl,hen you went over and fixed the door inside? 
A.. Hooked the other door inside. 
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Q. You were not intending to cross the track, were you t 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You were not listening out for any train particularly 
were you¥ 
A. I could not say I was. 
Q. Were you going to take any train¥ 
page 46 ~ A. No, sir. · 
Q. Didn't know of any train coming, did you 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't have any occasion to pay any attention as 
to whether or not any bell or whistle was being sounded Y 
A. No particular attention. 
Q. After the accident occurred where was the engine? It 
was not at the crossing, was it~ It had gone on beyond the 
crossingf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was it several car· lengths 1 
A. I don't know how many car lengths. 
Q. It was a right long train, wasn't it f 
A. Yes, sir, I suppose. I could not tell you how many cars 
it had on it. 
Q. You don't hear the train blow every time it blows there 
do you? 
A. I hear it right often. Sometimes they go by and I 
don't hear them; but on several occasions we have been sit-
ting there and I would say, ''There goes another one that 
didn't blow''. · 
page 47 ~ -Mr. Spicer: I object to the answer. 
The Court: I don't. thinl{ that is testimony.' It 
is not responsive to the question. 
By 1\fr. Haw : 
Q. You say you heard the crash. Did you find out what the 
crash was? 
.A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was it! 
A. A boy told me when I went out it hit 1\{r. Barlow's car. 
Q. His car was smashed up? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was the engine and train standing 'vhen you got 
out there~ 
A. I don't know; I could not exactly say how far up the 
track. 
Q. Had gone some distance up the track~ 
A. Well, I don't know. 
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By the Court : 
Q. Had the train stopped when you got out t 
A. Yes, sir, the train had, I suppose, about stopped when 
I got out. I was the first man I suppose to get to Barlow. 
page 48 ~ By ~Ir. Haw: · 
Q. You don't know where the engine wa.s and 
you don't know certainly where the train stopped 1 
A. No, sir. I went there as quick as I could after I heard 
the crash. Of course, I didn't know really what it was; I 
didn't know it was any train there when I beard the crash. 
Q. Did you help Barlow out of the car? 
A. No, sir. He was already out. 
Q. He was knocked out~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you pick him up~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were paying attention to him and not to the train1 
A. Yes, sir. 
\Vitness stood aside. 
page 49 ~ CA~IPBELL SHELTON, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXA:l\1INATION IN CHIEF. 
By Mr. Haw: 
Q. vVhere do you live? 
A. I live in Caroline County, Virginia. 
Q. About how far from Hanover f 
A. About nine miles. 
Q. Are you over here frequentlyj 
· A. Not very often. 
(~. A.re you familiar with the location down at Campbell's 
store1 
A. Not much. 
Q. Were you at Campbell's store the night .of l\Iarch 20th 
when ~Ir. Barlow was injured by the train 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vVhere were you at the time of the accident? 
A. I wa.s down the hill from the railroad in front of him. 
I was down the hill. 
Q. Down where? "\Vere you towarrls Judge 
page 50 ~ Cardwell's f 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Down towards that bridge? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You had backed your car down there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell the jury what you "did that night just before the 
train came. Where 'vere you a little while before the train 
came¥ 
A. I was in the store. · 
Q. Did you come out before or after Mr. Barlow~ 
A W c came out about at the same time. 
Q. Where was your car parked¥ 
A. Just behind his. 
Q. In front of Campbell's store you mean? 
A. 1res, sir .. 
Q. Did you get in your car to drive away that night~ 
A. 1[ e·s, sir. 
Q. Tell what happened after you got in your carY 
A. I backed on up. 
p~ge 51 ~ Q. Did you have any trouble starting your carY 
A. No, sir. I backed on out and started on up 
the hill and choked mv motor and rolled back down the hill. 
Q. After you started up the hill your motor choked Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What kind of car were you driving? 
A. Star coupe. 
Q. You backed down into what 1 Tow·ards Judge Card-
well's? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you there when Barlow went across the railroad~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In that position did you see anything coming down 
the railroad? 
A. No, ~ir, not then. 
Q. What did you seeY 
A. I saw a light on the back side. 
Q. From your position you saw the light on the engine? 
A. 1[ es, sir. 
Q. Back of the storeY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Over to the side opposite from the railroad? 
page 52 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. From that position could you see the rail-
road on the curve down belo'v the station? 
A .. I don't know whether I could or not. I saw it just be-
yoncl the cattle pen. 
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Q. You saw the light along about the cattle p~n just below 
the station? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you notice that light coming on up to the station T 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You saw lights when you were back down the road Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did the train blow? 
A. I heard it blow way off before I got in my car. 
Q. Do you know where it blew? 
A. It sounded like way off. It was a couple of minutes be-
fore it got there. 
Q. It blew when you 'vere leaving the store you mean~ 
A. ·Yes, sir, just before I got to my car. 
Q. You got in your car and started up the hill and choked 
vour motor and backed back Y · 
·· A. Yes, sir. 
page 52 a ~ Q. You were then in the road 'vhen you saw the 
light down about the cattle pen? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ho,,r many times did it blow 1 
A. I just heard it blo,v. Just heard it blow. 
Q. .T ust once~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After it blew that once (you say that was when you were 
leaving the store) did it ever blow any crossing whistle, that 
is, two or three short blasts 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did the "bell ring7 
... ~. No, sir. 
1\fr. Spicer: I object to the question. 
By Mr. Haw: 
·Q. Did yon see the train when it hit Barlow~ Was there 
any bell ringing? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Was there any whistle blowing1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you know how far the engine went up the 
page 53 ~ track after it hit Barlow? 
A. I don't know; I couldn't say. · 
Q. Did you help pick him up? 
A. _Yes, sir, I went up to him. 
-------
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Hy Mr. Spicer: 
Q. You say you saw the light on the engine? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Back about the cattle pen f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where is the cattle pen¥ Is that east of the station~ 
A. Yes, sir, east of the station. 
Q. You saw the headlight on the engine? 
A. Yes, sir, I saw a light; I reckon it was the headlight. 
Q. You saw a light? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Looked like I suppose an electric light bulb of some 
kind? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. vVas it a. pretty strong lightt 
page 54 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
youY 
Q. You didn't have any trouble seeing it, did 
A. No, sir, not from where I was. 
Q. You saw the light and you had heard the train blow? 
Yon heard the train blow 1 
A. Yes, sir, I heard it blo'v way off. 
Q. You knew there was a train coming, didn't you 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you got in the car did you close the wii1dows f 
A. ""'vV ell, I don't know whether the windows were closed or 
not. · 
Q. After you started up to the track, you choked your mo-
tor? 
A. Yes, sir. I was going on across and choked my motor 
and rolled back down hill. 
Q. Of course, having seen the light and heard the whistle 
blow, you knew a train was coming¥ 
A. Yes, sir, I guess it was. 
Q. You didn't have to have anybody tell you after you 
heard it blow and you saw tl1e light; you clidn 't have to have 
anybody tell you that it was comingf 
A. No, sir. 
page 54a } By the Court: 
Q. I would like to get clear what you say in 
reference to the light, whether you saw the reflection of the 
light or whether you saw the headligl1t itself1 
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A. I could not say I saw the headlight but I saw a light. 
Q. You saw the reflection of the light on the ground, or on 
the road~ 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. The train was not in view, the headlight itself, was it 1 
A. I could not say. 
1\:fr. Spicer: I think he had previously answered he saw the 
headlight itself. 
l\1:r. Haw: He said he saw a light. 
The Court: I was not clear '1;rhether he had or not. 
l\:fr. Haw: I don't think he is certain whether he saw the 
1Ieadlig1It or the reflection of the light1 
1\fr. Spicer: Let the witness say that. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 55 } EDDIE BAR-LOW, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
Bv l\tfr. Haw: 
·Q. Are you a brother of Mr. l\L L. Barlow? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "r ere you at I-Ianovcr Station the ni,g-ht he was struck 
hv the train¥ 
··A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where 'vere yon at that time he was struck? 
A. I don't know. I had crossed just in front of him, hacked 
my car out and come on out. 
·Q. "\Vere you in the store with him that night? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you come out of the store at or about the time he 
nulled out? 
4 
A. We came on out at about the same time, all came out to-
gether. 
Q. Did you hear any train blow when you same 
page 56 } out? . . 
. A. No, sir. 
Q. vVhere did you go after you came out 1 
A. Got in my car, cranked up to come on across, stopped 
nnd looked each way and clidn 't hear a thing of the train 
either way or bell either. 
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Q. Diq you and Mr. :NI. L. Barlow get to that crossing 
about the same timet 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you in front of him? 
A. Yes, sir, I was in front of him. 
Q. You cranked up and drove across the track 1 
A. Came right on across in front. 
Q. Do you know how close behind you he wasT 
A. I don't think he was far behind me. 
Q. Which way did you goT 
A. I took the other road up towards Dr. Bray's. 
Q. You turned your back to the station? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You turned to the left and weut west along 
puge 57 ~ that track? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And drove away? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You didn't know anything about the accident did you 7 
A. No, I didn't know anything about it until after it was 
Hll over. 
Q. Did you hear the whistle blowY 
A. No, I didn't hear any whistle at all. 
Q. Hear the bell ring? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you know the crossing sig11al that they give at cross-
ings? 
A. Yes, sir, I know that, but I never heard it. 
Q. Did you hear any? 
A. No, sir, never heard a bit. 
CROSS EXAMINATION . 
.By !'Ir. Spicer: 
Q. Do you know where you were when the accident oc-
eurred? 
A. No, sir, I don't know exactly. Of course, I could not 
· have been very far a'vay. I got across in front of him. 
Q. Doesn't that road that you took run beside 
page 58 ~ the railroad track some .. distance west? 
A. It runs along beside it. 
Q. Did you see the train afterwards when it came up there'~ 
. A. No, sir, I didn't s~e a bit of train. 
Q. Did you hear the train? 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. Do you know whether you were as much as two or three 
hundred yards a'vay from the accident, or away from the 
crossing, when the accident occurred? 
A. I don't kno,v. I don't think hardly I was as much as 
two or tl1ree hundred yards. I could not have been very far 
because we all cranked up at the time. 
Q. You didn't know anything about tl1e accident having 
happened? 
A. No, sir, not until after I got away. 
Q. When did you know about it? 
A. I guess about an hour or two afterwards someone told 
me and I went down. 
Q. You ha.d left and· went in the direction opposite from that 
from which the train came Y · 
·A. Yes, sir. 
·Q. After crossing over the· track Y 
page 59 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Of course you didn't see the train when you 
crossed the track T 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Wasn't any train in sight then? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Didn't see any headlight? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Or stream of any headlight after you passed over the 
track, did you T 
A. No. 
Q. llad one shown on your car from the rear, I supJ!>OSe 
yon would have noticed· it, 'vouldn 't you 1 
A. I never noticed it; I didn't see any. 
Q. After you got over the railorad track there were not 
any other lights on that side of the track were they? 
A. No, sir, I don't think there were. 
Q. So if the headlight of the engine had flashed on your car 
that would have made home impression on you? 
A. I never noticed particularly. 
Q. You did not notice1 
page 60 ~ A. No, sit, but I don't think it did. 
Q. If it had flashed on your car, you would have· 
known it, wou1dn 't you' 
A. I suppose so. 
Q. What kind of car 'vas yours? 
A. Ford coupe. 
Q. "\Vas it a cold night? 
A. Right cold. 
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. Q. Did you have your windows up? 
. A. Not all the way. I don't generally keep them all the 
way up. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 61 ~ JOHN HARDING, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
By 1fr. Haw: 
Q. Mr. Harding, were you living in Hanover at the time ~{r. 
Barlow was injured f · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \Vhere were you the night he was struck~ . 
A. I was down at the depot at 1\ir. Campbell's store. 
Q. Did you leave there before Mr. Barlow¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "\Vl1ich way did you come? 
A. I came around by 1\ir. Jacobs' up the hill. 
Q. You came down the lower road and up the hill1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you when the train hit lVIr. Barlow's car? 
A. About half way between the road that comes from the 
Court house, out into this road which runs by the hotel-
halfway between that and the hotel. . 
Q. Coming up the edge of the. hill? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had you beard the train coming before the-
page 62 ~ crash 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "\Vhere were you when you heard the train¥ 
A. I hadn't got out of this road yet. 
Q. You were this side of ~fr. Stevens' house? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Down the road that comes to the Court l1ouse? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you hear the train coming from the direction of 
Cadiz? 
A. Yes, sir, I could hear it running. 
Q. Did the train blow? · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did it ring the bell~ 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. You say you heard the crash 7 
A. Yes, sir, heard it come to a dead standstill. 
Q. Did it ring the bell or blo'v the whistle any time imme, 
diately before the crash or a short time before t. 
A. I never heard it. 
Q. You say yqu heard the train all the way up 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 63 ~ CROSS EXA~iiNATION. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. How far w·ere you from the station when the crash oc-
curred? 
A. I suppose you would call it about a quarter of a mile. 
I was halfway between as that road comes up to the hotel. 
Q. You heard the crash 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were coming on up this w·ay by the Court house 7 
A. Coming on up to the Court house. 
Q. You were not going back towards the railroad f 
A. No, sir. I was boarding at the hotel. I was coming to 
the Court house. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 64 ~ J. ¥. CA:rviPBELL, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows : 
EXAMINATION IN CI-IIEF. 
By l\Ir. Haw: 
Q. You are ~Ir. J. l\L Campbell? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You own a store at Hanover? 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you in your store the night Mr. Barlow was in-
jured 1 
1\. Yes, sir. 
Q. What were you doing at the time of this accident'1 
A. I was in there closing up and counting up and putting 
my books away. 
Q. Did the train blow or ring the bell that night as it came 
into the station T . · 
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A. I didn't hear the train blow and I am positive the bell 
was not ringing. I was not in a position to say whether the 
t'rain blew or not, but I certainly did not hear it, but. the bell 
was not ringing, I am satisfied. 
Q: You are positive the bell was not ringing? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. But you would not say· the whistle did not 
page 65 ~ blow? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you hear the whistle? 
A. No, sir. 
{~. Heard no whistle? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You are positive no bell rang? 
.A. Positive ~o bell rang. 
Q. Did you go to the scene of the. accident immediately? 
A. Yes, sir. I was a little bit behind Mr. Hughes and the 
others. I did not hear the train whmi it came in. I looked 
orit and saw the train <?n the main line and I said, "What is 
the trouble"~ when I heard the crash, and they said the train 
struck Mr. Barlow's car. We went out and picked him up 
and carried him to the doctor. 
Q. Do you know where the engine stopped? 
A. No, sir, I could not say. It was not very far up the road 
tl1ongh, somewhere about seven or eight r.ar lengths, or ten; 
I could not say exactly. I did not look at that particularly~ 
Q. ~{r. Campbell, will you please state to the jury to what 
extent the light on yeur side porch and the lights around 
your store affect your seeing the headlight of an engine com-
ing from that direction? 
page 66 ~- ~fr. Spicer: I object to the question. It is purely 
a conclusion or opinion. The jury has had a view 
of the scene. · 
lVIr~ Haw: But not at night. 
The Court: I don't think it is entirely an opinion if the man 
is familiar with it at night. The jury hasn't had a view of 
it at night. · 
Mr. Ha,,r: If he has observed it I think his evidence is cer-
tainly competent. I will put the question this way: 
Q. Mr. Campbell, what lights have you on your store? 
. A. Two lights-Do you mean what power? 
Q. What power~ . 
A. The one on the front I think is 60 or 80 and the other on· 
the hack side is about 50. 
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Q. What you call the back side is next to the railroad 7 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. That is the side of the store? 
A. Yes, sir, a little stronger light on the front than on the 
side. 
Q. You have a light on the front with a shade 
page 67 } that deflects the light downY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How a bout the light on the side? 
A. That is a bare light. 
Q. No shade on that? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I-Iave you observed ~whether or not the rays of the light 
interfere with your view of a headlight of an approaching loco-
motive coming from the east towards the west on the C. & 0. 
tracks~ 
~he Court: Have you ever observed it from a point on the 
road Y -
Witness: I have. 
Q. (Continued) State to the jury what effect it has upon 
your vision ae far as seeing the· light is concerned upon an 
®~M? . 
1\Ir. Spicer: I object to the question and any answer as stat-
ing a pure cmiclusion. . 
'J.1he Court: I overrule the objection. 
~Ir. Spicer: 'Ve note an exception. 
page 68 ~ A. About a month or two before the accident 
occurred I had occasion-
1\Ir. Spicer: lie is stating a conclusion. 
A. (Continued) I crossed .over one night and it was a 
train-
1\fr. Spicer: He ·is stating a conclusion. 
Mr. Haw: State what happened. 
A. (Continued) I have crossed there with a train pretty 
close to me, and I said to my boy-
The Court: We don't want what happened to you on any 
particular occasion. If you are familiar with that and have 
84 Supreme ()ourt of A ppcnls of Virginia_. 
stood in that road and looked down the track and seen what 
the effect is, all right, but if you saw it on one occasion I don't 
think it is proper. 
By Mr. Haw: 
Q. Have you noticed whether or not that light interferes 
with your view of the headlight of ai} approaching locomotive 
coming from the east~ 
A. I have. 
Q. Does it interfere with it f 
A. It does. 
page 69 ~ By a Juror: 
Q. "\Vas it burning that night 1 
. A. It was burning that night. It always burns while I 
have the store open. 
By :Wir. Haw: 
Q. The light was burning the night :Mr. Barlow was hurt t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You say that does interfere with your vision in cross-
ing the crossing of a train coming from the east f 
A. It does. 
Q. When a train comes in from the east going west on the 
track there, have you observed at what point the light, as 
the train comes on that curve at Hanover Station, will shine 
over the crossing f -
A. No, sir, I .can't say that I ever have. 
Q. Does it shine over the crossing at any appreciable dis-
tance from the crossing? vVhere ~oes it hit f 
Mr. Spicer: We object. H~ said he didn't observe. 
The Court: lie said before he hadn't observed. 
By 1\fr. Haw: 
Q. Where does the light of a. train hit as it comes up to 
Hanover depot~ Does it hit the railroad track on the other 
side~ 
A. It is bound to hit on the other side of the 
page 70 r track because it is coming around a curve.· It 
wouldn't throw the light right straight of course. 
!fr. Spicer: I object to the question and answer on the 
ground that· the witness has not made the observation. 
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By Mr. Haw: 
Q. Is there anything else that you know about this that I 
Have not asked you about? 
· ~[r. Spicer: I object to the question. 
A. I don't think there is. 
The Court: The oath of the \vitness is that he will tell the 
truth and the whole truth. If h.e knows anything he should 
t:ell it. 
~1:r. Spicer: As long as he said, "No", it is all right. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By ~Ir. Spicer: 
Q. ~Ir. Campbell, you were not preparing to cross that 
track as that train approached it, were you; you were still in 
the store1 
A. No, sir, I was stiil in the store. 
Q. It was a cold night? 
page 71 ~ A. rrhey said it was a cold night. I don't think 
it was particularly cold. It was cold enough to 
be in . the house but not particularly cold. 
Q. You clidn 't have any particular reason to be listening 
out for any train coming~ 
A. No, sir., I did not. 
Q. You didn't ln1ow whether there was a train coming at 
that time? 
A. I didn't hear the train~ It came mighty easy. It could 
not have been running fast. 
Q. You didu 't know there was a train coming 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Didn't have any reason. to expect a train at that time~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. \Vhat size ·did you say those lights were¥ You said 
50. What did you mean by thatf 
A. 50 watts. I am not an electrician. We have some that 
go an)~where from 40 to 100. 
The Court: I suppose 40 candle power. 
Witness: Yes, sir, 40 candle power. 
"\Vitness stood aside. 
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page 72 ~ :MISS JOSEPHINE WINSTON, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows : 
EXAMINATION IN CI-IIEF. 
By Mr. Ha,v: 
Q. You are Miss Josephine Winston Y • 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where do you live Y 
A. Hanover. 
Q. ·At 'vhat point as regards Hanover Station Y 
A. I live on the other side of the railroad adjoining Judge 
Cardwell's. 
Q. You live i'n the house on the hill from the railroad Y 
A. Yes. · . 
Q. You don't kno'v how far it is in a direct line from your 
house to the crossing? · 
A. No, sir. By road about half a mile. 
Q. It is shorter in a direct line? 
A. Yes. 
Q .. The road curves around? 
page 73 ~ A. Yes. 
. Q. Did you hear the train that struck Mr. Bar-
low the ni~l1t of }.{arch 20th f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where "rere you? 
A. We were, three of us, sitting in the back bedroom and 
heard this rumbling. It is very often you can't tell whether 
it is an automobile coming up that hill or a train until the 
automobile gets in the yard or the train whistles. My mother 
said, ''What is ·that noise''~ We waited a second and no 
car in the yard, so we didn't pay any more attention. A few 
minutes after that we heard a train at the depot. 
Q. You mean you heard a train steaming there? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Did the train blow? 
A. I did not hear it . 
. Q. Any hell ring? 
· A. I didn't hear it. 
Q. Your attention was called to it by the rumbling you 
l1eard? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And remarked whether it was an automobile 
page 7 4 ~ or train~ 
· A. Yes. 
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Q. Then shortly afterwards you heard a train steaming at 
the station 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that the train that struck Mr. Barlow? Was it 
around 9 o'clock! 
A. Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. How far did you say your house w:as from the station Y 
A. Half a mile by the road. 
Q .. About how far is it by straight line 1 
A. I couldn't say. · 
Q. Quarter of a mile? . 
A. I couldn't say. I don't know what it would be in a 
straight line. . . 
Q. A quarter or a half or three-quarters <>f a mile~ 
A. I 'vould nof· say in a straight line. 
page 75 ~ Q. Which way do you get to it; by crossing in 
front of Mr. Campbell's store? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On the south .side of the railroad¥ 
A. Yes. 
'\Vitness stood aside . 
. page 76 ~ MRS. E. K. TAYLOR, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
By Mr. Haw: 
·Q. Mrs. 'ray lor, where do, you live in reference to the cross-
ing at Hanover? 
A. About 150 feet from the track. 
Q. North side of the tracki 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that your house which is almost directly opposite the 
crossing and just across the county road from the crossing 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. On the night Mr. Barlo'v was injured, ~Iarch 20th, 1928,. 
where were you 1 · · 
A. I was sick in bed. 1\{y bedroom is the front room .. 
Q. Nearest side of the house from the track? 
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A. Side next to the post office---:-eastern side~ I had the 
blinds down. and was lying there too sick to go to Church, 
there by myself. 
Q. Were your windows open .or shut~ 
A. They ·were shut and my blinds. were down. 
Q. Just tell the jury what you heard. 
page 77 ~ A. The train came in so easy I thought it must 
have been standing there~ I heard it just sliding 
along almost like a snake I imagine. Then I heard this dread-
tjrl crash. I did not raise the blinds. I thought ''The train 
is. making more fuss than usual tonight". I just let it go at 
that; but it stopped very suddenly then, this awful grinding 
of these brakes I thought it must have been fo:r lots of times 
it does that anyway, but I did not· hear any l)lo,ving and I 
did not hear any bell ring; I just heard it as I thought get-
ti~g ready to· shift' or pick up a car. . 
Q. You heard it then before the crash, heard it coming in~ 
A. Yes~ 
Q. It 'vas running very easy¥ 
A. Very easy. 
Q. Was any bell ringing? 
A. No, no bell. 
Q. Any whistle blo,ving Y 
A. No whistle. If the whistle blew way down the· road I 
certainly didn't hear it and there was no crossing whistle. 
Q. You heard no bellY 
A. No. 
page 78 ~ CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By My Spicer: 
Q. Mrs. Taylor, you were not particularly listening out for 
that train, were you Y 
A. No, I was not, but lots of times we have noticed, because 
it is such a dangerous crossing, we have noticed trains very· 
often don't ring- · 
The Court: You can't tell about what it did at other times. 
Witness: The only reason I say that is all of us together 
have known those things. 
The Court : Gentlemen of the jury that is not legal evidence 
Dnd should not influence you . 
. By ].fr. Spicer: 
Q. You had no reason to know that a train was coming un-
til you heard it on this particular occasion, did you? 
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A. No. 
Q. In other words, you were not expecting to catch a. train 
there that night~ 
A. No. 
Q. You were not preparing to cross the track? 
A. No. I was lying in my bed. I was quite sick. 
page 79 ~ Q. And the windows were closed~ 
A·. Yes, but I am almost on the track, just 150 
feet and I heard the train sound naturally. 
Q. You didn't go out after the accident, right after the· ac-
cident occurred Y 
A. No, I did not. I did lift my blind because my bed is 
as near as this to the window. (Indicating) I saw lots of 
lanterns running up and down but even then I thought it must 
be shifting. 
Q. You heard the bral{es of the train? 
A. Yes, just the gdnding of them. 
Q. Sound like emergency bral{es ~ 
A. Yes. 
RE-DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Haw: 
Q. What train was it that you are speaking· off 
A. I don't know the number. I just kno'v it was ·late be-
cause they hadn't come from Church. They were having a 
mission at St. Paul's and they hadn't come from Church. 
I thought it was getting mighty late. I suppose it 
page 80 ~ was just the usual train coming in there. 
Q. What was the usual train f 
1\.. About 9 :30 I think. 
Q. Is it a passenger train or freight train? 
A. Freigl1t train. 
Q. rrhrough freight or local, do you know? 
· A. I don't know. I think it is through. I could not just 
tell you that. 
Q. You know there is a freight train usual1y comes along 
n bout that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. \Vas that a freight train when you saw lanterns running 
up and down~ 
A. Yes, I saw the cars. 
Q. It was a freight train? 
A. Yes. 
'Vitness stood aside. 
------------~-----------·-
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page 81 ~ . HOWARD W. TAYLOR, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being first duly 
~worn, testified as follows : 
EXA~iiNATION IN CHIEF. 
By M:r. Haw: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, where do you live in reference to the sta-
Hon? · 
A. I live on the other side of the railroad in the bend of 
f.he. track. The track comes up from Cadiz over the trestle. 
almost directly to my house, and turns and comes back and 
makes a bend and comes around by the depot. 
Q. A straight shoot from the bend down to the whistling 
post to Campbell's store would about cut through your house7 
A. Would cut about behind my house. The light from a 
tra1n coming around there about hits the back window of my 
dining room before it makes a turn. 
Q. When the- train comes around the bend approaching 
Hanover depot coming from the east, where does the light 
sl1ine? 
A. It goes across Copeland field. 
Q. But when it comes up to the station where does it go? 
A. It follows around on a curve on the opposite side from 
my house. 
·Q. At what point, if you have observed it, after 
rmge 82 ~ passing the station, does the light finally reach the 
crossing? 
A. I could not say accurately. I never observed it. 
Q. On the night of March 20th, 1928, when lVIr. Barlow was 
struck by the train, did you see that freight train coming h1 
t-hat night? 
A. I didn't see the freight train. 
Q. Dici you hear it? 
A. I heard it.· 
Q. A.t what point did you first hear it? 
A. The first time I recall hearing it was when it blew for 
Cadiz station or crossing. I was observing the train that 
night, if it is proper for me to tell, for a particular reason. 
Q. I don't know that it is proper, but if the railroad com-
pany wants to know it I suppose you can tell it, but you w.ere 
observing the train? 
A .. I.ha.ppened to be at home that night by myself with two 
~mall children (everybody else had gone to Church), and was 
sitting in the living room. The little colored girl in the kitchen 
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remarked to my wife that day that her grandmother, who 
lived-
page 83 } l\1r. Spicer: Can ~t you get any nearer to it than 
that' · 
By Mr. Ha,v: 
Q. As a matter of fact (you need not go into detail why 
you listened), you say you were particularly interested in 
tl1e train that night~ 
A. Yes, sir, I was listening for the train. 
Q. What did you hear! · 
A. I heard the train blow for Cadiz crossing, or station, 
and came on down the hill and drifted down into Hanover. 
! 
The Court: I don't know whetp.er the jury is familiar. 
\Vhere is Cadiz c.rossingY 
Witness: About a mile and a half or a mile and a quarter 
east of Hanover Station. 
Bv a. Juror: 
· Q. Where is the whistle post 7 
A. This crossing is in a bend this side of Courtland where 
T said the light would ·turn off my house coming around. 
Q. Just before .it gets to your house7 · 
A. Yes, sir. 1\ly house is about as far from the railroad as 
half-way from here to that house· there. (Indicating) 
page 84 ~ By the Court : 
Q. You mean the Cierk 's Office or the Church 1 
A. About that knoll, just about that knoll. (Indicating) 
~ir. Spicer: I would l.ike t6 know the approximate dis-
tance. . 
~Tr.-Haw: Suppose you just give the distance. 
\Vitness : About 300 yards. 
J'uror: 300 yards from where 1 
'\Vitness: 300 yards from the railroad. 
Bv l\!r. Haw: 
·Q. You mean it curved around? 
A. Further and nearer in some places. 
Q. How f&r are you from Hanover Station in a direct line t 
A. I imagine about 200 yards. 
Q. How far are you from the end of the switch at the east,. 
that little s'vitch markerj 
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1\.. Just about the same distance. 
Q. 'VVhat is that distance? 
A. 200 yards. 
Q. You sa.id you were listening for the train f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you hear itf 
page 85 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
thinkY 
Q. You heard it blow for Cady's Station you 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then when did you hear the train ntnning 1 
A. When it was coming down between Peak and Cady's. 
Q. As it came on from Cadiz to Hanover at what point was 
it running so easy 7 
A. I heard him shut off when he drifted down Cady's hill. 
Q. You mean the roar of the train was diminished~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you hear him all the way into Hanover'j 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he blow any whistle for Hanoverf 
A. I didn't hear it. 
Q. Did he blow the ~tation whistle 1 
A. I. didn't hear it. 
Q. Blow the crossing :whistle f 
A. I didn't hear it. 
Q. You heard the train all the time didn't you f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you hear the whistle blowf 
page 86 ~ A. I did not. 
Q. Did it ring the bell~ 
A. I didn't hear the bell. 
Q. All that time you were listening to the train· as it came 
in? · . 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Is that the same train that hit J\{r. Barlow! 
A. That is the train that they say hit Mr. Barlo,v. 
Q. Was it the train that came in that night? 
A. It was. 
Q. About what time was it f 
A. It was around 9 o'clock. 
Q. Did any other freight train come in around that hour f 
J\ir. Spicer: I object. 
A. No, sir. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. vVas that a cold night? 
A. Yes, sir, it was not 'varm. 
Q. You had the windows down I suppose ~ 
page 87 ~ A. Yes, sir, had fire in the room. 
Q. Did you hear the crash of the accident 7 
A: I could not distinguish between the crash of the accident 
and the emergency brakes. I heard the train stop. 
Q. You heard the emergency brakes, you say 1 
A. Yes, sir, I heard what I took to be the emergency brakes. 
I don't know whether it was the emergency brakes or not. 
Q. You hear trains stop right often, don't you f 
A. Yes, sir. Of course I don't know a thing in the world 
about the accident. 
Q. You don't know positively that this is the train that 
caused the accident, do you 1 . 
A. No, sir, I could not positively say that this was the train 
that caused the accident. That part of it I don't know any-
. thing about. 
"\Vitness stood aside. 
Plaintiff Rests. 
page 88 ~ J. N. LUCK:, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
EXANIINA'fiON IN CHIEF. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. 'Vhat is your business 7 
A. Operate a garage and sell automobiles. 
l\ir. Spicer: I note the same objection to the testimony as 
f.o the value of the automobile. I am offering this 'vitness 
subject to the objection already noted. Your Honor already 
admitted the testimony. I didn't want to be understood as 
waiving the objection made. 
Q. At Ashland? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you sell Chevrolet automobiles~ 
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A. Yes, sir, done so for some years. 
Q. How many years 7 · 
A. Since 1916. 
Q. Did you ha.ve occasion to make an appraisal of the auto-
mobile which was struck by a train and which Mr. ~arlow 
Wf\S driving on 1\tiarch 20th of this year? 
A. I don't remember just the date but I was 
pnge 89 ~ asked to come down and look at a· car. 
Q. Did you make an appraisal after the acc1-
dent? 
A. Yes, sir. 
lVIr. Haw: Are you asking for the value of the car as 
it was then or when? 
Mr. Spicer : Both. 
The Court: Ask whether ~e is qualified to state what it 
was worth afterwards. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. State what it was 'vorth afterwards? 
A. Judging the car the best I could, what could ·be used 
nnd as salvage on some parts and tires, about $30.00. . 
Q. After examination of the car were you able to come to 
anY. conClusion as to 'vhat that car had been worth prior to 
this accident? 
Mr. Haw: 1 object to that, because· I don't think any man 
could tell what a car was worth before it was hit by a train, 
taking into ·consideration what that car was worth after it 
was hit. 
The Court: Did you, know the car at all before 
page 90 ~ it was struck? 
vVitness: Yes, sir. I didn't sell that cal\ I never 
ltnd it in my possession. I had seen this car on one occa-
sion before that to look at it. I had seen 1\IIr. Barlow driving 
it several times. 
The Court: I think the objection is more to th_e credibility 
of it than to the absolute admissibility of it. 
1\tfr. Haw: Exception. 
Q. (Continued) What value would you place on it, ·Mr. 
Luck, as of l\f.arch 20th, in other words, before the accident? 
A. Well, I made an estimate down there at that time as 
11ear as I could. At that time, as well as I could arrive at it, 
a bout $1!5.00. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Haw: 
Q. Had John Winston made an effort to trade that car with 
you before he sold it to Barlow? 
A. No, sir. Mr. Barlow had it at my place once. I under-
stood he wanted to trade it in for a new car. . 
Q. What did you offer him in trade? 
page 91 ~ A. I don't remember. It was sometime prior to 
this. J·ust whether it was two weeks or two months 
before that I could not say, but it 'vas sometime back. 
Q. Didn't you offer him $2·50.00 in trade? 
A. I don't remember. I have so many appraisals they go 
through my head. . . 
Q. If he says you did offer him that would you deny itY 
A. I wouldn't deny it. 
Mr. Ha:w: I withdraw my objection now which I made. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 92 ~ Mr. Spicer: It is agreed between counsel for the 
parties that these exhibits, which have been re-
ferred to during the testimony as exhibits Barlow Nos. 1, 2 
and 3, were taken at the points noted on the backs of the 
pictures, respectively. I want to offer them as· my own ex-
hibits. 
l\1r. Haw: They are filed as the defendant's exhibits as I 
understand' 
Mr. Spicer: Yes, exhibit Barlow #1 being taken 33 feet 
from the south rail of the main line track looking east; ex-
hibit Barlow #2 being taken 32lf2 feet south of the main 
line looking east,. and exhibit Barlow #3 being taken 23 feet 
from the north rail of the main line looking south. 
:1\ir. liaw: J\1r. Barlow has just gotten the title to this car~ 
I would like to put him back on the stand. 
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. page 93 J M .. L. BARLOW, 
the plaind:lll, r.ee.alled at this time, jn his .own be-
half, further testified as follows: 
EXA~iiNATION .IN CHIEF. 
By Mr. Haw: 
Q. Is Mr. "\Vinston, that you got this car frD.m, Mr. John 
Winston who is head of .or has some-thing to do with the Pe-
ninsula Chemical Company of Florida¥ 
A. Yes, sir. _, .. 
Q. Is he the brother of 1\fiss J o Winston who testified here 7 . 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. When he turned that car over to you was it :a. sale to you 
or how was it turned over to you? . 
A. I learned by my wife. he said I -oon.ld -take the ·ear for · 
$100.QO if I wanted it or sell it for him. 
Q. Did you take the caT Y 
.A. Well, [ nev·.er tclid de.cide. 
Q. You never signed a pap.er Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Is that the title .certificate that he sent you~ 
page 94 } (Indicating) 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Who was that .deli:v:er.ed 'to you by' 
A. I went t.o JMiss .J.e Winston to ge.t it. 
Q. Did you make an effort to trade that car with Mr. LuckY 
A. I a-sked him. 
·Q. What ·did ·he -offer you m trade for it Y . 
A. I understood ~:Ir. Bumpass to say they would allow me 
$250.00 for it. 
Q. vVas that one of Mr. ·Ludk?:a men :there¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Not-e·: Title certificates identified ·by witness was filed and 
marked, "Ex. Barlow #5". 
CROSS EXAJ\IIINATION. 
By 1\fr. Spicer: 
Q. You say under the arrangement with Mr. Winston you -
were to pay him $1.00.00 for that car if you took it Y 
A. I asked my wife about it just uo,v, and she 
page 95 ~ said that is the way she understood it; I was to 
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$100.00 for it. Of course, as I wa.s going to say, I put about 
$60.00 worth of work and two tires on the car: 
REDIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Haw: 
Q. Had you decided to keep the car for yourself 1 
A. Yes~ sir. · 
Q. Then did you owe him $100.00 for it 0/ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You say you put $60.00 worth of work on itY 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. And two tires Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
'Vitness stood aside. 
page 96 ~ D.- J. BROWN, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. 1\fr. Brown, what is your business? 
A. Draftsman in the Division Engineer's Office, C. & 0. 
R.ailway. 
Q. At my reqn est did you make a blueprint rna p of the 
crossinp: and ground surrounding the place at which. this ac-
cident occurred? · 
A. I did. 
Q. Is this the map made by you Y (Indicating) 
A. It is. 
Note: Map identified by witness was filed and marked, "Ex. 
Brown #6". · 
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Q. Was it drawn according to scale¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Brown, what is the approximate width of the right 
of way of the C. & 0. Railway Company at -that crossing at 
which this accident occurred~ 
A. On the south side it is 40 feet. 
page 97 } Q. From what point? 
A. From the center line of the main line. On 
the north side it varies. 
Q. I mean at the point of the accident f 
A. 40 feet on the south side. 
Q. You have noted on this map east of the railroad station 
a tie yard and in between the station in the tie yard is that a 
road crossing? · 
A. Private road crossing. 
Q. What is the distance between that road crossing and the 
crossing at which this accident occurred? 
A. 450 feet approximately. · 
Q. You are familiar with the scene of the accident, your-
self? 
A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. At a point 30 feet south of the main line· track how far 
east, or approximately how far east, can a locomotive be seen 
or a traiil be seen, free of obstructions? 
A .. About 600 feet. 
Q. That is of the main line track? 
A. The main line track. 
Q. Beyond the edge of this map in the qirection 
page 98 ~ noted "To Fort Monroe", does the curve ~f the 
track continue in the same direction for some dis-
tance~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have occasion to calculate the distance from 
the railroad crossing at \vhich the accident occurred to the 
beginning of the far end of the curve? 
A. Yes, I measured that off. 
Q. About what distance was it? 
· A. 1,680 feet. 
Bv the Court: 
·Q. Does that measure with the curve.or straight! 
A. Measuring with the.curve. 
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By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. That is 1,680 feet from the crossing to the far -endt 
-A. To the east end ·of t:he oorv~. 
Q. How far, acool'ding to .your map, is the west end of the 
little dotted space-I suppose that is the platf.orm' 
A. Yes, sir~. 
Q. How far from the west €nd of the platform is the ocoss-
ing at· whic'b. the accident occurred? 
A. One hundred and sixty-iiive feet -to the cen-
page 99 ~ ter line of the -crossing. 
Q. Are the buildings lecated :on your map anel on 
both sides of t-he er.ossing, ·designated a·s ·ba;rn and store of 
J. J\II. Campbell, entirely .elf the right ·of way of the C .. -& O. 
Railway Company f 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court : 
Q. 'Vhere is the whistle post east -of this ·crossing where 
this .aooide~t .occurr-ed-~ Is that designated ·on the ma.p q 
A. No, sir. There is a station whistle post east of the 
crossing. I can give you the measurement of tthat. 
Q. The whistle post w.Qttld be ;baek :further on .th:e map~ 
.A. Yes, ·sir. 
1\fr. Spicer: The map doesn't go far ·.enough to show it .. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 100 ·~ D .. F. -GERHARDT, 
.a witness 'On behalf of the defendant, being :first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
EXAMINATIC>N IN CHIEF .. 
By Mr. Spicer : . 
Q. Were you engineer ·.of thte t;rain ·that had th:e callision 
with the automobile driven by 1\tlr. Barlow on .1\far.ch 20th? 
A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. flow long have you been an engineer with the C.~& O.Y 
A. Twenty y.ears. . 
. Q. How long have you run ·on this .division ·between Rich-
mond and Charlottesville Y 
A. Same length of time. 
Q. Are you thoroughly familiar with the road-bed between 
Richmond and Charlottesville' 
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A. Yes, sir, thoroughly. 
Q. Do you know there ·is a crossing just west of the station 
at :Hanover Court house 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were any warning signals given of the ap-
page 101' ~ proach of the crossing at which this automobile 
was struck on the night in question Y Were any 
given by you or. anyone else on the engine ~ 
A. The fireman called out just before-
Q. I am asking you were any warning signals given 1 
A. 0, no, sir. 
J\{r. Spicer: Just a minute. You don't quite understand me 
yet, I don't think. 
Mr. Haw: I think he did. 
Q. I asked you 'vere any signals given by the engineer or 
anyoneY 
A. The whistle, yes, sir. 
Q. In approaching this crossing? 
A. Yes, sir, blew the whistle for the crossing. 
Q. Your previous answer was incorrec.t ~-
A. Yes, sir. I didn't understand you at all. 
Q. Will you just state what signals ·were given and where 
they were given to the best of your recollectionY 
A. I blew ·the road crossing signal about the point of this 
eurve. 
page 102 ~ 
this map? 
Q. You mean where that curve begins 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that the curve, part of which is shown on 
A. Yes, sir. The point of this curve which, would be prac-
ticalLy 450 yards, something like that, from the crossing. 
Q. You had occasion to make a calcu.la.tion of that? 
A. It is a regular thing for me to blow for this crossing· 
nnd I know exactly about the point that I usually blow. 
Q. This curve is not all shown on this map 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You mean you began to blow \vhen you first touched the 
eurve? 
A. When I got up on the· curve, yes, sir. 
Q. Just what did you blow¥ 
A.. Two long and two short blasts,. which is the road crossing 
whistle-grade crossing whistle .. 
Q. Do you recall distinctly blowing that whistle on that 
night? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long does it take to blow lhat signal Y 
A. About thirteen seconds. 
Q. Was there any other signal given besides the 
page 103 ~ blowing of the whistle~ 
A. The bell was ringing, yes, sir. 
Q. Did you ring the bell, or start the bell to ringing¥ 
A. I turned the air on the bell and it was Tinging, yes, sir. 
Q. The bell works by airY · 
A. 1 .. es, sir. 
Q. You have a valve to turn it on? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, when did you turn the bell valve on Y 
A. About the time I ceased to blo'v the whistle. I blew the 
· whistle like this and my hand dropped down and I turned 
the bell on. · 
Q. So the bell valve is located really where your hand 
would beY 
. A. R;ght under the whistle cord. 
Q. When you open the valve and start the bell ringing, does 
it continue to ring or do you have to ho~d it downY 
A. It is simply a little valve you turn to the left to open, 
like any other valve. 
Q". Did that bell continue to ring after you opened 
page 104 ~ the valve? 
A. Yes, sir, continued to ring until I shut it 
rr~ . 
Q. Do you have any occasion to remember particularly why 
it was ringing? 
A. I got down and walked ~round the engine to see what 
damage was done to the pilot after the accident, and as I 
walked around the bell almost deafened me. The bell was 
still ringing. I got back on the engine and shut the bell off. 
Q. Where is the bell located on that engine? 
A. Right on the front of the engine between the hvo air 
pumps .. 
Q. Does that affect the sound of the bell, that is, the direc-
tion ii1 which the sound goes Y 
A. 1 t will have a tendency to throw the sound ahead more 
than if the bell was located back on the boiler or further 
back. 
Q. You say you worked around the engine after it stopped Y 
A. Yes, sir, walked arou.nd the engine to see if there was 
any damag·e done to the engine or pilot or anything broken 
on the pilot, and the bell was still ringing when I went around 
there. · · 
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Q_. Where did the fireman go at that timet 
page 105. } A. He went back to see about the accident, to 
see about the man, to-help him out, to see what he 
could do. 
Q. What was the first notice you had tha.t there was any-
. thing on the crossing or anybody attempting to cross the track 
as you approached this crossing 
A. The first notice I had of it was lv[r. Lowry holloed, 
''Hold her! Hold her". I alr~ady had the brakes applied 
in service because we were going to stop, had a message. to 
pick up a car at this point. 
Q. Were you going to stop before you got to the crossing? 
A. No, sir, I was going to stop west of the crossing and 
hnd already started applying·brakes. When he holloed ''Hold 
her"! I threw it into emergency and stopped as quick as I 
could. I think we ran seven car-lengths by the crossing. 
Q. About how ma.ny cars did you have in the train? 
A. Between 25 and 30; I don't know. 
- Q. Under the circumstances, when you heard the :fireman 
l1ollo "Hold her"!. was there any way that you could have 
stopped any more quickly? · . 
A.. It would have been impossible to stop any 
page 106 } quicker. 
Q. Did the emergency brakes take effect? 
A. Oh, yes, bound to take effect when you put the pressure 
on them. 
Q. Was it physically possible for you where you 'vere lo-
cated on the engine to have seen this automobile approaching 
the crossing? . 
A. It was· absolutely impossible for me to see him coming 
from the south side of the track. 
0. You were on which side of the cab' 
A .. Right side. 
Q. Regular engineer's side? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were looking ahead from t~at position? 
A. Yes, sir. It was impossible for me to see anything· ap-
proaching from the left side. · · 
Q. The ·boiler 'vould cut off your view? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You said you had already made the servjce application 
of brakes to slow up or to stop? 
A. Yes; sir. 
Q. That is before you got to the .crossing~ 
page 107 } A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you went by the station? 
-------------..,..------
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A. Just as I went by the station I just started to apply 
brakes. 
Q. Do you recall where did you finish blowing the crossing 
whistle? . 
A. Just above this little crossing right there at the depot. 
Q. You refer to the crossing shown here on the blueprint t . 
A. Yes, sir this crossing right here. (Indicating} 
By Mr. Haw: 
Q. That little private road c.rossing·t 
A. Yes, sir, right at that little house where that wah1ut 
t.ree is, . · 
By the Court: 
Q. Is that place shown there where that dotted line runs 
acrossY 
A. It goes over to that pond. (Indicating on blueprint.) 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. Between the depot and the yard¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is shown on the blueprint~ 
page 108 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
that engine Y 
Q. Mr. Gerhardt1 was there any headlight on 
A. Very good one, yes, sir. 
Q. \Vhere is that headlight located on the engine~ 
A. Right on the pilot ori this particular engine, or right 
Lack of the pilot. 
Q. Was it burning that night f 
A. Yes,sir. 
Q. Do you know ahout how far that headlight stretches, 
that is, how far ahead Y 
A. I ~uppose you could see an object as large as a man a 
quarter of a mile with it. On a straight line that is. 
Q. How broad is it? _ 
A. I suppose it would throw a ray of light from one side 
of the railway to the other, about. 
By the Court : 
Q·. Hoiw. far frontf 
A. It broadens out as it go.es. 
Q. About how far from the engine would it extend in the 
right of way?· · 
A. It would take maybe 50 or 75 feet. 
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page 109 ~ By Mr. Spicer: . 
Q. Beyond that distance it would extend out-
side the right of way? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The right of way is about 80 feet, isn't it 1 
A. I think it is about that. 
Q. Ass~ming that ~Ir. Barlow started onto the crossing at 
approximately the time your engine passed this private road 
crossing just east of the crossing, was there any reason in 
the world why that light could not have been seen by him? 
Mr. Haw: I object to that. That is a question of opinion. 
The Court: Ask him is there anything to obstruct the view. 
By Mr. Spicer:' 
Q. Assuming ~Ir. Barlo'v started on across the crossing 
at the time that your engine was passing this private cross-
ing, was there anything to obstruct his view~ 
A. I don't see where there could be anything whatever to 
obstruct the view at that point. 
Q. About what rate of speed was the engine 
page 110 ~ going after it passed the depot? 
A. Well, approximately 15 miles an hour. 
By a Juror: 
Q. Do you usually ring your bell when you are going to 
stop? 
A. Yes, sir, we usually ring the bell for all crossings, espe-
cially those that are usel constantly. 
Q. If you stop at this one do you usually ring the bell 'vhile 
you are stopping·? 
A. Yes, sir, until we stop. 
By 1\fr. Spicer: 
Q. You generally shut it off after you stop 1 
A. Yes,sir. 
The Court: The question was, when he wa.s going to stop 
at the crossing, whether he usually rang the bell. 
. vVitness : I rang the bell as we were going over the cross-
rn~ . 
Juror: I thoug·ht probably when he was coming down to 
slow speed he might have thought it not neccessary to ring 
tl1e bell. 
vVitness: ·we ring the bell until we pass over the crossing. 
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page 111 ~ By Mr. Spicer: 
· Q. Even though you are going t~ stop after 
passing the crossing? 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Haw: 
Q. You said that you could not see the crossing, yourself, 
as engineer on there, until you were 'directly on top the cross-
ing? · 
A.. When I got pretty close to it. · 
Q. In other words, you could not see that crossing (that is, 
this public crossing where ~ir. Barlow was. ·injured) until 
you had passed the end of the depot platform, could you? 
A. Just about there, yes, sir. 
Q. Then your light would not shine on that crossing until 
it had passed the end of th~ station platform, would it? 
A. Oh, yes, sir, the light would shine on that crossing- be., 
fore you got there. 
Q. You were going around a curve. The light doesn't run 
around the curve does it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. \-Vhen it got on that curve it was shining 
page 112 ~ over about on 1\IIr. Jacobs' store, wasn't it, when 
it passed the station? 
A. No, it would not be shining on Mr. Jacobs' store as it 
passed the station because we would be mighty near by his 
store at that time. 
Q. You know there is quite a considerable curve right at 
the crossing, don't you? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. It doesu 't straighten out until after it passed the end 
of the depot platform, does it Y 
A. The curve doesn't straighten out until it passes the 
rlepot platform . 
. Q. It keeps on around and curves over the crossing? 
A. It curves slightly over the crossing, yes, sir. 
Q. You did what you call cutting your engine off; that is, 
you were running easy, weren't making much fuss? 
A. I was drifting. 
Q. You were not being propelled by your own steam? 
A. Wasn't using any steam. . 
Q. Going by its own momentum with a certain amount of 
steam in the cylinders? 
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A. There was a little steam in the cylinders. 
page 113} Q. The train was going rather smoothly and 
was not making much fuss? · 
. A. It was making plenty of fuss all right. If you rode on 
one you would think it was plenty of fuss. 
Q. I am talking about people not on the train. ·You were on 
the train. I used to ride on #48 myself so I know something 
about it. . 
When did you turn on that bell ringerf 
A. I stated before that it was at the point I ceased to blow 
the whistle, when I blew the last blast of the whistle. 
Q. As a matter of fac.t, didn't you turn it on after the train 
hit the automobilet · 
A. What good would tha.t have done ~ 
Q. \Vhy didn't you turn it off after you hit -him 7 
A. Because during the excitement I thought perhaps the 
man was ground up and I forgot to turn it off. 
Q. There wasu 't anything you could do between the time 
that you hit him and the time that you stopped, was it? 
, A. No, sir, but I was on the ground when I found the bell 
still working. · 
Q. You said as soon as the fireman said what? 
page 114 ~ A. ''If old her!'' 
Q. You .didn't know why to hold her did you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You clidn 't know anybody 'vas hit, did you? 
A .. Sure I knew it was hit. When I got to the crossing I 
<~ould tell I hit a car. · 
Q. Did you know you hit anybody? 
A. I knew I hit a car. I don't suppose the ca.r could have 
gotten up there by itself. 
Q. Did you know whether it was a car or a cow~ 
A. There is quite. a difference in size. 
Q. Yon never saw it, did you 7 
A. I saw it about the time it hit. 
Q. You thought you hit it. You had alre~dy put on your 
emergency brake? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And there wasn't a thing on the face of God's earth you 
could have done after that? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You could not reach down and hold any-
pnge 115 ~ thing?· 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You couldn't drag your foot on the ground ·and stop it 
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or anything of that sort? All you could do was to sit there? 
A. That is about all I could do. 
Q. Yet you let your bell keep on ·ringing when you didn't 
have anything on earth to do. Why didn't you turn it off~ 
A. I told you why I didn't turn it off. 
Q. The emergency was past as far as you were concerned ; 
you put the emergency brake on and were sitting there wait-
ing for the engine to st9p Y 
A. Why should I shut the bell offf 
Q. Did you blow the whistle any more t 
A. ~o, sir. · 
Q. Why not? 
A. It was not necessary. 
Q. Why didn't you cut the bell offY 
A. That was not necessary either. 
Q. Wasn't necessary to cut it offf 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you always let the bell ring? 
page 116 ~ A. Until I see fit to cut it off, yes, sir. 
Q. Have· you ever failed to blow a crossing 
whistle or ring· the bell at a crossing? 
lVIr. Spicer: I object. 
The Court: I don't think that is ptoper testimony in this 
case. 
By Mr. Haw: 
Q. Mr. Gerhardt, you are just assuming that you did all 
this, don't really know you did f 
A. If I didn't know it I wouldn't say it. 
Q. You knew this was a public road crossing? 
A. Certainly I did. 
Q. You knew it was a dangerous crossing, didn't you, Mr. 
Gerhardt? 
.l\ .. I knew it was a rather dangerous crossing. 
Q. It is a rather dangerous crossing, isn't it? 
A. I think the view is obstructed by ~{r. Campbell's store. 
Yes, sir, to a certain extent; but a man can certainly see 
far enough there to keep from g·etting hit. 
Q. You were drifting there, running slow to pick up a car, 
weren't you, 1\{r. Gerhardt~ · 
page 117 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Isn't it a fact that you figured you were run-
ning so slow that it wasn't any use giving any signals? 
A. No, sir, it is not a fact. 
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Witness stood aside. 
page 118 ~ H. S. LOWRY:, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: • 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. Were you fireman of the train that struck 1Ir. Barlow's 
car at Hanover Cou1·t house on the night of :Niarch 20th Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been a fireman1 
A. Fourteen years. 
Q. On the C. & 0. aU that time f 
A. Yes, sir. I have been promoted seven years; that is, 
ntnning off and on. 
Q. You mean you are rated as engineer f 
1\.. Yes, sir. · 
Q. But have been doing firing work 1 
A. Off and on. · 
Q. How long have you been running on this division be-
t ween Richmond and Charlottesville? 
A. Fourteen years. 
Q. vVhere were you sitting as the train approached the sta-
tion at Hanover that night? 
A. Sitting on the fireman's seat box. 
page 119 ~ Q. Which side of the cab is that¥ 
· A. Left hand side. 
Q. Which way were you looking? 
A. Looking ahead. 
Q. You, of course, are familiar with the location of the 
croRsiug at which this accident occurred? 
A. Practically raised there. 
Q. Where were you raised; in Hanover County? 
A. Practically .raised in Hanover . 
. Q. Mr. Lowry, do you kno'v whether or not any crossing· 
~ignals were given by the engineer in approaching this cross-
ing on that occasion¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What signals were given 1 
A. Road crossing signal. 
Q. Just what does that consist of? 
A. Two long and two short blasts of the whistle. 
Q. Was there anything further done, any further signals 
f,riven of any other kind? 
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A. Rang the grade crossing bell approaching the station. 
Q. Do you mean the bell was rung continuously! 
A. Always. 
Q. Was it rung on this occasion f 
page 120 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You remember that· as a fact Y 
A. It was ringing when I got off the engine. 
Q. Is it your recollection that the bell was rung like -it. is 
customarily rung after the whistle warning is given Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did the bell work automatcilly after you started itY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you remember the bell being shut off after you had 
. gotten off the engine! · 
A. I dropped off the engine before the engine stopped. 
Q. You went back to see ? 
A. As soon as we hit the automobile I lit a torch and jumped 
off the engine before it stopped and went back. 
Q. This automobile approached the crossing from your side 
of the engine, did it not Y · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "\Vill you just state where you first saw the automobile 
and where the train was at that time? 
A. I guess the engine was just about in front of the sta-
tion. When I saw the automobile it looked as if it was run-
ning very slow, moving off; it looked as if' he was 
page 121. ~ on the crossing coming down-the main crossing. 
I thought he was on there, and I thought, run-
lling slow like that, he would finally stop it. I did not say 
anything until we got about the platform; I sa:w he was run-
ning parallel with us and saw him when he turned up the 
bank, and when he turned up the bank I knew he was going 
across because the speed was faster. I holloed to the engi-
neer in the usual manner, "Hold 'em"? The automobile 
Rtopped with the wheels right on the rails.' I holloed a second 
time, "I-Iold 'em', and then the automobile·rolled back about 
fhree feet, and I was still watching it, and it hit it just about 
the ·front door~ 
Q. When you holloed ''Hold 'em'' Y ·the first time did Mr. 
Gerhardt do anything or act on that? 
A. He applied the brakes in emergency. 
Q. About how far was the front of the engine from the 
erossing the first time when you holloed? 
A. Just about west of the platform. 
Q. You mean just about the point indicated as the mail 
erane on this blueprint? 
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A. ·Yes, .sir. 
Q. That is the mail crane right there~ (In-
page 122 } eating) 
A. West end of the platform. 
Q. You said when you first saw the automobile it looked lik~ 
j t was on the road tha.t comes across this creek Y 
A. Yes, sir, comes down from 1\!Ir. Campbell's plac~. 
Q. Around in front of the store~ 
A. ·Yes, sir. . . 
Q. It looked like it ·was running very slowly? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was there anything in the way it was being driven that 
indicated to you that it was not going to stop for that train 
to cross? · 
A. Well, as 've approached, as we got nearer to him-
Q. I mean when you first saw him was there anything in 
the way that that car was being driven to indicate to you he . 
was going to try to get across the track in front of the train Y 
A .. Oh, no, sir. We find them approaching the track that 
way every day, you know. 
Q. And slow up and stop Y 
A. Yes, sir, and I thought he was running slow, but just 
as he turned I saw he was running better than I thought he 
was because he was running with us, that is, 
page 123 } he was running kind of oblique with us. 
Q. Not parallel but somewhat oblique? 
A. Yes, sir~ · 
Q. Did you see him slow up at all after he got to the pass-
ing track or did he stop ~ · · • 
A. He stopped the car. 
Q. When did he stop the carY 
A. He came to a stop right on the main line. 
Q. After it had gone on the main line' 
.... ~. Yes, sir. 
Q. About how far was the car as well as you say from the 
main line track when you realized he was going to cross or 
when you holloed to the engineer ''Hold her'' Y How far was 
the automobile from the ·main line track? 
A. He was just turning up the bank-40 feet. 
Q. About 40 feet? 
A. That is 40 feet by the road but would not be that much 
in an air line because it makes a turn. 
Q. When you passed the station I believe you said you saw 
him as you got to the depot Y . 
A. Just about the depot when I first saw the car. 
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Q. Did you have any trouble seeing the cart 
page 124 ~ A. No, sir. 
Q. By reason of darkness~ 
A. No, sir. It was very light there, plenty of light. 
Q.. Was the headlight shining on the crossingf 
A. Our headlight shines on the rail regardless of any 
curve that we have. 
Q. It was shining on the crossing when you saw the car? 
A. We hadn't gotten around that far., but the headlight 
will penetr~ te the rail regardless of ·any degree curve we 
have on the system. 
Q. Did the emergency brakes take effect and the train 
stopf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How many cars did you have¥ 
A. Twenty-seven. 
Q. flow many cars passed the crossing¥ 
A. vVe cut seven cars off to let the automobile through. 
Q. ·That was after you had stopped t 
A. Yes, sir. • 
Q. 1,hat means that the seventh car had not gotten across~ 
A. Was east of the crossing. 
Q. Was there any train or any cars on the pass-
page 125 ~ ing track on either side of the crossing ~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. The passing track being the track that he first ran 
across? · 
A. Yes, sir. That is not a storage track. 
Q. But there were no cars· on there¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. At the time when you first saw this automobile was 
there anything between you and the automobile which would 
obstruct his view or keep him from seeing the engine or the 
headlight? 
A. I did not see any, no, sir~ 
CROSS EXA~IINATION. 
By Ha'Y: . 
Q. Mr. Lowry, wl1ere did you say your engine was 'Yhen 
vou sa'v ~Ir. Barlow's car first 1 ' 
"' A. Just about in front of the depot. 
Q. ,Just about in front of the depotf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You saw him where¥ 
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A. When I saw him I thought he was on the road leading 
right straight across; I did not now the person was leav-
ing Campbell's store. That is the road I thought he was on 
then. When we approached the c.rossing nearer I saw him 
turn up the branch. 
page 126 ~ Q. But you said at first that you thought he 
was on the road going from Mr. Campbell's storeY 
A. No, sir, I said I thought he was on the road that comes 
down from Mr. Campbell's house. 
Q. You said you thought he was on that road~ 
A. Yes, sir, at first, but when I got close to him I saw he· 
wasn't on that road. 
Q. Then you saw him when f.OU were at what point; right 
at the station or past the station or the middle of the station 
or whereY 
A. Just about the telegraph office. 
The Court: Is that the place marked "Signal post"~ 
Mr. Haw: Here is a picture that will show you. 
Q. As a matter of fac.t, lVIr. Lowry. when you we1~e at that 
point you could not see anybody out to the left of Camp-
bell's store, or in front of the store, by reason of the fact 
that the store was between you and any vision there Y Don't 
vou know that? 
• A. No, sir, not unless he was behind the store. 
_page 127 } ~Ir. Haw:: The store was between you and him 
when you thought he was near the bridge 1 · 
Witness: Have you ever stood there and looked over 1 
Mr. Haw: I am asking you if that is not a fact. 
Witness: No, sir, that is not a fact. 
Q. vVhere were you when you saw him go up the bank 1 
A. Just about the west end of the platform. 
Q. ""' ... hen did you l1ollo "Hold her" 7 
A. That is when I holloed. 
Q. Now, ~Ir. Lowry, you talked about this light. You don't 
mean to say· that light follo,vs around a curve do you? 
A. That light will show on a c.urve. We don't have any 
degree curve that that headlight will leave the rail entirely. 
Q. But you don't mean to say it will show clean around a 
curve, do you? 
A. No, sir .. 
Q. It doesn't run in a circle Y 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. In other words, it shows straight ahead and where-
ever it hits the rail you see the rail Y • 
A. It never leaves the rail. 
page 128 ~ Q. It is bound to hit some part of the rail 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
- Q. And if there is a curve so sharp that there is only 20 
feet of rail ahead of you, it wouldn't hit but 20 feet, would 
UY . 
A. That is a 60 degree curve. 
· · Q. How many feet of rail would that hit before you get 
to the west end of the platformY Five feet of the west end 
A. I wouldn't say that. 
Q. When you first saw him coming up the bank the light 
hadn't reached the crossing, had it Y 
A. I didn't say that. He hadn't reached the crossing. 
Q. Do you know that positively or just think soY 
A. I followed that headlight over twelve months around 
there. 
· Q. You don't know where it was that night? 
A. It was very dark. I could not ha:ve seen without that. 
-Q. You know there is a big light at Cambpell's store, two· 
incandescent lights, one on the porch next to the railroad 
and one on the front of the store which makes it as light as 
day in front of that store? 
A. You take an ob~ect between you and a light, you can see 
it very plain; put it beyond the light,' you can't see it very 
good. 
Q. 'rhen there was something between Mr. Bar-
page 129 ~ lo'v and your train which would stop him from 
· seeing· your train, namely, th·e light, because the 
object was beyond the light as far as he was concerned Y 
A. As far as Mr. Campbell's lig·ht was concerned, but the 
headlig-ht was there. 
Q. Your train was ·beyond the light and the light was be-
tween Barlow and the train, 'vas it not-Mr. Campbell's light Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
. Q. Then what applied to you as far as seeing Barlow was 
concerned Hpplied to him as far as seeing the train 'vas con-
cerned; isn't that right Y 
A. I suppose so. 
Q. IR it ~ustomary for you all to let your bell keep on riD:g-
in~ after the train stops Y 
A. I l1ave heard it ring until somebody says, "For God's 
Rake get up and cut it off". 
Q. Didn't anybody say, ''For God's sake cut it off'' that 
night, did they? 
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A. I was:t:l 't up there. I dropped off and went back. 
Q. How long have you. been working for the 
page 1~0 } railroad Y 
A. Fourteen years. 
Q. Still working with them~ 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
By ·Mr. Spicer: 
Q. ·You didn't have any trouble seeing Mr. Barlow on ac-
count of too much light or not enough light, did you 7 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you kno'v any reason why he could not have seen 
you with the headlight of the engine! 
1vir. Ha'v: Don't lead the witness. 
By a Juror: 
Q. Did you see 1\fr. Barlo'v on account of the store light? 
A. No, sir, on account of our ·headlight. . 
By Mr. Haw: . 
Q. You say you saw Barlow when he was below Campbell's 
store, looked like he was going in the road; you didn't see 
him go in it, did you f 
A. No, sir, I could see him by the lights of the store. 
Q. Weren't the store lights between you and Barlow then? · 
A. Yes, sir. . -
Q. Why was it you say the second time you saw 
page 131 ~ him by the headlight and not by the store light T 
A. Be(1ause he was beyond the lights of the 
store. 
Q. Then the store lights didn't bother you, did. they? 
A. No, sir. 
Rv the Court: 
· Q. Did you see any other automobile down there~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. As he w~nt across? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. I am talking about before the accident, did you see more 
than one automobile? 
A. No, sir. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. You didn't see any car going across the track as you 
approached Hanover Station? 
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A. No, sir. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 132 ~ D. H. MEE·KS, 
a witness on behalf of the· defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
By 1\f r. Spicer: 
Q. Were you brakeman on the train that struck ]\{r. Bar-
low's car at Hanover Court house on March 20th f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you front brakeman f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you about the ·time the train passed the 
depot at Hanover Y 
A. I was standing on the right side. 
Q. On the engineer's side! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In the cab~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you hear any crossing signals being given by Mr. 
·Gerhardt, the engineer Y 
A. I heard him blow the whistle. 
Q. Heard him blow the whistle 1 
page 133 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Hear any other signal Y 
A. Bell was ringing. 
Q. Bell was ringing Y 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recall whether he gave the regular crossing 
~ignal Y 
A. Yes, sir, two longs and two shorts. 
Q. Did the bell ring Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Until after the accident 1 . 
A. After the accident. After we got back down to the 
crossing where the car \Vas hit the bell was ringing then. 
Q. You got off the engine and went back to the crossing~ 
A. Yes, sir, with Mr. Lo,vry, the fireman. 
Q. Did you hear ]\{r. Lowry hollo any signal to 1\{r. Ger-
hardt, the engineer Y 
A. I heard him hollo ''Hold 'em'' I 
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Q. Did Mr. Gerhardt act on that signal! 
A. Yes, sir, applied the emergency. 
Q. Was the train expected to stop at Hanover that night'? 
A. Yes, sir, we had a message to pick up a car 
page 134 } there. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Ha,v: 
Q. What were you doing in the engineY . 
A. That is where I am supposed to be-head brakeman. 
Q. What were you doing in there? I don't mean 'vhat 
was your business there. What were you doing there 7 
The Court: What were you doing there? 
A. I was standing up looking for the car. I got up off the 
left side and walked over on the ri'ght to see if the car was 
in the spur track. 
Q. "\Vas your head out of the window 7 
A. Standing in the gangway. 
Q. Were yqu hanging out of the engine looking out? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Hanging on the outside of the engine? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. The gangway is between the tender and engine? 
A. Y es1 sir, and the cab. Q. Were you look~ng through the window 111 
page 135 } front of the engineer or one side 1 
A. Looking out the gangway where you get up. 
Q. Had your head sticking out 7 
A. Yes, sir. , · 
Q. You are still working for the C. & 0.? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 136 } S. S. WHEELER, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF. 
By 1\fr. Spicer: 
Q. Mr. Wheeler, were you conductor on the train that 
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struck Nir. Barlow's car at Hanover Court house on March 
20th~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you in the train at the time of the accident1 
A. In the caboose on the rear of the train. 
Q. About how many cars were on the train f 
A. Well, we had (I will not say positively), I would say, !>e-
tween 25 and ~0. Some have said 27, so I think that is cor-
rect. I would say be.tween 25 and 30 . because I don't know 
positively, but between 25 and 30. 
Q. You were at the rear end of the train? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. In the caboose Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was it your intention to make a stop at Hanover and 
pick up a car that night? . 
A. Yes, sir, I had a message to pick up a car there. 
Q. Located in the caboose and 27 cars from the 
page 137 ~ engine, would you ordinarily be able to hear the 
whistle blow or bell ring? 
A. No, sir, not unless under favorable conditions I might 
hear it. What I mean by that is weather conditions. If it is 
cloudy a.nd everything still and not much noise I might hear 
it, but I could not hear the distance of 27 cars the bell but I 
might hear the whistle. I don't hear the whistle very often, 
not all the time; might hear it occasionally, but everything 
would have to be very favorable if you heard th~ bell and 
whistle that distan~e. 
Q. Do you recall whether you heard it on this occasion 
A. No, sir, I didn't hear it. I could not say whether the 
bell was ringing or he blew the whistle or not. 
Q. Did you go up to the scene .of the accident after the 
train stopped ~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Barlowf 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did you have any conversation with him? 
A. No, sir, not especially with Mr. Barlow. 
page 138 ~ Q. Did he make a.ny remarks or comment? 
A. I retp.ember very distinctly 
1\t[r. lia.'v: I object to any remark Mr. Barlow made be-
cause the evidence is the man 'vas pretty badly injured. It 
seems it would not be exactly fair. 
The Court: I think that would go to the question of credi-
bility .. Answer it. Did you know .it was :Mr. Barlow? 
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By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. ·You know Mr. Barlow when you see him Y 
A. Yes, sir. I recognize that gentleman (Pointing to plain-
tiff) as being the gentleman we struck a.t the crossing. The 
gentleman is sitting 1·ight there. 
Mr. Haw: We object to any statement made to him by ·Mr. 
Barlow. It is excepted to. · . 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. If he said anything, what did he say, 'vliat did you 
hear him say f 
A. ~Ir. Barlo'v said, as I recall, ''How "did I get on the 
track", or "How came me on the track"Y or something to that 
ninount. That 'Yas about the only thing that I can recall him 
saying- especially. He either said, "Ho'v ~id I get on the 
track'' ? or ''How ~arne me on the track'' Y or 
page 139} something of that amount. 
Q. Was there anything else he said? 
.lt. No. sir. I suggested that 've take him to a doctor. I 
Raid, "We must p;et him to a. doctor and s.ee if he is hurt bad''. 
1Vfr. Campbell was standing by .. He said, "That is all right, 
Captain. I will take cha!ge of him and take him to the doc-
tor". Mr. Barlow then was standing in the road with possi-
1-:ly a half a dozen men around, and I took the names of one 
or two other men present, but I haven't the ,record here. I 
l0oked for it yesterday lJut couldn't find it. He says, "That 
is all rig-ht Captain. I will take charge of him; I will take him 
to the doctor". T said, "I will cut the train off so you can 
~et across'', and I cut the crossing and Mr. Cam-pbell led 
1vfr. Barlow into the car and they went aeross the track. 
'l~ha t is the last I saw of him. 
By the Court : 
Q. What was the condition of ~{r. Barlow at that time Y 
A. Mr. Barlow seemed to be in what I would call a dazed 
. eondition. He didn't seem to knO\V just what he was talking 
n bout. If you will excuse the remark, of course I don't mean 
to say that 1w was, but. I was under the impression at the 
t:ime that l1e was drinky or something, but Mr. Campbell re-
marked to me "Mr. Barlo"r is not drinky; he is 
page 140)~ simply knocked out; he just came out of my 
store". He was in a dazed condition. I haven't 
said anything except what I know he said. lie made the re-
mark ''How came me on the track'' f or ''How did I get on 
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the track''~ and made some other remark, but it was. along 
the same line as a man that didn'tknow what he was talking 
about. You understand, the remarks he made were along that 
line. I cut the crossing and 1.\{r. Campbell took him in a car 
and said he "~as going to t.ake· him to a doct.or. 
CROSS EXAMIN1\TION. 
By 1\ir. Haw: 
Q. 1.\fr. Wheeler, the man bad just gotten up off of the 
ground with his head cut open and bleeding from his headY 
A. I saw a little blood trickling down from his hat or cap, 
whichever he had on. 
Q. Under the circumstances it is very natural he should 
have been stunned and not able to remember just what 
happened, isn't it Y 
A. I was under the impression he was not ra-
page 141 ~ tional, he did not know what he was talking 
about. 
Q. He had just been hit by the train? 
A. I couldn't say that. 
Q. You knew a. mhn was in the car didn't you~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You did notf 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Who did you think it was-just an innocent bystander 
A. No, sir. Of course, I am persuaded likf\ anybody else 
that he was the man, but being 27 cars away I couldn't say 
the train ever hit him. 
Q. You understood he was the man that was hit Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You knew he had just been picked off the ground Y 
A. When I got there he was standing in the road with pos.,. 
sibly half a dozen men around him. 
Q. He was the ina.n that had been hit, you understood? 
A. I suppose so. 
Q. He had blood running down his face? 
page 142 } A. Some little blood trickling down his head. 
Q. He seemed to be pretty well dazed¥ · 
A. He seemed to be what you might term a little knocked 
out. T-le didn't know exactly what he was talking about. 
. Q. You don't mean to say he was drunk or anything of 
that sort? 
A. No, sir. I said, being a stranger to me, he would put 
you in mind of a man who was under the influence of some-
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thing of that sort. I wouldn't say he ever took a drink in 
his life. 
Q. In other words, he was dazed and in the same fix a man 
would be if he was drunk ? . 
A.. He didn't seem to know what he was talking about. His 
conversation was such you would not think he knew what he 
was talking about. 
Witness stood aside. 
Defendant Rests. 
page 143 ~ J. M. CAMPBELL, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being recalled 
in rebuttal, further testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CIDEF. 
By J\tir. Haw: 
Q. J\tir. Campbell, I predicate my question that I do not 
know that there is any charge of drinking made, but it was a 
remark by one of the witnesses that might lea.ve the impres-
sion that J\tir. Barlow might ha:ve been intoxicated that night. 
Will you tell the jury ·whether or not he is a drinking man 1 
A. He it not, and he certainly was not, and, even if he ever 
had one in his life, I don't think he had one that night.· 
1\t[r. Spicer: We don't contend that. 
~{r. Ha:w: I just wanted to clear up any doubt on that: 
Witness stood aside. 
Testimony Closed. 
page 144 ~ And this being all the evidence in the case, 
the jury, having been instructed by the court 
n nd after having heard the arguments of counsel, retired to 
their room, and later returned into court with the verdict, 
'vhich is set out in the orders of court herein. And there-
upon the defendant, by counsel, moved the court to set aside 
the verdict of the jury and enter up judgment for the de-
. fendant, or at the least award it a new trial, upon the fol-
lowing grounds : 
1. Verdict contrary to tl1e la'v and evidence and without 
evidence to support it. 
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2. Error of the court in the admission of certain testimony 
of the plaintiff, as heretofore pointed out. 
3. Error of the court in granting any instructions author-
izing a recovery by the plaintiff. · 
. 4. Error of the court in granting, on motion of the plain-
till\ Instruction No. 1. 
5. The damages awarded by the jury are excessive and 
without evidence to support them. · 
But the court overruled said motion and entered up judg-
ment for· the plaintiff on the verdict of the jury, to which 
ruling and action of the court in overruling the motion to set 
aside the verdict of the jury and enter up judgment for the 
defendant, or award it a new trial, and in entered up judg-
ment for the plaintiff upon the verdict of the jury, the de-
fendant, by counsel, excepted upon the grounds set forth, 
and tenders this its Bill. of Exceptions No. 1, and prays that 
the same may be signed, sealed and made a part of the record 
in this cause, which is accordingly done on this 29 day of 
,June, 1929, within the time prescribed by law, and after rea-
sonable notice in writing to counsel for tlie plaintiff, as re-
quired by la,v. 
F,RANI( ARMISTEAD, Judge. (Seal) 
page 145 ~ Virginia, 
· In the Circuit Court of Hanover County. 
1\L L. Barlow 
v. 
rrhe Chesapeake rtnd Ohio Railway Company. 
DEFENDANT'S BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO.2. 
Be It Remembered that on the trial of this case and after 
the jury ha.d been selected and sworn and after the evidence 
had been introduced before the jury, 'vhich evidence is set 
ont in defendant's Bill of Exceptions No. 1, the plaintiff, by 
counsel, moved the court to give to the jury the follo,ving in-
structions, numbered respectively 1, 2 and 3. · 
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PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTIONS 
(1) 
The court instructs the jury that, if they believe from the 
cvid~nce .in this case, that the approach to the crossing wh~re 
the plaintiff was struck was extraordinarily dangerous, then 
it was the duty of the servants of the defendant to exercise 
extraordinary care to prevent injury to persons about to cross 
over on said crossing, and it was also the duty of the plain-
tiff to use extraordinary care for his safety in crossing and 
as to whether such care was used or adopted by the defend-
ant's servants or by the plaintiff in conformity with the dan-
ger of the crossing, is a question for the jury to determine. 
(2) 
The court instructs the jury that the statute law of Vir-
ginia re·quires the operatives of every engine on a steam 
railway, when approaching a grade crossing thereon, to sound 
its whistle at least twice at a distance of not less· than 300 
yards and not more than 600 yards from such crossing, and to 
ring- its bell or sound its ·whistle continuously or 
page 146 ~ alternately until such ~rossing is reached; there-
fore the court further instructs the jury that if 
they shall believe from the evidence that the freight train of 
tho defendant company, on the night of March 20, 1928, ran 
into and collided with the automobile of the plaintiff at and on 
the grade crossing over the defendant's railway just west 
of Hanover Stat1on, and that before it reached the crossing 
the operatives of the defendant's engine failed to perform any 
one of the statutory duties required of it by law and above 
enumerated, and such failure was the proximate cause of the 
accident and that the plaintiff was injured and his automo-
bile was damaged by said collision, you shall find for the 
plaintiff, even though. you shall believe from the evidence that 
the plaintiff, Barlow, was negligent in any respect in ap-
proaching or attempting to cross over said crossing, and his 
negligence contributed to the accident nevertheless you shall 
find for the plaintiff, l1owever you may consider such negli-
gence of the plaintiff, if any, in mitigation of- damages. 
pq 
r:rhe court instructs the jury that, should they find for the 
plaintiff they shall award to him such damages as shall seem 
to them 'fair and just in the light of the evidence, but not in 
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excess of amount sued for, and in ascertaining such damages 
they may take into consideration: 
First: To what extend was the plaintiff injured., 
Second: Whether his injuries or any of them are perma-
nent; 
r:rhird: His pain, suffering and loss of time from his busi-
ness; 
Fourth: To what extent his earning capacity has been cur-
tailed, if at all ; 
Fifth: The age, nature of employment and earning capacity 
of the plain tiff; 
Sixth: What amount he has spent or incurred in hospital 
bills, doctors' bills and medicines, by reason of his ·injuries; 
Seventh: The extend and amount of damages to his auto-
mobile. 
page 147 ~ The defendant, by counsel, objected to the giv-
ing of any instruction by the court which author-
ized a recovery by the plaintiff on the ground that the phy-
sical facts and othe~ evidence afirmatively showed,·as a matter· 
of law, that tlle plaintiff's own negligent act of driving his 
. automobile immediately in front of the train was the sole 
proximate cause of the accident; that ftrrespective of any 
finding of negligence on the part of the defendant the evi-
dence showed, as a matter of law, that. such negligence, if 
existent, had no causal relation to the accident. 
In addition to these general objections the defendant fur-
ther objected specifically to the giving of Instruction No. 1, 
upon the following grounds: 
(1) No evidence to support any contention that the crossing 
was ''extraordinarily dangerous''; 
(2) That the notice of motion did not charge that the 
crossing was ''extraordinarily dangerous'' ; 
(3) !!'hat it was undisputed that at a distance of 30 feet 
from the tracl\ on which the train was running, plaintiff had a 
clear unobstructed vision for 600, or more, feet in the direction 
from which the train was approaching; 
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( 4) That in any event the defendant was only required to 
exercise ''ordinary" care, as contracted with "extraordi-
nary'' care. 
The defendant further objected specifically to the giving 
of Instruction No. 2, upon the ground that it did not compel 
the jury to diminish damages because of the plaintiff's neg-
ligence. 
But the court overruled each and every one of said objec-
tions and gave all of said instructions offered by the plaintiff, 
to the jury, to which rulings and actions of th~ court the de-
fendant, by counsel, excepted, upon the grounds set forth 
above, respectively. 
Subject to the general objections he1~einbefore noted, de-
fendant, by counsel, moved the court to give to the jury the 
following instructions numbered 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, and the 
court gave each and every one of said instructions: 
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(4) 
The court instructs the jury that the mere facts that a 
collision occurred between the defendant's train and an auto-
mobile driven by the plaintiff raises no presumption what-
ever that the defendant was negligent. The court further 
instructs the jury that the burden of proof is upon the plain-
tiff to show by a preponderance of legal evidence that the 
defendant was guilty of negligence p.roximately causing the 
accident, and unless the jury shall believe that there is such 
prepondering evidence in this case they shall find for the 
defendant. 
(5) 
'rhe Court instructs the jury that a railroad train is en-
titled to the right of way in preference to an automobile 
where the two are approaching a railroad crossing at approxi-
mately the same time, and that in such a case it is the duty 
of the driver of the automobile to stop his automobile in or-
der to give the right of way to the train, provided he saw or 
ought to have seen the train approaching. 
134 f:;upreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
(6) 
rrhe court instructs the jury that a railroad track is of it-
. He If a notice of danger and a person approaching a railroad 
crossing in an automobile must not only look and listen in 
hoth directions for approaching trains, but must discharge 
this duty in a way to make such acts effective. And if the 
jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff in the in-
stant case did not look and listen in both directions as he 
npproAehed the crossing, or that he did not continue to .look 
and listen so as to make such looking and listening effective 
in both directions before driving upon the defendant's main 
liue track, the plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter 
of law. 
(7) 
The Court instructs the jury that where ·employees in 
eharge of a train see an automobile approaching a railroad 
crossing in full view of the train for a distance 
pnge 149 ~ from the crossing sufficient to enable the driver of 
the automobile to stop before going upon the 
crossing, such employees in the absence of other circum-
Rtances are justified in presuming that the driver will stop 
the automobile at a safe distance from the erossing, and un-
less otherwise at fault it is not negligence on the part of such 
employees to act on this presumption intil they have reason-
able cause to believe that tl1e driver of the automobile is ob-
Hvious of l1is danger or for other cause. is not going to stop, 
l'ut is entering upon the crossing in front of the approaching 
train. 
(8) 
rrhe Court instructs the jury that even though they may 
lJelieve from the evidence that the enginemen in charge of the 
defendant's train in approaching the erossing did not give the 
warning signals specified by la,v, yet if they further believe 
from the evidence that there were available to the plaintiff 
as he approached the crossing other timely means of notice 
of the approach of the train, of which the plaintiff failed to 
take heed, and that the act of the plaintiff in failing to take 
heed of such means of notice and in driving on the defend-
ant's main line traek in the face of the approaching train 
was the sole proximate cause of the accident, then they shall 
fincl for the defendant. 
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(9) 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe frorp. the 
evidence that the operatives of the defendant's train sounded 
the train whistle at least twice at a distance of not more than 
600 yards and not less than 300 yards from the crossing, 
and therefore rang its engine bell continuously until the cross-
ing was reached, then they shall find for the defendant. 
To which rulings and actions of the court in giving any 
instructions which authorized a recovery by the plaintiff, and 
in giving Instruction Nos. 1 and 2, the defendant, by counsel, 
excepted and tenders this its Bill of Exceptions No. 2, and 
prays tha.t the same may be signed, sealed and made a part 
of the record in this cause, which is accordingly done on this 
29 day of June, 1929, within the time prescribed 
page 150 ~ by law and after reasonable notice in writing to 
counsel for the plaintiff, as reqired by law. . 
FR.ANK: ARMISTEAD, Judge. (~Seal) 
page 151 ~ Virginia : 
j\f. L. Barlow 
v. 
In the Circuit Court of Hanover County. 
~Phe Chesapeake and Ohio. R.ailway Company . 
. DEFENDANT'S BII.JL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 3. 
. i 
BE It RE1VIEMBERED that on the trial of this case, dur-
ing the examination.,in-chief of M. L. Barlow, the plaintiff, by 
counsel for the plaintiff, and after he had testified, as set out 
in defendant's Bill of Exceptions ·No. 1, the following oc-
curred: 
'' Q. l\Ir. Barlow, did the train blow the whistle at all for 
tJwt crossing? 
A. I never heard the sound of a. whistle. 
Q. Did you notice whether the. bell 'vas ringing or not? 
A. I will hold up my band to God that no bell ·was ringing. · 
Q. "\Vas there any whistle blowing when it struck you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q1 'Vas there any bell ringing? 
A. No, sir, not a sound of a bell ringing. The last thing 
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I remember that passed through my mind I knew the train 
would hit me- · · 
Mr. Spicer: I object to that form of testimony as to his 
opinion. He can testify as to facts. 
The Court: I think impressions made on him are proper. 
By Mr. Haw: 
Q. Can you say what passed through your .mind1 
A. It passed through my mind that if the belJ had been 
ringing I never would have been hit. I knew the train .was 
right at me.'' 
'rhereupon the defendant, by counsel, objected to the evi-
dence as set out above and moved to strike it out as being 
purely opinion evidence and therefore inadmis-
page 152 ~ sible, which objection the court overruled and 
allowed the evidence to go to the jury, to which 
ruling and action of the court the defendant, by counsel, ex-
cepted, upon the ground set forth above, and tenders this ~ts 
Bill of Exceptions No. 3, and prays that the same may be 
signed, sealed and made a part of the record in this cause, 
'vhich is accordingly done on the 29 day of June, 1929, within 
the time prescribed by law and after reasonable notice in 
writing to counsel for the plaintiff, ·as required by law. 
F~ANJ( ARJ)!IISTEAD, Judge. (Seal) 
page 153 ~ I, C. "\V. Taylor, Clerk of the Circuit Court for 
the County of Hanover, do hereby certify that 
the foregoing is a true transcript of the record in the above 
styled suit of M. L. Barlow vs. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway 
Company and that the bond required by the order of June 
29; 1929, has been duly executed. 
Given under my hand this 12th day of August 1929. 
Teste: 
C. W. TAYLOR, Clerk. 
Clerk's Fee $30.00. 
A Copy-Teste: 
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